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ABSTRACTPolicy design, whether conceptualized as a verb referring to the process of formulating policy ideas, or as a noun describing the logic through which policy intends to achieve its objectives, remains relatively uncharted territory. This paper reviews what we know about how policy designs emerge, and identifies the kinds of biases and weaknesses that are introduced into designs by the decision heuristics employed. Theories of policy invention and expert decision-making suggest that individuals search through large amounts of relevant information stored in memory, reason by analogies, make comparisons, and either copy or simulate patterns of information. Policy scholars may contribute to improved policy design by making more explicit the biases introduced through reliance on decision heuristics, and by suggesting a more formal, self conscious search and selection process that enables designers to be more discriminating when they pinch policy ideas from other contexts. To perform this task, comparative policy analysis is needed in which common elements that exist in virtually all policies are identified and the underlying structural logic of the policies is made explicit. In this paper we set forth generic elements found in policies, describe and compare some of the more common design patterns, and discuss the circumstances where these may be inappropriately copied or borrowed, thereby thwarting the effectiveness of the policy.

Both the federal and state governments have strong constitutional daims and political resources with which to influence the allocation of water resources. Until the 1970s. federal agencies were able to dominate kr setting goals and objectives. However, when the federal government attempted to implement a national water policy in the 1970s, effective opposition was mounted by the states. Both the states and the federal government now exert decisive influence in water policy.

Since Hardin first formulated the tragedy of the commons, researchers have described various ways that commons problems are solved, all based on the model of individual rationality. Invariably, these institutional solutions involve creating some system of property rights. We formulate an alternative model, one not founded on property rights but on decision-making around so-called vector payoffs. The model is formalized and an existence proof provided. The new model is shown to be effective in explaining some anomalous results (e.g., unanticipated cooperation) in the experimental games literature that run counter to the rational model. We then use the case of the buffalo commons to illustrate how the new model affords alternative explanations for examples like the rise and fall of the buffalo herds in the Great Plains. We find the vector payoff model to complement, though not displace, that of individual rationality. [Reprinted by permission of Sage Publications Ltd., copyright holder.]

Since Hardin first formulated the tragedy of the commons, researchers have described various ways that commons problems are solved, all based on the model of individual rationality. Invariably, these institutional solutions involve creating some system of property rights. We formulate an alternative model, one not founded on property rights but on decision-making around so-called vector payoffs. The model is formalized and an existence proof provided. The new model is shown to be effective in explaining some anomalous results (e.g., unanticipated cooperation) in the experimental games literature that run counter to the rational model. We then use the case of the buffalo commons to illustrate how the new model affords alternative explanations for examples like the rise and fall of the buffalo herds in the Great Plains. We find the vector payoff model to complement, though not displace, that of individual rationality.

This article focuses on a comparison of states and markets in the management of transboundary water. Borders are often harbingers of change and areas of innovation. Nation states have struggled mightily to overcome problems of shared river basins and aquifers. Today, the state-centric model is losing its hegemony. Once the article has established the limitations of states as governing institutions, its attention turns to an alternative offered by public choice scholars. Proposals for functional, overlapping, and competing jurisdictions are subjected to critical scrutiny and found wanting. Both of these conceptual frameworks have serious flaws. While the state-centered model poorly captures the emerging complexities of intermestic politics, the market approach fails to incorporate institutions that foster intersectoral cooperation and communication. The article concludes that effective governance of fluid resources is increasingly and necessarily founded on the cooperative interrelationships of various institutions that represent the variety of complementing logics and functions within the transnational water arena.

The frameworks and models employed in conventional policy analysis serve poorly the purpose of examining the impacts of institutions and public policies upon citizenship and democracy. This failing is all the more serious during the current period of non-incremental institutional and public policy change. Such fundamental changes in the landscape of governance include: the diminishing power of Washington and the devolution of authority over many issues to lower levels of government; the movement of many public issues from public to private spheres; the use of market-like incentives in public policies; the emergence of community-based initiatives in policy; and the creation of new institutional forms including new kinds of property rights and regional forums. The purpose of this round table is to raise critical questions about the possible side effects of the "reforms" being undertaken. What will be the impacts on already underserved constituencies? How will institutional and public policy changes affect the mobilization of and participation of groups? How will the attitudes citizens hold about their obligations to government and their conceptions of role of government in society be altered? And, from a research perspective, how should the models and methodologies political scientists and policy analysts be modified to better capture the effects on institutions and policies upon citizenship and democracy?