Suchergebnisse

The strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantially in dynamic models where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes, but investment subsidies may become completely ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are static.

The strategic effects of subsidies on output and subsidies on investment differ substantially in dynamic models where a government's commitment ability is limited. Output subsidies remain effective even as the period of commitment vanishes, but investment subsidies may become completely ineffective. This difference has been obscured because most existing models of strategic trade policy are static.

Modern international investment agreements have challenged the customary exclusion of public good regulations from being considered government 'takings' subject to compensation rules. Full compensation for regulatory takings can, however, lead to over-investment and excessive entry in risky industries. An alternative is to 'carve-out' apparently efficient regulation from compensation requirements. We design a carve-out/compensation rule that induces efficient regulation and firm-level investment even when the regulator suffers fiscal illusion and has private information about the social benefit from regulation. We also show that a carve-out reduces the subsidy to risky industry implicit in compensation rules, and thus mitigates the entry problem.

Modern international investment agreements have challenged the customary exclusion of public good regulations from being considered government 'takings' subject to compensation rules. Full compensation for regulatory takings can, however, lead to over-investment and excessive entry in risky industries. An alternative is to 'carve-out' apparently efficient regulation from compensation requirements. We design a carve-out/compensation rule that induces efficient regulation and firm-level investment even when the regulator suffers fiscal illusion and has private information about the social benefit from regulation. We also show that a carve-out reduces the subsidy to risky industry implicit in compensation rules, and thus mitigates the entry problem.