Suchergebnisse

AbstractElection skepticism has become a persistent feature of American politics since the Obama era. Such beliefs are most prevalent among White Americans and especially Republicans, and they are resistant to change. Conspiracy theory studies have shown that such beliefs are linked to feelings of ingroup victimization, at times associated with election loss. We draw on theories of White ingroup processes to argue that White grievance—the belief that Whites are victims of discrimination—is a key correlate of election skepticism among White Americans. White grievance was employed in the Obama era, but it was weaponized by Trump in the 2020 election. Our results based on four national datasets (2012–2020 ANES, 2021 YouGov) show that controlling for negative outgroup attitudes and other factors, White grievance is a significant predictor of election skepticism in all four studies. In 2020, the effect is stronger among White Republicans and independents. We also show that White identity/consciousness has the opposite effect, generally boosting trust in elections. Furthermore, a lagged dependent variable model using the 2016–2020 ANES panel shows that White grievance remains significant even after an LDV is included in the model.

AbstractObjectiveKnowledge on anti‐semitism and its effects as an attitude is limited. We seek to assess its relationship with other out‐group measures and its predictive ability on political judgments. We seek to (a) study the properties of a measure of anti‐semitism; (b) explore the relationship between anti‐semitism and other frequently used measures of out‐group attitudes; (c) assess the key demographic predictors of endorsement of anti‐semitic beliefs; (d) evaluate the predictive ability of our measure of anti‐semitism in models predicting support for the QAnon conspiracy theory and vote for Trump in the 2020 election.Data and MethodsThis study utilizes two national online surveys fielded in January and August 2020 that are weighted to match the U.S. population. We utilize a Bayesian factor analytic approach to assess the relationship between various out‐group measures. We also use regression analyses to predict the correlates of anti‐semitism and to test the relationship between anti‐semitism and support for QAnon and for Trump.ResultsOur results show that anti‐semitism shares more variance with xenophobia than anti‐black prejudice suggesting that people tend to perceive Jews as national outsiders not as racial others. Furthermore, anti‐semitism is a strong positive predictor of both support for QAnon and intent to vote for Donald Trump.

ObjectiveWe theorize that anxiety (fear) related to mass shootings and social violence increases support for gun control among the American public.MethodsWe support our theory with a regression discontinuity analysis based on an actual mass shooting, observational analyses from the same data set testing the relationship between fear and support for gun control, and two survey experiments that prime anxiety in the context of mass shootings and social violence.FindingsWe show that support for gun control increased on the day after an actual mass shooting. Observational analysis shows a positive correlation between fear of crime and support for gun control. One priming experiment shows that inducing anxiety about mass shootings increases support for gun control. A second priming experiment shows that exposure to a story about social violence activates anxiety and also increases support for gun control.ConclusionsOur analyses show that anxiety related to mass shootings and mass violence increases support for gun control.

AbstractObjectiveScholars have reached conflicting results as to the relative importance of cultural and economic threats to majority group receptivity to immigrants and refugees. This study seeks to test whether cultural or economic threat has a stronger influence on white Americans' receptivity to Syrian refugees.MethodWe designed a 2 × 2 priming experiment fielded among white Americans in 2015 that varies both the religion of Syrian refugees to be admitted to the United States (Christian vs. Muslim) and the material costs of refugee admission (economic burden vs. no economic burden).ResultsThe results show that cultural threat (Muslim religion) is not by itself sufficient to induce a decline in receptivity among white Americans. Instead, it is the combination of cultural and economic threats that leads to lower levels of refugee acceptance.ConclusionCultural threat, especially when it comes to religious "others," may not operate alone but in conjunction with material fears.

Gun ownership is a key predictor of gun policy preferences, political advocacy on behalf of gun rights, and political engagement. Theories have linked both racial and gender ideologies to gun ownership among white Americans, but the evidence is spotty. Statistical analyses provide some limited confirmation that racial resentment is a key predictor of gun ownership, but the role of sexism has not been tested quantitatively especially in conjunction with racial resentment. We use the 2004–2016 ANES and a 2015 Gun Survey to statistically test the relative importance of racial resentment and sexism in predicting gun ownership, rationales for owning firearms, and NRA membership among whites. We find strong evidence that racial resentment is associated with gun ownership, rationales for owning firearms, and NRA membership, but the results for sexism are generally not consistent with expectations.

ObjectiveMany studies investigating contact theory have suggested that contact effects are not universal but rather conditional. In this article, we test one form of conditional contact effects. Our approach posits that contact with out‐groups produces support for pro‐minority public policies only when in‐group members are not subject to contrary messages from co‐partisans.MethodsWe use data from an original survey to test this theory in the immigration policy domain.ResultsWe find strong confirmatory evidence that the emergence of contact effects on support for a path to citizenship for undocumented immigrants is dependent on party identification.ConclusionWhen information from the social environment and that from the party coincide, they reinforce each other, producing more tolerant policy preferences. However, when the two are not congruent, individuals may use partisanship to help interpret contextual information, thus canceling out the positive effects of intergroup contact on policy opinions.

AbstractHeeding the call of the special issue, we look at the past decade's advances in public opinion studies of our understanding of the relationship between white racial identities, attitudes, and presidential voting preferences. Following a short review of developments in the literature during the Obama years, we critically evaluated four theories explaining whites' support for Trump: racial resentment, xenophobia, sexism, and white identity. Using data from three ANES studies, we test the relative explanatory power of all four approaches in predicting a vote for Trump during the 2016 Republican primary, the 2016 election, and intent to vote for him in 2020. The results suggest that xenophobia had the most consistent effect across all models, followed by racial resentment and sexism. White identity appears to have influenced voting for Trump in the primary and it could also have an impact in the 2020 election, but its effect in the 2016 general election does not appear to have been consistent with theoretical expectations. Finally, we use these results to think critically about the state of the field and propose new questions and challenges for research.