Suchergebnisse

It is argued that previous attempts to test Frances Fox Piven's & Richard A. Cloward's explanation of post-WWII increases in Aid to Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) caseloads (Regulating the Poor: The Functions of Social Welfare, New York: Vintage, 1971) have been incomplete. Short-term time-series analyses of national-level data for 1948 to 1977 give mixed support to Piven's & Cloward's explanation of AFDC caseload growth. Their hypotheses that Community Action Agency legal aid & counseling activities, black rioting, & additional disruptions involving sreet crime generated large AFDC roll increases are supported, but evidence of positive effects of unemployment on AFDC caseload increases contradicts their denial of "need." Evidence indicating that AFDC rolls may have expanded because of 1965 amendments to the Social Security Act is also noted. Implications of these findings for theory & research concerning welfare policy determination & policy consequences of direct action by the poor are discussed. 63 References. Modified HA.

We examine the roles of democratic politics and political institutions in shaping social welfare spending in 18 contemporary capitalist democracies. We explore the social spending consequences of government partisanship, electoral competition and turnout, and the self-interested behaviors of politicians and bureaucrats, as well as such relatively durable facets of political institutions as neocorporatism, state centralization, and traditionalist policy legacies. Pooled time series analyses of welfare effort in 18 nations during the 1960–82 period show that electoral turnout, as well as left and center governments increase welfare effort; that the welfare efforts of governments led by particular types of parties show significant differences and vary notably with the strength of oppositional (and junior coalitional) parties; and that relatively neocorporatist, centralized, and traditionalistic polities are high on welfare effort. Overall, our findings suggest that contrary to many claims, both partisan and nonpartisan facets of democratic politics and political institutions shape contemporary social welfare effort.

Empirical analysis of the role of democratic politics and political institutions in shaping social welfare policy in 18 capitalist democracies.

Why do countries liberalize capital controls? The literature identifies a range of possible reasons. Yet, despite considerable advances, the impact of international non-governmental organizations has yet to be considered. In fact, surprisingly, systematic analysis of the role of international non-governmental organizations in the diffusion of economic openness, financial or otherwise, has not been pursued previously. We offer the first such analysis by advancing the idea of 'climatic mimesis,' which refers to the cultural climate for policymaking that results from country ties to international non-governmental organizations. International non-governmental organizations shape capital account regulation by altering the cultural climate in a country such that liberalization becomes a more problematic policy choice. Our statistical analysis of data from developing countries reveals that international non-governmental organization ties inhibited liberalization, as did relatively high public debt and concentrated domestic banking sectors. The presence of an International Monetary Fund program and liberalization by economic competitors encouraged it. We suggest that these findings have important implications for understanding the potential for convergence and divergence in an era of globalization.

Abstract. Post‐war welfare effort (i.e., welfare spending as a share of national income) in advanced capitalist political democracies is proposed to result from policy routines emphasized in the traditional academic literatures complemented and mediated by class‐linked factors stressed in the 'new political economy' literature. Both sets of factors are integrated into a single conception of state policy‐making. In this, self‐interested elite and administrative state personnel respond to their environments by means of relatively discretionary and relatively automatic policy routines, respectively. Left and non‐Left governments mediate these routines and do so differently in different long‐term institutional (strong‐union versus weak‐union) and macroeconomic (expansionary versus crisis) contexts. Welfare expansion is found to be amply explained by the proposed processes, differentiated by context. Left parties and militants are found to matter primarily in contexts marked by 'Left corporatism'(or strong unions) and/or by relatively 'expansionary economic climates'. Ironically, Left‐party governments in Left corporatist contexts are found to be particularly sensitive to inflation where transfer spending is concerned. Where unions are strong, policy making is generally less incremental and more flexible. After 1973, policy sensitivity to real economic growth or decline looms large, and working‐class‐linked politics are muted where unions are weak, most especially where they are decentralized.

A conception of the process of state policy making in postwar welfare efforts in 16 nations is presented that integrates both the "industrial society" or "developmental" literature & the "new political economy" literature. Self-interested elite & administrative state personnel respond to their environments by means of relatively discretionary & automatic policy routines, respectively. Left & non-Left governments mediate these routines differently in different long-term institutional & macroeconomic contexts. Welfare expansion is explained by the proposed processes, differentiated by context. Left parties & militants matter primarily in contexts marked by strong unions &/or by relatively expansionary economic climates. Left-party governments in Left corporatist contexts are particularly sensitive to inflation where transfer spending is concerned. Where unions are strong, policy making is generally less incremental & more flexible. After 1973, policy sensitivity to real economic growth or decline looms large, & working-class-linked politics are muted where unions are weak, especially where they are decentralized. 6 Tables, 1 Figure, 69 References. Modified HA

The view that the key to long-term economic growth is a Left that is strong both politically & economically & strong labor unions, proposed by Peter Lange & Geoffrey Garrett (see SA 34:1/86Q3379) & later modified by Alexander Hicks ("Social Democratic Corporatism and Economic Growth," Journal of Politics, 1988, 50, 677-704), is challenged via a reanalysis of 1974-1980 statistics on 15 countries. In the original model of Lange & Garrett, economic growth is a multiplicative function of the power of labor unions & parties of the Left; Hicks presents a modified model containing more variables & four degrees of freedom. It is argued that with so many parameters, results are individually fitted to make the model work. In addition, there is no evidence to show that the partisan composition of governments impacts economic growth, because parties tend to converge in their policies. 2 Tables, 23 References. A. Cole