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Given the bleak prospects for a global agreement on coordinated policies to mitigate climate change, political pressure is increasing among industrialized countries for unilateral abatement. A major challenge thereby is the appropriate response to the threat of emissions leakage. Border carbon adjustments and output-based allocation of emissions allowances can increase effectiveness of unilateral action but introduce distortions of their own. We assess the relative attractiveness of these anti-leakage measures as a function of the abatement coalition size. We first develop a partial equilibrium analytical framework to gain generic insights on how these instruments affect emissions within and outside the coalition. We then employ a large-scale computable general equilibrium model of international trade and energy use to assess the cost-effectiveness of alternative anti-leakage strategies as the coalition evolves toward global coverage. We find that full border adjustments rank first in global cost-effectiveness, followed by import tariffs and then output-based rebates. The differences across anti-leakage measures and the overall appeal of such measures decline with the size of the abatement coalition. In terms of cost incidence, the abatement coalition prefers border carbon adjustments over output-based rebates; the opposite holds true for countries outside the coalition.

Abstract
Individual countries are in the process of legislating responses to the challenges posed by climate change. The prospect of rising carbon prices raises concerns in these nations about the effects on the competitiveness of their own energy-intensive industries and the potential for carbon leakage, particularly leakage to emerging economies that lack comparable regulation. In response, certain developed countries are proposing controversial trade-related measures and allowance allocation designs to complement their climate policies. Missing from much of the debate on trade-related measures is a broader understanding of how climate policies implemented unilaterally (or subglobally) affect all countries in the global trading system. Arguably, the largest impacts are from the targeted carbon pricing itself, which generates macroeconomic effects, terms-of-trade changes, and shifts in global energy demand and prices; it also changes the relative prices of certain energy-intensive goods. This paper studies how climate policies implemented in certain major economies (the European Union and the United States) affect the global distribution of economic and environmental outcomes and how these outcomes may be altered by complementary policies aimed at addressing carbon leakage.

Individual OECD countries are in the process of legislating responses to the challenges posed by climate change. The prospect of rising carbon prices raises concerns in these nations of the impacts on the competitiveness of their own energy intensive industries and the potential for carbon leakage, particularly to emerging economies that lack comparable regulation. As a response, controversial trade-related measures and allowance allocation designs are being proposed to complement their climate policies. Missing from much of the debate on trade-related measures is a broader understanding about how climate policies implemented unilaterally (or sub-globally) affect all countries in the global trading system. Arguably, the largest impacts are from the targeted carbon pricing itself, which generates macroeconomic effects, terms-of-trade changes, and shifts in global energy demand and prices, in addition to changing the relative prices of certain energy-intensive goods. This paper studies how climate policies implemented in certain major economies (the EU and the US) affect the global distribution of economic and environmental outcomes, and how these outcomes may be altered by a variety of complementary policies aimed at addressing carbon leakage.

Individual countries are in the process of legislating responses to the challenges posed by climate change. The prospect of rising carbon prices raises concerns in these nations about the effects on the competitiveness of their own energy-intensive industries and the potential for carbon leakage, particularly leakage to emerging economies that lack comparable regulation. In response, certain developed countries are proposing controversial trade-related measures and allowance allocation designs to complement their climate policies. Missing from much of the debate on trade-related measures is a broader understanding of how climate policies implemented unilaterally (or subglobally) affect all countries in the global trading system. Arguably, the largest impacts are from the targeted carbon pricing itself, which generates macroeconomic effects, terms-of-trade changes, and shifts in global energy demand and prices; it also changes the relative prices of certain energy-intensive goods. This paper studies how climate policies implemented in certain major economies (the European Union and the United States) affect the global distribution of economic and environmental outcomes, and how these outcomes may be altered by complementary policies aimed at addressing carbon leakage.

Policymakers are often reluctant to implement strong carbon pricing for fear of disadvantaging domestic industries and offshoring emissions-intensive activities. Border carbon adjustment (BCA) would address such carbon leakage concerns by using trade measures to ensure that products from foreign producers facing lower (or no) carbon prices are on equal footing with domestically produced goods. Despite intuitive economic appeal, BCA requires numerous challenging regulatory choices, including its scope of applicability (i.e., which policies, goods, sectors, countries), the methodology for assessing the carbon content of products, the type and price of the adjustment, scenarios requiring modification, and how the resulting revenues will be used. Each of these choices has economic and environmental implications that influence the effectiveness of the BCA, as well as nuanced technical, legal, and political consequences that must be considered. In particular, the design of any BCA must comport with international agreements governing trade and climate policy responsibilities. This article reviews the economic and legal literature on BCA, provides guidance for the design and implementation of BCAs, and identifies research priorities.

We use economic analysis to evaluate grandfathering, auctioning, and benchmarking approaches for allocation of emissions allowances and then discuss practical experience from European and American schemes. In principle, auctions are superior from the viewpoints of efficiency, fairness, transparency, and simplicity. In practice, auctions have been opposed by important sectors of industry, which argue that carbon pricing without compensation would harm international competitiveness. In the European Union's Emissions Trading System, this concern led to grandfathering that is updated at various intervals. Unfortunately, updating gives industry an incentive to change behavior to influence future allocation. Furthermore, the wealth transferred to incumbent firms can be significantly larger than the extra costs incurred, leading to windfall profits. Meanwhile, potential auction revenues are not available to reduce other taxes. By circumscribing free allocation, benchmarking can target competitiveness concerns, incur less wealth transfer, and provide a strategy consistent with transitioning to auctions in the long run.

AbstractEconomists have for decades recommended that carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases be taxed – or otherwise priced – to provide incentives for their reduction. The USA does not have a federal carbon tax; however, many state and federal programs to reduce carbon emissions effectively price carbon – for example, through cap-and-trade systems or regulations. There are also programs that subsidize reductions in carbon emissions. At the 2022 meetings of the American Economic Association, the Society for Benefit-Cost Analysis brought together five well-known economists – Joe Aldy, Dallas Burtraw, Carolyn Fischer, Meredith Fowlie, and Rob Williams – to discuss how the USA does, in fact, price carbon and how it could price carbon. Maureen Cropper chaired the panel. This paper summarizes their remarks.

Several years of very low allowance prices in the EU emissions trading scheme (ETS) have motivated calls to introduce a price floor to correct potential underlying distortions and design flaws, including (i) the political nature of allowance supply and related credibility issues, (ii) potential myopia of market participants and firms, and (iii) waterbed and rebound effects resulting from policy interactions. In the wake of the recent EU ETS reform, allowance prices have sharply increased. This raises the question of whether the case for introducing a price floor in the EU ETS remains valid. We argue that such a price floor, also adopted in several other greenhouse gas cap-and-trade systems worldwide, remains an important improvement in the design of the system, as long as the above-mentioned distortions and design flaws persist. An EU ETS price floor can safeguard against these issues and provides more explicit guidance on the minimum allowance price policymakers consider acceptable. Either as a complement or substitute to the current Market Stability Reserve (MSR), a price floor would thus make the EU ETS less prone to future revision in case of unexpectedly low prices. We identify and confront four prominent arguments against the introduction of an EU ETS price floor. Key policy insights An EU ETS price floor would be an important institutional innovation enhancing political and economic stability, and predictability of the EUA price The recent Market Stability Reserve (MSR) reform has not removed the need for a carbon price floor. Introducing an element of price responsiveness into the so far purely quantitative design of the EU ETS would help to preserve its integrity In contrast to conventional wisdom, legal analysis reveals that an EU ETS price floor can be legally feasible Political support for a carbon price floor is gaining traction across Europe.

When it first launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) expected to see carbon dioxide prices of around €30/ton and be a cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. The reality was a cascade offalling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of muted incentives for investment in the technology and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with various administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances ("backloading") and using a quantitybased criterion for regulating future allowance sales ("the market stability reserve"). While prices have now begun to recover, it is farfrom clear whether these measures are sufficient to adequately support the price of carbon dioxide into the future.

When it was launched in 2005, the European Union emissions trading system (EU ETS) was projected to have prices of around €30/ton CO2 and to be a cornerstone of the EU's climate policy. The reality was a cascade of falling prices, a ballooning privately held emissions bank, and a decade of low prices providing inadequate incentive to drive investment in the technologies and innovation necessary to achieve long-term climate goals. The European Commission responded with administrative measures, including postponing the introduction of allowances (backloading) and using a quantity-based criterion for regulating future allowance sales (the market stability reserve); although prices are beginning to recover, it is far from clear whether these measures will adequately support the price into the future. In the meantime, governments have been turning away from carbon pricing and adopting overlapping regulatory measures that reinforce low prices and further undermine the confidence in market-based approaches to addressing climate change. The solution in other carbon markets has been the introduction of a reserve price that would set a minimum price in allowance auctions. Opponents of an auction reserve price in the EU ETS have expressed concern that a minimum auction price would interfere with economic operations in the market or would be tantamount to a tax, which would trigger a decision rule requiring unanimity among EU Member States. This Article reviews the economic and legal arguments for and against an auction reserve price. Our economic analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is necessary to accommodate overlapping policies and for the allowance market to operate efficiently. Our legal analysis concludes that an auction reserve price is not a "provision primarily of a fiscal nature," nor would it "significantly affect a Member State's choice between different energy sources." We describe pathways through which a reserve price could be introduced.