Suchergebnisse

A theory of political cleavages is formulated in which structure of political cleavages generates perceptions of cross-pressures, which in turn generate partisan intensity. Survey data from a 1969/70 national survey of 1,769 Austrian citizens are used to test this model empirically. These data support the prediction that those in cumulative cleavage positions will be stronger partisans & those in cross-cutting cleavage positions weaker partisans. Exploration of attitudinal & affiliative linkages between cleavage position & partisanship gives further evidence of the role of attitudinal cross-pressures in the Austrian setting. These relationships are robust & statistically significant, but do not explain a large part of the total variance in partisan intensity. 3 Tables, 1 Figure. Modified HA.

Political scientists have contributed to the world of electoral systems as scientists and as engineers. Taking stock of recent scientific research, we show that context modifies the effects of electoral rules on political outcomes in specific and systematic ways. We explore how electoral rules shape the inclusion of women and minorities, the depth and nature of political competition, and patterns of redistribution and regulation, and we consider institutional innovations that could promote political equality. Finally, we describe the diverse ways that political scientists produce an impact on the world by sharing and applying their knowledge of the consequences of electoral rules and global trends in reform.

Because political evaluation is both inescapable and desirable, it is too important to be left to partial and unexamined criteria. Even the most self-conscious studies of political performance have tended to rely on a limited and incomplete range of standards. We are arguing here for a more comprehensive typology of "political goods," with which both the standards and the performance of specific regimes and ideologies can be compared. Although we cannot, of course, deal with every cultural and structural nuance that may itself be valued, we can attempt to consider explicitly classes of goods that are associated with each of the different levels of analysis of the political system.

Comparative studies of election rules and legislative representation have focused intensively on vote-seat disproportionality as an indication of poor representation. Beginning with citizens' preferences, rather than votes, has important advantages and is especially more appropriate for a majoritarian vision of democracy. We analyse the effect of election rules on both vote-seat correspondence and median left-right correspondence in seventy elections in seventeen countries. We show theoretically the stringent conditions necessary to reduce vote-seat disproportionality in high threshold systems and empirically their high variance (and higher levels) of distortion. Although good median correspondence could be created, in theory, under a wide range of electoral systems, our empirical results suggest that proportional representation (PR) systems tend to outperform single-member district (SMD) systems by this criterion also. (British Journal of Political Science / FUB)