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The financial and economic crisis has increased attention on EU social policy, yet little policy change has been realized. Drawing on Easton's political system approach, we differentiate demand emanating from the difficult situation following the crisis and support in form of the 2004, 2009 and 2014 European elections. On the output side, we show how social policy has been substantially removed from the priorities of the EU political agenda already prior to the crisis. We argue that it is the contrast between crisis-generated demand and a more long-term lack of policy support that empowered actors interested in deepening economic integration and austerity policies. We present new empirical data that shows how partisan and governmental preferences are channelled through the EU institutions and how thus, changing ideological composition of the Commission as agenda-setter and an asymmetrical intergovenmentalist turn, have been a key driver for the substantial decline of EU social policy provision.

First Online: 02 March 2016 ; Gewaltenteilung und Demokratie sind als Kernkonzepte der Politikwissenschaft eng aufeinander bezogen, denn repräsentative Demokratien, die demokratischen Standards genügen, müssen auf einem gewaltenteiligen System beruhen. Dieser Anspruch ist in den meisten repräsentativen Demokratien in die formal-institutionelle Trennung von Legislative, Exekutive und Judikative übersetzt worden, die gegenseitige Kontrolle, Ausgleich und Mäßigung der Herrschaftsmacht erlaubt. Jedoch ist diese Verbindung von Gewaltenteilung und repräsentativer Demokratie seit mehreren Jahrzehnten Wandlungsprozessen unterzogen. Ein zentraler Faktor für Veränderung ist dabei die Europäische Integration, die in den EU-Mitgliedstaaten und besonders in ihren politischen Systemen vielfältige Anpassungsprozesse auslöst. Der einführende Artikel diskutiert kurz die Begriffe der Demokratie und Gewaltenteilung und führt drei zentrale Charakterisierungen von Gewaltenteilung in repräsentativen Demokratien ein. Auf dieser Basis wird der Zusammenhang von Demokratie und Gewaltenteilung in drei Dimensionen des EU-Mehrebenensystems konzeptionalisiert: interne Aufsplittung einer Organgewalt, sowie horizontale und vertikale Teilung. Abschließend erfolgt ein Überblick über Struktur und Beiträge des Sonderheftes.

The European Union is often considered as a prime example of a liberal regulatory state. We argue, however, that being limited to the regulatory policy does not prevent the European Commission from pursuing political aims going beyond market efficiency. We draw up two ideal-type perspectives of market regulation – being either efficiency or equality enhancing – that differ systematically in terms of rationale, degree of intervention, patterns of stakeholder access and conflict within the regulator. We trace these aspects in three financial services initiatives on the registration and supervision of reinsurers, equal treatment in financial services and the regulation of consumer credit. Our analyses suggest that there is scope for equality-enhancing re-regulation when proactive agents proceed decidedly on the basis of social-treaty concerns and frame regulatory beneficiaries as market participants as well as when they seek the redistribution of rights instead of resources.

[Abstract] The European Union is often considered as a prime example of a liberal regulatory state. We argue, however, that being limited to the regulatory policy does not prevent the European Commission from pursuing political aims going beyond market efficiency. We draw up two ideal-type perspectives of market regulation – being either efficiency or equality enhancing – that differ systematically in terms of rationale, degree of intervention, patterns of stakeholder access and conflict within the regulator. We trace these aspects in three financial services initiatives on the registration and supervision of reinsurers, equal treatment in financial services and the regulation of consumer credit. Our analyses suggest that there is scope for equality-enhancing re-regulation when proactive agents proceed decidedly on the basis of social-treaty concerns and frame regulatory beneficiaries as market participants as well as when they seek the redistribution of rights instead of resources

The European Union is often considered as a prime example of a liberal regulatory state. We argue, however, that being limited to the regulatory policy does not prevent the European Commission from pursuing political aims going beyond market efficiency. We draw up two ideal-type perspectives of market regulation – being either efficiency or equality enhancing – that differ systematically in terms of rationale, degree of intervention, patterns of stakeholder access and conflict within the regulator. We trace these aspects in three financial services initiatives on the registration and supervision of reinsurers, equal treatment in financial services and the regulation of consumer credit. Our analyses suggest that there is scope for equality-enhancing re-regulation when proactive agents proceed decidedly on the basis of social-treaty concerns and frame regulatory beneficiaries as market participants as well as when they seek the redistribution of rights instead of resources.

The European Union is often considered as a prime example of a liberal regulatory state. We argue, however, that being limited to the regulatory policy does not prevent the European Commission from pursuing political aims going beyond market efficiency. We draw up two ideal-type perspectives of market regulation - being either efficiency or equality enhancing - that differ systematically in terms of rationale, degree of intervention, patterns of stakeholder access and conflict within the regulator. We trace these aspects in three financial services initiatives on the registration and supervision of reinsurers, equal treatment in financial services and the regulation of consumer credit. Our analyses suggest that there is scope for equality-enhancing re-regulation when proactive agents proceed decidedly on the basis of social-treaty concerns and frame regulatory beneficiaries as market participants as well as when they seek the redistribution of rights instead of resources.

Persönliche Merkmale von Mitgliedern der Organisationseliten, wie etwa Beruf, Nationalität oder Parteizugehörigkeit, sind wichtige Bausteine, um politische Entscheidungen zu erklären. Sie rücken zusehends in den Fokus systematischer Analysen europäischer Politik. Die Europäische Kommission ist in vielerlei Hinsicht mit nationalen Verwaltungen vergleichbar. Einer der wohl bedeutendsten Unterschiede ist jedoch, dass ihre personelle Zusammensetzung im Gegensatz zu nationalen Administrationen sehr heterogen ist. So unterscheiden sich die Führungspersonen der Kommission untereinander erheblich in parteipolitischer und beruflicher Hinsicht sowie in ihrer nationalen Herkunft. Eine systematische Analyse dieser Varianzen erscheint besonders relevant, wo wir annehmen, dass sie zu unterschiedlichen Herangehensweisen und Bewertungen politischer Prozesse führen. Der vorliegende Beitrag gibt einen Überblick über den Forschungsstand und überprüft die zentralen Thesen anhand einer neuen Datenbank zur Europäischen Kommission. Die Datenbank ist innovativ, weil sie, anders als existierende Arbeiten, Daten über Kommissionsmitglieder seit der Gründung im Jahr 1958 bis zum Jahr 2010 umfasst und nicht nur Kommissare, sondern auch Generaldirektoren einbezieht. Und sie erlaubt erstmals einen Zusammenhang zwischen der Organisationsstruktur der Kommission und den persönlichen Merkmalen ihrer Mitglieder herzustellen. Auf dieser Basis lässt sich zeigen, dass es sich bei der Kommission um ein changing kind of animal handelt, das anderen Verwaltungsstrukturen im EU-Mehrebenensystem in vielerlei Hinsicht zunehmend ähnelt, aber auch, wo es sich von ihnen absetzt. ; Personal characteristics of organizational elites, such as their socialisation, prior employment or party membership are important factors in explaining political decision making. Studies on European politics increasingly provide more systematic analyses of such factors. The European Commission is in many respects comparable to national administrations. However, a central differences is that its political staff is much more. Commission personnel differs substantially not only in nationality, but also in party political orientation and prior professional affiliation. A systematic analysis of these features becomes relevant where we assume that related variance results in different approaches to and judgements in political processes. The paper at hand summarizes the state of the art on personal characteristics of organizational elites in the EU political system and tests central hypotheses on the basis of a newly established and comprehensive data base on the European Commission. The novelty of the data base that is covers features of the Commission's political staff since its founding days in 1958 until today 2010, not only from Commissioners, but also from Director Generals. And it allows for the first time to connect the organisational structure of the European Commission to personnel characteristics of its staff. On this basis we can conclude that the Commission is a changing kind of animal that increasingly resembles national administrations in many respects, but continues to differ on others.