Suchergebnisse

Social identity theory (SIT) suggests that perceived identity difference between groups predicts to intergroup conflict, including interstate conflict. Contact theory suggests that social contact between groups can help reduce intergroup conflict. Contact theory, however, has not traditionally focused on perceived identity difference, and it has not been tested much on real-world interstate conflicts. Employing an experimental design, our study tests for the effects of imagined social contact on Chinese students' generally malign perceptions of identity difference with Japanese people. We find that imagined contact reduces key perceptions of difference by reducing both perceived Japanese malignity and perceived Chinese benignity. This suggests that social contact helps produce new hybrid in-group. By employing SIT, our findings provide a new microfoundation for contact theory, suggest an important process in the creation of security communities, and provide a proof of concept for public policies aimed at large-scale cultural exchanges.

Ausgehend von einem Überblick über die bis in die späten 70er Jahre von der VR China in der Frage der Abrüstung und der Rüstungskontrolle vertretenen Position untersucht der Verfasser die Ursachen und Hintergründe des Wandels bzw. der Flexibilisierung der chinesischen Abrüstungs- und Rüstungskontrollpolitik in den 80er Jahren sowie die hierdurch implizierten Modifizierungen bzw. Änderungen der Haltung der VR China in wichtigen Bereichen der Abrüstung und Rüstungskontrolle (i.e. umfassende Abrüstung, umfassender Atomwaffenteststop. Nonproliferationsvertrag, Verzicht auf nuklearen Erstschlag, MBFR-Verhandlungen und konventionelle Rüstungskontrolle, SALT-, START- und INF-Verhandlungen, Kontrolle chemischer Waffen, SDI). (BIOst-Klk)

The central issue in Taiwan's politics revolves around the island's relationship with China. The three major parties—the Kuomintang, Democratic Progressive Party, and Taiwan People's Party—take different positions on this, and their supporters align with these respective positions. However, there is a scarcity of research on the foreign policy inclinations of individuals who do not align with any political party. We find empirically that self-reported independents in Taiwan exhibit a preference for bandwagoning, driven by concerns for tangible material benefits; cultural similarity, economic interests, and the power dynamics between the US and China also play substantial roles here. These findings shed light on the unique role and dynamics of independents in Taiwan's political landscape. Our theoretical innovation lies in showing that in a democracy, different factors come into play in the formation of the foreign policy preferences of different groups.