Suchergebnisse

Moral behavior and legal institutions coevolve. While evolutionary game theory has often analyzed the evolution of moral behavior within given institutional rules, it has not examined the coevolution of moral preferences and different institutional aspects of the decision environment. By an 'indirect' evolutionary approach, we analyze the coevolution of moral preferences (in the sense of trustworthiness) and legal institutions like court rulings and legal insurance. We find that preference detection capabilities crowd in morality and can thus render useless the role of courts and legal insurance as public institutions. Legal institutions become crucial for the emergence of morality, however, when information about preference types is not available. This holds true even when courts do not have superior detection capabilities than other agents.

Abstract
The main results of our indirect evolutionary approach to trust in large interactions suggest that trustworthiness must be detectable if good conduct in trust-relationships is to survive. According to theoretical reasoning there is a niche then for an organization offering a (possibly) costly service of keeping track of the conduct of participants on the net. We compare traits of an organizational design as suggested by economic reasoning with those that actually emerged and ask whether institutions like eBay will increasingly have to 'economize on virtue' although so far they could rely on its spontaneous provision.

"Durch die Knappheit der Ressourcen können nicht alle Wünsche befriedigt werden. Für ein Höchstmaß an Wunschbefriedigung müssen unsere Wünsche durch Vorsicht und Vernunft kontrolliert werden. Die Wirtschaftswissenschaft kann hierbei Hilfestellung leisten." (Autorenreferat)