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China is, and will continue to be for some time to come, a great concern to U.S. administrations. The Clinton administration has chosen to pursue a policy of engagement with China, arguing that it is best to try to bring China into "the community of nations" rather than to contain and isolate it. Integrating China through a policy of engagement has meant, most importantly, the maintenance and expansion of American trade with, and the encouragement of investments in, China. There have been some limits to the administration's policy though, for a tough line has been taken toward China on membership in the World Trade Organization (WTO) and on the piracy of intellectual property (e.g., compact discs and videos). Engagement empowers pacific economic internationalists in China, while containment would likely bring to the fore more aggressive political and economic interests. What are the security implications of such a policy? This paper focuses on the impact that America's economic relations in the policy of engagement with China have had, and will likely have, on the nature of Chinese foreign policy and on U.S.–Chinese security relations. In short, we argue that a policy of engagement will have beneficial consequences. Such a policy empowers more pacific economic internationalists in China, while containment would likely weaken those forces and might bring to the fore more aggressive political and economic interests. The risks of engagement are also insignificant in the near term. Because U.S. economic stakes in China are fairly small, they do not carry the danger of tying the hands of U.S. leaders should the Chinese pursue conflictual policies that require the United States to balance against China. A policy of engagement thus promises greater benefits than containment, with few risks.

"Economic Interdependence and Conflict" published on by Oxford University Press.

China's rising power and increased global activism have attracted increasing attention, with particular focus on whether a stronger China is likely to be a revisionist or status quo state. Power transition theory highlights the potential for a dissatisfied rising power to challenge the existing international order, but it is difficult to evaluate whether a rising power is dissatisfied. Where Chinese leaders choose to travel can offer insights into whether China's behavior is more consistent with that of a revisionist or status quo state and into China's broader diplomatic priorities. We present a series of expectations concerning how the travel patterns of a challenger state are likely to differ from the travel patterns of a status quo state. Using a newly compiled data set, we then analyze the correlates of travel abroad by top Chinese leaders from 1998 to 2008. Our results are more consistent with a status quo conceptualization of China, though there are some important exceptions such as willingness to travel to rogue states. We also use travel data to test other hypotheses about Chinese foreign policy behavior. Adapted from the source document.

In Taiwan's 2008 presidential election, both candidates advocated signing a peace agreement with China, and Chinese leaders have also expressed interest in reaching such an agreement. Although substantial obstacles remain in the way of a cross-strait peace agreement, this increased interest on both sides of the Taiwan Strait suggests that a closer examination of an agreement's possible dimensions and consequences is warranted. This analysis considers what an agreement might look like, whether and how it might be effective in reducing the possibility of cross-strait military conflict, the relevant barriers to an agreement, and whether an agreement—if reached—would be likely to endure.