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In this paper, we document the forecasting performance of estimated basic dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) models and compare this to extended versions which consider alternative expectation formation assumptions and financial frictions. We also show how standard model features, such as price and wage rigidities, contribute to forecasting performance. It turns out that neither alternative expectation formation behaviour nor financial frictions can systematically increase the forecasting performance of basic DSGE models. Financial frictions improve forecasts only during periods of financial crises. However, traditional price and wage rigidities systematically help to increase the forecasting performance.

In diesem Beitrag wird die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung Sachsen-Anhalts seit 1990 im Kontext des ostdeutschen Transformationsprozesses von einer Zentralverwaltungswirtschaft zu einer Marktwirtschaft beschrieben. Die wirtschaftliche Leistungsfähigkeit Sachsen-Anhalts hat in den frühen 1990er Jahren zunächst schnell gegenüber Westdeutschland aufgeholt, vor allem weil der Kapitalstock modernisiert und erweitert worden ist. Seit einiger Zeit stagniert der Aufholprozess jedoch, und das Bruttoinlandsprodukt je Erwerbstätigen liegt etwa 20% unter dem westdeutschen Niveau. Die wirtschaftspolitische Herausforderung besteht darin, den Aufholprozess durch die Förderung von Forschung und Innovation und durch bessere Qualifizierung der Erwerbstätigen weiter voranzubringen. ; This article describes the economic development of Saxony-Anhalt since 1990 in the context of the East German transition from a centrally planned economy to a market economy. In the early 1990s, the economy of Saxony-Anhalt caught up quickly with West Germany, mainly because the capital stock was modernised and expanded. Convergence, however, has almost come to a halt for some time now, and gross domestic product per employed person is still about 20% below the West German level. The challenge for economic policy is to further the catchingup process by fostering research and innovation and improving the skills of the workforce.

Polen hat seinen Abstand gegenüber den entwickelten Marktwirtschaften Westeuropas seit dem Beginn der 1990er Jahre bis heute gemessen am Pro-Kopf-Einkommen stark verringert. Galt das Land in den ersten zwei Jahrzehnten unter den mittelosteuropäischen Ländern als Vorreiter beim Wirtschaftswachstum, so hat sich das Aufholtempo in den letzten Jahren verlangsamt. Die polnische Regierung reagierte darauf mit einem strategischen Entwicklungsplan ('Morawiecki'-Plan), der Maßnahmen und Ziele bis 2030 benennt und Polens Aufholprozess neuen Schwung verleihen soll. Für das wirtschaftsliberale Reformland bedeutet mehr staatlich gesteuerte Wirtschaftsplanung allerdings einen Paradigmenwechsel. Vom Erfolg dieser Strategie hängt es ab, ob Polen den Übergang in die zweite, innovationsorientierte Phase des Aufholprozesses schafft oder längerfristig auf dem bisherigen Niveau zu verharren droht.

This paper investigates a perception in the political debates as to what extent poor countries are affected by price movements in the global commodity markets. To test this perception, we use the case of India to establish in a standard SVAR model that global food prices influence aggregate prices and food prices in India. To further analyze these empirical results, we specify a small open economy New-Keynesian model including oil and food prices and estimate it using observed data over the period from 1996Q2 to 2013Q2 by applying Bayesian estimation techniques.

Die öffentliche Auseinandersetzung um den Mindestlohn in Deutschland ist von einem Diskursversagen geprägt. Gestritten wird um faire Löhne und gute Arbeit. Dass dabei die Möglichkeit der Teilhabe an einem attraktiven Arbeitsleben für alle eine zentrale Rolle spielt, wird hingegen vernachlässigt. Dieses Diskursversagen hat zur Konsequenz, dass die Einführung eines flächendeckenden Mindestlohns ohne Ausnahmen in einigen Branchen und Regionen zu einem deutlichen Kostenschub führen wird. Insbesondere Ostdeutschland dürfte dies vor neue Probleme stellen. Aufgrund der politischen Festlegung auf den Mindestlohn sollte es jetzt vor allem darum gehen, seine praktische Implementierung so gut wie möglich zu gestalten. Dazu gehört auch die systematische und unabhängige wissenschaftliche Evaluierung der Effekte des Mindestlohns auf Einkommen und Beschäftigung. Zudem kommt es darauf an, dass sich das Diskursversagen in der schon jetzt absehbaren Folgedebatte über Lohnsubventionen nicht wiederholt. ; The public debate about introducing a minimum wage in Germany can be characterized as a discourse failure. Attention concentrated on fair wages and good work. In contrast, it was neglected that the feasibility of access to an attractive working life plays a central role. A direct consequence of this discourse failure is that the introduction of a mini-mum wage in Germany, across the board and without exemptions, will lead to a considerable cost push for several branches and regions. Especially East Germany will face serious problems. However, since politics has come to a definite decision, the major challenge is to carefully arrange the practical implementation of the minimum wage. This requires systematic and independent research into its effects on incomes and employment. Furthermore, it is of utmost importance that the foreseeable debate on introducing wage subsidies in Germany does not replicate the discourse failure of the past.

We discuss how the welfare ranking of fixed and flexible exchange rate regimes in a New Open Economy Macroeconomics model depends on the interplay between the degree of exchange rate pass-through and the elasticity of substitution between home and foreign goods. We identify combinations of these two parameters for which flexible and for which fixed exchange rates are superior with respect to welfare as measured by a representative household's utility level. We estimate the two parameters for six non-EMU European countries (Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, Slovakia, Sweden, United Kingdom) using a heterogeneous dynamic panel approach.

We use the World Input Output Database (WIOD) to estimate the potential employment effects of a hard Brexit in 43 countries. In line with other studies we assume that imports from the European Union (EU) to the UK will decline by 25% after a hard Brexit. The absolute effects are largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK like Germany and France. However, there are also large countries outside the EU which are heavily affected via global value chains like China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) are largest in Malta and Ireland. UK employment will also be affected via intermediate input production. Within Germany, the motor vehicle industry and in particular the "Autostadt" Wolfsburg are most affected.

We investigate drivers of Euro area inflation dynamics using a panel of regional Phillips curves and identify long-run inflation expectations by exploiting the crosssectional dimension of the data. Our approach simultaneously allows for the inclusion of country-specific inflation and unemployment-gaps, as well as time-varying parameters. Our preferred panel specification outperforms various aggregate, uni- and multivariate unobserved component models in terms of forecast accuracy. We find that declining long-run trend inflation expectations and rising inflation persistence indicate an altered risk of inflation expectations de-anchoring. Lower trend inflation, and persistently negative unemployment-gaps, a slightly increasing Phillips curve slope and the downward pressure of low oil prices mainly explain the low inflation rate during the recent years.

In this paper, we investigate to what extent sovereign stress and banking stress have contributed to the increase in the level and in the heterogeneity of nonfinancial firms' refinancing costs in the Euro area during the European debt crisis and how they did affect the monetary transmission mechanism. We identify the increasing effect of government bond yield spreads (sovereign stress) and the share of non-performing loans (banking stress) on firms' financing costs using an instrumental-variable approach. Moreover, we estimate both sources of stress to have significantly impaired the monetary transmission mechanism during the European debt crisis. ; This version: May 2022

We use the World Input Output Database (WIOD) to estimate the potential employment effects of a hard Brexit in 43 countries. In line with other studies we assume that imports from the European Union (EU) to the UK will decline by 25% after a hard Brexit. The absolute effects are largest in big EU countries which have close trade relationships with the UK like Germany and France. However, there are also large countries outside the EU which are heavily affected via global value chains like China, for example. The relative effects (in percent of total employment) are largest in Malta and Ireland. UK employment will also be affected via intermediate input production. Within Germany, the motor vehicle industry and in particular the 'Autostadt' Wolfsburg are most affected.