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Bargaining in legislatures is conducted according to formal rules specifying who may make proposals and how they will be decided. Legislative outcomes depend on those rules and on the structure of the legislature. Although the social choice literature provides theories about voting equilibria, it does not endogenize the formation of the agenda on which the voting is based and rarely takes into account the institutional structure found in legislatures. In our theory members of the legislature act noncooperatively in choosing strategies to serve their own districts, explicitly taking into account the strategies members adopt in response to the sequential nature of proposal making and voting. The model permits the characterization of a legislative equilibrium reflecting the structure of the legislature and also allows consideration of the choice of elements of that structure in a context in which the standard, institution-free model of social choice theory yields no equilibrium.

This article presents a method for analyzing the extent and strength of coattail voting in presidential elections. This method allows the authors to estimate the magnitude of coattail voting and then to decompose this estimate into more "basic" elements. Estimates are given for presidential elections beginning with 1956.The determination of the coattail vote and its decomposition depend on the theory of the voting decision that is assumed. In this article we present a model of vote determination that is similar in most respects to the traditional SRC model; the vote for congressional representation in a presidential election year is determined jointly by partisan affiliation, attitudes toward the presidential candidates, and local forces unique to the congressional race (such as may be captured by an incumbency variable). This model permits the separate estimation of the strength of short-term forces and of the efficiency of the presidential coattails.Application of the model to survey data since 1956 indicates that efficiency of presidential coattails has declined during this period. Furthermore, the 1980 election does not appear to be an exception to this trend. On the other hand there has not been any particular trend in the strength of short-term forces during this period; instead events peculiar to the context of a specific election generate short-term forces at the level of the presidential election, but the degree to which these forces are carried over to local races seems to have declined.

THIS ARTICLE PRESENTS A METHOD FOR ANALYZING THE EXTENT AND STRENGTH OF COATTAIL VOTING IN PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS. THIS METHOD ALLOWS THE AUTHORS TO ESTIMATE THE MAGNITUDE OF COATTAIL VOTING AND THEN TO DECOMPOSE THIS ESTIMATE INTO MORE "BASIC" ELEMENTS. ESTIMATES ARE GIVEN FOR PRESIDENTIAL ELECTIONS BEGINNING WITH 1956. THE DETERMINATION OF THE COATTAIL VOTE AND ITS DECOMPOSITION DEPEND ON THE THEORY OF THE VOTING DECISION THAT IS ASSUMED. IN THIS ARTICLE WE PRESENT A MODEL OF VOTE DETERMINATION THAT IS SIMILAR IN MOST RESPECTS TO THE TRADITIONAL SRC MODEL; THE VOTE FOR CONGRESSIONAL REPRESENTATION IN A PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION YEAR IS DETERMINED JOINTLY BY PARTISAN AFFILIATION, ATTITUDES TOWARD THE PRESIDENTIAL CANDIDATES, AND LOCAL FORCES UNIQUE TO THE CONGRESSIONAL RACE (SUCH AS MAY BE CAPTURED BY AN INCUMBENCY VARIABLE). THIS MODEL PERMITS THE SEPARATE ESTIMATION OF THE STRENGTH OF SHORT-TERM FORCES AND OF THE EFFICIENCY OF THE PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS. APPLICATION OF THE MODEL TO SURVEY DATA SINCE 1956 INDICATES THAT EFFICIENCY OF PRESIDENTIAL COATTAILS HAS DECLINED DURING THIS PERIOD. FURTHERMORE, THE 1980 ELECTION DOES NOT APPEAR TO BE AN EXCEPTION TO THIS TREND. ON THE OTHER HAND THERE HAS NOT BEEN ANY PARTICULAR TREND IN THE STRENGTH OF SHORT-TERM FORCES DURING THIS PERIOD; INSTEAD EVENTS PECULIAR TO THE CONTEXT OF A SPECIFIC ELECTION GENERATE SHORTTERM FORCES AT THE LEVEL OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTION, BUT THE DEGREE TO WHICH THESE FORCES ARE CARRIED OVER TO LOCAL RAPY: 1983

Political scientists for some time have questioned the value of party identification in the British context. The most popular objection has been that party identification appears to be less stable and less independent from the vote in Great Britain than in the United States. We attempt to demonstrate that the first objection is based on strong assumptions about how to deal with minor party identifiers and independents while the second can be disputed by showing that short-term forces, and not just measurement error, cause party identification and the vote to covary imperfectly. The analysis is carried out with the original Butler and Stokes data.

Many empirical investigations indicate that information is scarce and therefore costly to holders and seekers of public office. Indeed, some studies suggest that imperfect information may account for important aspects of the behavior of politicians. Nevertheless, there is as yet no theoretical investigation of political decision making that illustrates the impact of costly information or behavior.In this paper the authors develop a model of electoral competition in which the candidates are only imperfectly aware of public preferences over issues and in which they may have the opportunity to increase the amount of information they hold at some cost. It turns out that the absence of perfect information profoundly affects the strategic structure of candidate competition. If information is costless, two-party electoral contests are naturally modeled as symmetric two-person zero-sum games. However, if candidates have distinct beliefs about voter behavior, the natural game-theoretic representation becomes a non-zero-sum game. This article is concerned mostly with analyzing the consequences of this transformation.

A discussion is presented to clarify the relationship between the consistency of social choice & the necessity for other moderate inequality in the distribution of power in society. An examination is made of numerous consistency conditions weaker than those used in classical papers, & of a variety of axioms regulating the distribution of power. It was found that the more egalitarian a society is required to be, the less consistent it can be. Results for social choice functions are presented to satisfy a weaker set of consistency requirements than those traditionally used. In this case, the power structure is not necessarily oligarchy; power can reside with a small group, or social choice can be indecisive. M. Cain.

During the period in which our article (APSR vol. 68 [June 1974]) circulated in manuscript form it provoked an unusual amount of collegial reaction. Of course, we were quite prepared for a reaction from those who use decision-theoretic models in their research—they were our intended audience. More surprisingly, we also received comments from less directly involved bystanders—a medieval historian for example. All this correspondence indicates to us that nearly everyone has his own theory of how voters behave, and that most such theories do not agree with the one presented in our article. The comments of Professors Tullock, Beck, Mayer and Good, and Stephens further support this conclusion.In an appendix to this note we have responded to the imaginative point raised by Tullock. As for the traditional questions raised by our other critics, however, we adopt a different line of rebuttal. Rather than conduct an unfruitful debate over the a priori plausibility of the minimax regret model we will do something that theorists too seldom do: examine some data. Before doing so we will make an important distinction between using a model prescriptively and using it descriptively. (Decision-theoretic types tend to move a bit too easily from one usage to the other.) Then, after reviewing the major point of our article we will turn to the data.

Various analysts have noted that the decision to vote in mass elections is difficult to justify from the standpoint of an expected utility maximization model. Put simply, the probability that a citizen's vote will affect the outcome is so small that the expected gains from voting are outweighed by the costs in time and effort. Such analyses treat rational behavior as synonymous with expected utility maximization. In this paper we show that an alternative criterion for decision making under uncertainty, minimax regret, specifies voting under quite general conditions. Both two and three candidate plurality elections are considered. Interestingly, a minimax regret decision maker never votes for his second choice in a three candidate election, whereas expected utility maximizers clearly may. Thus, the model proposed has implications for candidate choice as well as turnout.