Suchergebnisse

AbstractForest certification is the response to a perceived need for consumers to assure themselves that wood products are from well‐managed or sustainable sources. This paper takes a look at the framework for forest certification that is evolving and compares it with the emerging schemes for environmental management systems. A view is then put as to the preferred way forward for any organization in the wood value chain‐from forest managers through importers to wood product manufacturers and retailers‐seeking independent verification of good management practices. Copyright © 1995 John Wiley & Sons, Ltd. and ERP Environment

Offers his services in defense of Partridge. ; Transcription by Joseph Byrne. Transcriptions may be subject to error.

PurposeThe purpose of this paper is to investigate the relationships between measures of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on the one hand and measures of inequality and redistribution on the other, using state‐level US data.Design/methodology/approachThe relationship between ethnic/religious heterogeneity and inequality/redistribution is estimated, first, with ordinary least squares (OLS) and then with generalized method of moments (GMM). The principal explanatory variables for inequality and redistribution in the study are ethnic and religious polarization and fractionalization measures.FindingsIt is found that inequality is positively associated with polarization and has an inverse‐U relationship with fractionalization. These findings are bolstered by findings of indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on inequality through their influence on welfare programs.Originality/valueThis is the first paper investigating the magnitude of possible direct and indirect effects of ethnic and religious heterogeneity on income inequality using US data.

Abstract
A dual income tax system, combining progressive taxation of labor income with proportional taxation of income from capital, may or may not be unambiguously inequality reducing. Examples show that the degree of correlation between the distributions of wage and capital income, the degree of tax rate differentiation in the DIT, and reranking of tax-payers can be expected to complicate a clear-cut analysis. We trace out what can be said definitively, obtaining sufficient conditions for unambiguous inequality reduction in certain cases, and more generally identifying the nature of the implicit redistribution between labor and capital income components which is sufficient to ensure overall inequality reduction.

A local measure of classical horizontal inequity (HI) in an income tax or tax‐benefit system is proposed and aggregated into a global index. This index expresses the revenue gain per capita that would come from eliminating HI welfare‐neutrally, and also reveals the loss of vertical performance, in terms of the Blackorby and Donaldson (1984) progressivity index, caused by the presence of HI. Non‐parametric estimation procedures that can be used to tackle the 'identification problem' are delineated. An application to the Canadian tax‐benefit system between 1981 and 1994 reveals the changing profile of local HI, its sources, and its aggregate significance. JEL Classification: C14, D31, D63, H23 Approche normative et statistique à la mesure de l'inéquité horizontale classique. Nous nous intéressons dans ce document au problème tenace de la mesure de l'inéquité horizontale. Nous proposons tout d'abord une mesure locale d'inéquité horizontale, que nous agrégeons ensuite en un indice global. A la différence d'autres approches, qui s'intéressent au gain en bien‐être social qu'il y aurait àéliminer l'inéquité horizontale en gardant constant le revenu de l'État, notre indice global mesure le gain fiscal per capita qui échoirait au gouvernement si l'inéquité horizontale était éliminée sans changement dans le niveau de bien‐être social. Lorsque ce gain fiscal est exprimé en proportion des revenus moyens nets, notre mesure constitue un élément (négatif) dans l'indice de progressivité de Blackorby et Donaldson (1984); elle quantifie alors la perte de performance verticale causée par un traitement fiscal discriminatoire vis‐à‐vis d'individus qui étaient égaux avant l'intervention de l'État. Notre ‐indice étant exprimé en unités monétaires, son interprétation est facile et intuitive. Nous proposons finalement des procédures d'estimation non‐paramétrique pour résoudre le problème important de l'identification des individus égaux dans une distribution de bien‐être. A notre connaissance, il s'agit d'ailleurs de la première solution statistiquement cohérente au problème classique de la mesure de l'inéquité horizontale. La méthode est appliquée à la distribution canadienne des revenus bruts et nets en 1981 et 1994, et révèle à la fois la variation du profil de l'inéquité horizontale le long des quantiles et son importance comme source de perte de progressivité et de redistribution. Nous décomposons aussi l'inéquité horizontale totale entre et à travers différents groupes socio‐économiques, et testons la sensibilité de ces estimés à la variabilitééchantillonnale ainsi qu'au choix d'échelles d'équivalence et d'intervalles des fonctions de noyaux.