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Although partisan swing is often assumed to be uniform across congressional districts, our analysis of the 2006 House elections demonstrates that systematic variation exists. In addition to incumbency status, partisanship, spending, and scandal, variation in the local salience of national issues across districts affects vote shifts in these districts. Notably, partisan swing in Republican districts proved highly sensitive to the number of Iraq war deaths from that district and, to a lesser degree, to the roll‐call vote of Republican House members on the war resolution. These findings have implications for theories of anticipatory representation, retrospective voting, and electoral accountability.

Cabinet secretaries represent their departments when testifying before Congress on a broad range of legislation. Do they also represent the president's views on such legislation? Consistent with institutional theories of the presidency, we posit that, in some instances, cabinet secretaries take public positions contrary to those of the president, suggesting ideological distinctions between presidents and their appointed secretaries. We examine all congressional testimonies of secretaries of labor, commerce, and agriculture from 1991 to 2002, coding their positions taken on legislation considered on the floor of the Senate. Though these public disagreements are infrequent, our evidence suggests that agreement is more likely as support for the president's position among oversight committee members increases, yet less likely as secretaries' tenure in office increases.

Most accounts of the Clinton Senate trial are based on legal theories and description or suggest that the Senate trial was sui generis, unrelated to regular Senate business. Alternatively, we argue that presidential removal trials can best be explained through a spatial voting model, with ideological estimates for senators best predicting the trial outcome. To examine these hypotheses, we generate (a) ideal-point estimates using Markov chain Monte Carlo methods on roll-call data as well as (b) text-based (wordscores) point estimates scaled from public statements. Our results support the spatial hypothesis, but not legal or idiosyncratic accounts. Moreover, the significant discrepancy between text- and vote-based estimates provides support for Mayhew's contention that position taking for constituency benefit is rather costless. We conclude that when asked to be judges, senators, faced with multifarious political incentives, are more likely to act like legislators.

What role did race and gender play in vote choice for US president in 2008? With an African-American Democratic presidential nominee and a female Republican vice presidential nominee, were the black-white racial gap and the gender gap different in 2008 than in previous years? We find that the racial gap between black and white voters was larger in 2008 than it was in three of the four previous presidential elections, but not significantly larger than the gap in 1996 when white Democrat Bill Clinton won reelection. This gap is still present after we include control variables. On the other hand, the apparent gender gap whereby women are more likely than men to support Democratic candidates goes away once we include controls. Other factors - namely Iraq retrospections, ideological voting, and partisan identification - played a role as large or larger in citizen vote choice as did race or gender in the 2008 general election. Even though a voter's race was a key predictor in 2008 and even though there may be a widening racial gap, it is important not to overstate the role of race relative to other well-known predictors of the vote. Adapted from the source document.

Legislators claim that how they explain their votes matters as much as or more than the roll calls themselves. However, few studies have systematically examined legislators' explanations and citizen attitudes in response to these explanations. We theorize that legislators strategically tailor explanations to constituents in order to compensate for policy choices that are incongruent with constituent preferences, and to reinforce policy choices that are congruent. We conduct a within-subjects field experiment using U.S. senators as subjects to test this hypothesis. We then conduct a between-subjects survey experiment of ordinary people to see how they react to the explanatory strategies used by senators in the field experiment. We find that most senators tailor their explanations to their audiences, and that these tailored explanations are effective at currying support-especially among people who disagree with the legislators' roll-call positions. Adapted from the source document.