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BY 1967--AFTER 20 YEARS OF PERSISTENT, UNRESOLVED CONFLICT IN THE MIDEAST--ISRAEL HAD BECOME TIRED, DEFENSIVE, & REPETITIVE IN ITS STRATEGY. THIS IMMOBILISM WAS TEMPORARILY SHATTERED BY THE YOM KIPPUR WAR WHICH PROVIDED AN OPPORTUNITY FOR IMPORTANT REASSESSMENTS OF THE ISRAELI POSTURE & DEMONSTRATED THE WEAKNESS OF SOME OF ITS INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT. TO FULFILL THE NEED FOR CONSTRUCTIVE & INTELLIGENT INTERNATIONAL MANAGEMENT OF PEACE GOALS, HENRY KISSINGER FASHIONED A SERIES OF DISENGAGEMENTS. HOWEVER, THESE ARE VIEWED AS BEING AN UNSTABLE PATTERN OF NEGOTIATIONS THAT IS UNLIKELY TO ACHIEVE A PEACE SETTLEMENT. AS ANOTHER PATH TO PEACE, THE US & THE USSR MUST ACT IN CONCERT TO MOVE DIRECTLY TOWARD A NEGOTIATED SETTLEMENT OF A PEACE TREATY IN A TOTAL PACKAGE. THIS TREATY MUST NOT DEPEND ON UN FORCES. POSSIBLE TERMS OF SETTLEMENT ARE SUGGESTED, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON: (1) RETURN OF THE ARAB TERRITORIES CONQUERED IN THE 1967 WAR & THE INSTITUTION OF SELF-GOVERNMENT BY THE PALESTINIANS ON THE WEST BANK, & (2) RECOGNITION OF ISRAELS' EXISTENCE AS A STATE, ACCEPTANCE OF 1967 BOUNDARIES AS THE LEGITIMATE BOUNDARIES OF ISRAEL, & THE SIGNING OF FORMAL PEACE SETTLEMENTS. J. SHIFFER.

Less than a generation ago international relations textbooks either referred to the international system as a realm of anarchy or applied to it global generalizations such as the balance of power. That the number of major states in the system, their economic and military potential, their alliance patterns, and so forth might affect the resort to force and the results of such resort was largely foreign to analysis.

If Ambrose Bierce were writing his Devil's Dictionary today, he would probably define psychology as the science that predicts that Russian leaders will behave the same way during a missile crisis that a female sophomore does on a date. If tiiis is a caricature, it is only mildly so, as one would quickly learn by reading die testimony on psychology and international relations during die hearings in 1967 of die Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Over the past decade traditionalists have launched a series of attacks on scientific approaches to international politics. Most of the arguments employed against the scientific approach stem from those used earlier by E. H. Carr in The Twenty Years' Crisis. The general arguments that have been employed include these among others: that politics involves purpose in a way that physical science does not; that scientific knowledge is applicable to facts, but understanding, wisdom, or intuition are required for areas where human purpose is involved; that those pursuing scientific models tend to mistake their models for reality; that scientific method requires high precision and measurement and therefore is incapable of coping with the most important elements of international politics; and that the practitioners of scientific method can never be sure that they have not left something out of their model.

Senator Fulbright's recent excursion into the analysis of1 foreign policy has been hailed as a breath of fresh air that sweeps away the cobwebs of cant and misunderstanding. The history of postwar foreign policy explains why such a study is needed. The inspiring successes and inventive genius of the first Truman Administration—an era unparalleled in American history for resourceful and courageous adaptation to changing circumstances—have been succeeded by disarray and confusion in American foreign policy. Both the early postwar stereotypes and the grand design of policy are breaking down. Thus the Senator's objective—an objective of unmasking old myths and clarifying new realities—is necessary and salutary.