Conservation Contracts and Political Regimes
In: The Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming
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In: The Review of Economic Studies, Forthcoming
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5334
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Working paper
Tradable permits are celebrated as a political instrument since they allow (i) firms to equalize marginal abatement costs through trade and (ii) the government to distribute the burden of the policy in a politically fair and feasible way. These two concerns, however, conflict in a dynamic setting. Anticipating that high-cost firms will receive more permits in the future, firms purchase excessive amounts of permits to signal high costs. This raises the price above marginal costs and distorts abatements. In fact, it is better with non-tradable permits if the heterogeneity between the firms is small, if the (shadow) price for permits is large, and if the government redistributes permits frequently.
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In: CEPR Discussion Paper No. DP15044
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Working paper
In: CESifo Working Paper No. 8460
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Working paper
This paper analyzes a game in which countries repeatedly make emission and technology investment decisions. We derive the best equilibrium, i.e., the Pareto-optimal subgame-perfect equilibrium, when countries are insufficiently patient for folk theorems to be relevant. Relative to the first best, the best equilibrium requires countries to overinvest in technologies that are green, i.e., strategic substitutes for polluting, but to underinvest in adaptation and brown technologies, i.e., strategic complements to polluting. Under uncertainty, strategic investments reduce the need for a long and costly punishment phase or the probability that it will be triggered. Technological transfers and spillovers might discourage investments but can be necessary to motivate compliance when countries are heterogeneous.
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In: CESifo Working Paper Series No. 5562
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Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier than efficient instruments to repeal. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficient policy instrument. We describe when inefficient instruments are likely to be chosen, and predict that they are used more frequently in (moderately) polarized political environments and in volatile economic environments. We show conditions under which players strictly benefit from the availability of the inefficient instrument.
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Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost-effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier to repeal than efficient instruments. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficient policy instrument. We describe when inefficient instruments are likely to be chosen, and predict that they are used more frequently in (moderately) polarized political environments and in volatile economic environments. We show conditions under which players strictly benefit from the availability of the inefficient instrument. ; Harstad's part of the research received funding from the European Research Council (ERC) under the European Union's Horizon 2020 Research and Innovation Program (Grant 683031). Antoine Loeper gratefully acknowledges the support of the Fundación Ramón Areces, of the Ministerio de Economía y Competitividad (Spain), grants RYC-2015-18326, ECO 2016-75992-P, and MDM 2014-0431, and of the Comunidad de Madrid, grant MadEco-CM (S2015/HUM-3444).
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Why do rational politicians choose inefficient policy instruments? Environmental regulation, for example, often takes the form of technology standards and quotas even when cost‐effective Pigou taxes are available. To shed light on this puzzle, we present a stochastic game with multiple legislative veto players and show that inefficient policy instruments are politically easier to repeal than efficient instruments. Anticipating this, heterogeneous legislators agree more readily on an inefficient policy instrument. We describe when inefficient instruments are likely to be chosen, and predict that they are used more frequently in (moderately) polarized political environments and in volatile economic environments. We show conditions under which players strictly benefit from the availability of the inefficient instrument.
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Working paper