Policy Change and Learning: An Advocacy Coalition Approach
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 566-569
ISSN: 0022-3816
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In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 57, Heft 2, S. 566-569
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: Presidential Studies Quarterly, Band 37, Heft 3, S. 468-485
In Federalist no. 65, Alexander Hamilton wrote that the impeachment process is a decidedly political one. We use data from a national survey conducted in September and October 1998 to examine explanations for Bill Clinton's survival of the impeachment crisis: the robust economy, his own high popular standing with the public, and the concomitantly lower public evaluations of his principal investigators, Independent Counsel Kenneth Starr and the Republican-controlled U.S. Congress. Our analysis demonstrates that the performance of the U.S. economy did directly influence public support for impeachment, resignation, continued congressional hearings, and censure (four potential punishment options), but not in the manner most often hypothesized. More favorable assessments of the U.S. economy actually were related to higher levels of support for punishing the president. Evaluations of the president proved to be a double-edged sword. Although higher evaluations of Clinton's personal job approval ratings and of his personal ethics ratings are related to lower levels of support for punishment, Clinton benefited more from the former than the latter, as his approval ratings were high while the public held considerable doubts about his ethics. Finally, we show that higher public evaluations of Clinton's primary investigators, Starr and the U.S. Congress, were related to higher levels of support for punishing the president. As both actors had an exceedingly low average approval rating, however, this dynamic worked to Clinton's advantage. Adapted from the source document.
"For decades, public expectations of U.S. presidents have become increasingly excessive and unreasonable. Despite much anecdotal evidence, few scholars have attempted to test the expectations gap thesis empirically. This is the first systematic study to prove the existence of the expectations gap and to identify the factors that contribute to the public's disappointment in a given president. Using data from five original surveys, the authors confirm that the expectations gap is manifest in public opinion. It leads to lower approval ratings, lowers the chance that a president will be reelected, and even contributes to the success of the political party that does not hold the White House in congressional midterm elections. This study provides important insights not only on the American presidency and public opinion, but also on citizens' trust in government"--
"For decades, public expectations of U.S. presidents have become increasingly excessive and unreasonable. Despite much anecdotal evidence, few scholars have attempted to test the expectations gap thesis empirically. This is the first systematic study to prove the existence of the expectations gap and to identify the factors that contribute to the public's disappointment in a given president. Using data from five original surveys, the authors confirm that the expectations gap is manifest in public opinion. It leads to lower approval ratings, lowers the chance that a president will be reelected, and even contributes to the success of the political party that does not hold the White House in congressional midterm elections. This study provides important insights not only on the American presidency and public opinion, but also on citizens' trust in government"--
In: Policy studies journal: the journal of the Policy Studies Organization, Band 44, Heft S1
ISSN: 1541-0072
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 715-719
Scholars have used cultural theory (CT) to explain risk perceptions and opinion formation across an impressive array of public issues, ranging from environmental, regulatory, and energy policy to public health and economics. Although disparate, all these issues concern domestic policies. This article breaks with this trend by exploring the extent to which CT can help scholars better understand public beliefs about national security. Of critical importance in debates about national security are perceptions of individual versus collective threat and the appropriate role of authoritative institutions in protecting society from these threats. Because CT provides a framework that explicitly addresses these dimensions, national security issues provide an illuminating canvas for evaluating the theory's explanatory utility.
In: PS: political science & politics, Band 44, Heft 4, S. 715-720
ISSN: 0030-8269, 1049-0965
SSRN
Working paper
In: Risk analysis: an international journal, Band 27, Heft 3, S. 755-773
ISSN: 1539-6924
Social scientists have argued about the role of political beliefs in highly charged policy debates among scientific experts. In debates about environmental hazards, the focus of contention is likely to rest on the appropriate scientific assumptions to inform safety standards. When scientific communities are polarized, one would expect to find systematic differences among combatants in the choice of appropriate assumptions, and variation in the application of "precaution" in standard setting. We test this proposition using an experiment applied in a mail survey format to groups of scientists from opposing sides of the nuclear policy debate. Questions were asked about the role of political, social, and epistemological beliefs in reaching scientific and policy judgments about the relationship between radiation dose and cancer incidence in human populations. We find that the precautionary tendency is pervasive regardless of whether the scientist is associated with a putatively pro‐ or anti‐nuclear group. Using a multinomial logit model, we explain a modest percentage of the variation in the choice of preferred judgments about safety standards, but find that distinct sets of political and social values are significantly associated with policy positions among scientists. Implications for scientific advice to policymakers are discussed.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 67, Heft 3, S. 690-715
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 67, Heft 3, S. 690-715
ISSN: 0022-3816
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 48, Heft 3, S. 287-309
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
World Affairs Online
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 48, Heft 3, S. 287-309
ISSN: 1552-8766
Scholars have made little progress in exploring the degree to which research on belief structures among Americans may be generalizable to other political systems and geopolitical contexts. The distribution and structure of mass beliefs related to nuclear security, missile defenses, and nuclear energy issues in the United States and Great Britain are analyzed using data from telephone surveys simultaneously administered in both countries. In foreign and domestic areas, the British and American belief systems vary chiefly in the central tendencies of the beliefs held but not in the structural relationships among those beliefs. Findings provide evidence for a hierarchical model of policy beliefs with differential adjustments based on situational conditions, but also raise questions about the kinds of conditions—geopolitical and institutional—that give rise to these similarities.
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 61, Heft 4, S. 944-966
ISSN: 1468-2508
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 61, Heft 4, S. 944-966
ISSN: 0022-3816
In a recent article, Kimball & Patterson (1997, 722) found that citizens appear to make a comparison between what they expect of their representatives in Congress & what they perceive congressional behavior to actually be like -- what they call the "expectations-perceptions differential" & what presidential scholars call the "expectations gap." In this article, we replicate & expand Kimball & Patterson's study & relate it to the presidency. Through an analysis of survey data collected at the beginning & the end of the 1996 presidential election campaign, & by using four separate measures of expectations gap, we demonstrate that public expectations exert a significant impact on evaluations of an incumbent president. They also have a direct impact on vote preference. 6 Tables, 20 References. Adapted from the source document.