Suchergebnisse

Since 2005, the European Union intensified its political commitment in Lebanon. The same year an
Association Agreement was signed and the first Action Plan published in 2007. The Arab Uprisings
of 2011 – and on its coat-tails the brutal war in Syria – fortified an enduring imperative of stability.
Over the last years, the EU became more realistic in its ambitions – more assertive in its claims for
influence, and demonstrated a greater capacity to play to its political strengths. An increasing realism
was obscured by prevalent normative discourses reflected in EU documents. A particular normativegeopolitical
ambiguity in its external relations is caused by the imperial nature of the EU. This paper
argues that Brussels operates in legacies of imperial rule in its efforts to stabilize and transform the
Near East. The first chapter of the paper conceptualizes the EU's imperial politics. The second section
analyzes contents of the bilateral agenda, as formulated in the Action Plan, which can be compared
with 19th century 'standards of civilization' developed by European states; whereas the stabilization
policies resemble geopolitical concepts. The third chapter examines the current role of the EU in
Lebanon, especially in light of the "three M-approach" introduced by the revised ENP of Spring 2011
and beyond "three M" addressing security issues. Despite its successes, the Union still remains an
underestimated actor in the Levant. This is the case mainly because the ENP suffers from its normativegeopolitical
ambiguity, demanding at the same time a geopolitically motivated stabilization of the
peripheries (in terms of power) and a sustainable transformation of the neighbourhood converging
with the value system of the EU (in terms of norms).

Relations between the European Union (EU) and Ukraine appear to be stuck at the verge of a
new era. While a new Association Agreement providing for an unprecedented degree of political
cooperation and economic integration is ready to enter into force, political developments in
Ukraine prevent the EU from proceeding with its signature and ratification. This peculiar situation
represents a crucial test case for the effectiveness of the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP).
Effectiveness in this case is defined by the objectives that guide the EU in its pursuit of the ENP,
and by the degree to which the Union lives up to its capabilities to reach them. In the case of
Ukraine, the policy turns out to be largely effective, considering that the EU's top priority is the
avoidance of political and economic risks. However, this focus on risk avoidance severely limits
the Union's leverage regarding the attainment of any other policy objectives, most importantly
norm transfer and security cooperation. Consequently, even a largely effective ENP is unlikely to
have a significant impact on the situation in Ukraine and elsewhere as long as the Union does not
change its priorities.