Suchergebnisse

Introduces a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of postcommunist political & economic elites of 1990s Central & Eastern Europe. Following a description of a model that distinguishes & relates patterns of elite unity or disunity, differentiation, & circulation, attention turns to the relationship of elite change to institutional change. The utility of the aforementioned model is evaluated via examination of central elite & regime developments 1988-1994. During this period, ie, the transition years, elite change involved critical accommodations of unity in diversity, aided by profound but gradual & peaceful circulations in some countries, eg, Hungary & Poland; this did not occur on the same scale in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Russia, Serbia, & Croatia, thus, less democratic development occurred. Elite change since then is assessed, & a firming of democratic processes was evidenced in Bulgaria, Slovakia, & Russia, although scant sign of elite unity was seen. Elite divisions remained deep in Serbia & Croatia, leading to the former's destruction in 1999. References to contributions are made throughout. 3 Figures, 27 References. J. Zendejas

Noting that Marxist & elite paradigms birthed competing theories on social & political change & that the differential development of these theories depends less on evidence than on ideological leanings, the epilogue to a collection of essays on postsocialist elites compares these paradigms in terms of their polarity in the 20th century. Although fading by the end of the 19th century, Marxism saw renewed vitality as it was embraced as a theoretical & ideological tool of radical & reformist leaders of the European Left. Elite theory's decline is attributed less to a lack of its plausibility than to a lack of ties to organized political forces. However, Marxism's emergence as a major global intellectual & political movement had a concomitant destructive impact on its explanatory power. By the end of the 20th century, Marxist theory comprised many dissipating streams. The decline of elite theory is delineated, noting that its tenets remained intact despite its unpopularity among activists & intellectuals. The negative effect of fascism -- ie, the dubious notion that elite theory leads to fascism -- is noted, along with the idea that a combination of socioeconomic & sociocultural factors further eclipsed elite theory's development & popularity. Latter-20th-century elite theory lacked urgency in discussions on Western democracies & non-Western developing countries. However, three trends led to the reinvigoration of elite theory: economic advances of Japan & the Asian tigers, state socialism in Eastern Europe, & the elite-driven Soviet collapse. Thus, political developments driving the revival of elite theory include the centrality of elite choices & actions guiding these changes; & the theoretical developments include the exhaustion of Marxist theory's credibility & the reformulation of elite-centered democratic theory. Five suppositions underlying the analyses of contributions are delineated. 56 References. J. Zendejas

Introduces a collection of essays devoted to the analysis of postcommunist political & economic elites of 1990s Central & Eastern Europe. Following a description of a model that distinguishes & relates patterns of elite unity or disunity, differentiation, & circulation, attention turns to the relationship of elite change to institutional change. The utility of the aforementioned model is evaluated via examination of central elite & regime developments 1988-1994. During this period, ie, the transition years, elite change involved critical accommodations of unity in diversity, aided by profound but gradual & peaceful circulations in some countries, eg, Hungary & Poland; this did not occur on the same scale in Slovakia, Bulgaria, Russia, Serbia, & Croatia, thus, less democratic development occurred. Elite change since then is assessed, & a firming of democratic processes was evidenced in Bulgaria, Slovakia, & Russia, although scant sign of elite unity was seen. Elite divisions remained deep in Serbia & Croatia, leading to the former's destruction in 1999. References to contributions are made throughout. 3 Figures, 27 References. J. Zendejas

Noting that Marxist & elite paradigms birthed competing theories on social & political change & that the differential development of these theories depends less on evidence than on ideological leanings, the epilogue to a collection of essays on postsocialist elites compares these paradigms in terms of their polarity in the 20th century. Although fading by the end of the 19th century, Marxism saw renewed vitality as it was embraced as a theoretical & ideological tool of radical & reformist leaders of the European Left. Elite theory's decline is attributed less to a lack of its plausibility than to a lack of ties to organized political forces. However, Marxism's emergence as a major global intellectual & political movement had a concomitant destructive impact on its explanatory power. By the end of the 20th century, Marxist theory comprised many dissipating streams. The decline of elite theory is delineated, noting that its tenets remained intact despite its unpopularity among activists & intellectuals. The negative effect of fascism -- ie, the dubious notion that elite theory leads to fascism -- is noted, along with the idea that a combination of socioeconomic & sociocultural factors further eclipsed elite theory's development & popularity. Latter-20th-century elite theory lacked urgency in discussions on Western democracies & non-Western developing countries. However, three trends led to the reinvigoration of elite theory: economic advances of Japan & the Asian tigers, state socialism in Eastern Europe, & the elite-driven Soviet collapse. Thus, political developments driving the revival of elite theory include the centrality of elite choices & actions guiding these changes; & the theoretical developments include the exhaustion of Marxist theory's credibility & the reformulation of elite-centered democratic theory. Five suppositions underlying the analyses of contributions are delineated. 56 References. J. Zendejas

A BASIC QUESTION IS HOW POLITICS ARE TAMED AND CEASE BEING A deadly, warlike affair. The most dramatic way is through sudden, deliberate and lasting compromises of core disputes among political elites – what we think of as 'elite settlements'. Prior to settlements elites disagree about government institutions, engage in unchecked fights for dominance, and view politics as winner-take-all. After settlements, elite persons and groups continue to be affiliated with conflicting parties, movements, and beliefs, but they share a consensus about government institutions and the codes and rules of political competition. Settlements tame politics by generating tacitly accommodative and overtly restrained practices among competing political elites.

Taking its point of departure in the elitist paradigm and the much-discussed relationship between elite integration and stable democratic political systems, this article offers a typology of fragmented and integrated national elites and investigates the structure of the "consensually integrated" elite type. It is hypothesized that "consensually integrated" elites have largely similar structures consisting of personal interaction networks which are more inclusive and less class-based, and which contain more extensive and centralized connections among all major elite groups, than the plural elite, power elite or ruling class models of elite structure separately depict. Support for these hypotheses is found in a comparison of the network structures of two consensually integrated national elites, the American and Australian, as these structures are revealed by issue-based sociometric data taken from closely comparable elite samples and studies in the two countries.