Suchergebnisse

The reforms of the early to middle 1960s were based on the wall construction in 1961 for security rather than the events of 1956. De-Stalinization in the GDR was based on the article's description of extensive changes rather than the new ways Moscow started in 1956.

'Contemporary history' is inherently relevant to, indeed an integral part of, political and social processes in the present. Yet, despite a high level of politicisation of historical debates, the issue of 'objectivity' or 'value neutrality' cannot be addressed solely in terms of the views of the individual historian, or the wider functions fulfilled by a particular historical interpretation. Attention needs to be shifted to the conceptualisation and 'emplotment' of a historical narrative within a given theoretical paradigm. Professional history entails not (merely) the imposition of creative stories, as post-modernists would have it, nor (only) the digging up of ever more 'facts' about the past, as on the empiricist view. Rather, it is a puzzle-solving discipline requiring appropriate conceptual tools for the investigation of specific, theoretically constructed, questions. This article reviews recent developments in German contemporary history in the light of this framework.

Abstract The fall of the Berlin Wall and the collapse of the GDR took by surprise public opinion in Britain — like in other countries ; interpretations and explanations of those momentous events often were mistaken. A sharp contrast is generally perceived between the political stability which the GDR enjoyed for 40 years and its sudden breakdown. Actually, stability was more apparent than real, as there was an undercurrent of frequent agitation ; on the other hand, for a dozen years, movements of dissent had gathered strength, while the ruling elites were getting weaker. When the Soviet Union withdrew her unconditional support, the end came quickly. Likewise, the reunification process, which Chancellor Kohl conducted, was amazingly fast. Britain only had a minor role, of watching the developments of 1989-1990, but both government and public opinion soon worried about the power of reunited Germany, and also about the re-emergence of right-wing extremism. The author is critical of the widespread stereotypes about «German national character» (and of this very concept). Nonetheless, the new Germany has to face serious challenges, even though a parallel with the 1930's is fallacious. But those issues must be seriously and objectively investigated.

The German Democratic Republic was long noted for its apparent stability, efficiency and political quiescence, in contrast to the more turbulent domestic histories of neighbouring Poland and Czechoslovakia. In established narratives of East German history, the sole evidence of mass popular unrest before the autumn of 1989 was the June Uprising of 1953. After this, with a few isolated exceptions, East Germans simply kept their heads down. 'Dissent' was for the most part an activity associated with a few intellectuals–Harich, Havemann, Bahro–until the growth of oppositional movements associated with unofficial peace initiatives and environmentalist groups in the 1980s1. To all outward appearances, this sketch was correct. What now requires reconsideration, however, are the underlying reasons for these appearances, and the evaluation – indeed, the very characterisation – of patterns of popular political dissent in the GDR.

A YEAR AFTER THE COLLAPSE OF THE BERLIN WALL THERE ARE SERIOUS INDICATIONS OF SOCIAL TENSIONS CONSEQUENT OF THE UNIFICATION OF THE TWO GERMANIES. AFTER AN EXAMINATION OF PRESENT CONDITIONS THIS ARTICLE CONCLUDES THAT TWO SCENARIOS APPEAR EQUALLY POSSIBLE. EITHER A PERIOD OF TURMOIL AND TURBULENCE WOULD BE FOLLOWED BY A PHASE OF NORMALIZATION. THE ENLARGED FEDERAL REPUBLIC WOULD EMERGE BASICALLY MUCH THE SAME AS BEFORE. ALTERNATELY, THE PERIOD OF TURMOIL WOULD SPAWN SUCH SOCIAL TENSIONS AND POLITICAL SPIN-OFFS THAT A PERIOD OF GREAT UNPREDICTABILITY WOULD ENSUE.