Suchergebnisse

Abstract
This article employs unique tax administrative data and operational audit information, including risk scores used for audit selection, from a sample of approximately 7500 self-employed US taxpayers to investigate the effects of operational tax audits on future reporting behavior. Our estimates indicate that audits can have substantial deterrent or counter-deterrent effects, depending on the audit outcome. In the aggregate, taxable income is estimated to increase by roughly 15% 1 year after an operational audit. However, this figure masks substantial heterogeneity within the population. Among those taxpayers who receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be 64% higher in the first year after the audit (44% after 3 years) than it would have been in the absence of the audit. In contrast, among those taxpayers who do not receive an additional tax assessment, reported taxable income is estimated to be approximately 15% lower the year after the audit (21% 3 years later) than it would have been had the audit not taken place. Our results suggest that improved targeting of audits toward noncompliant taxpayers would not only yield more direct audit revenue but also pay dividends in terms of future tax collections.

Both coercion, such as strict auditing and the use of fines, and legitimate procedures, such as assistance by tax authorities, are often discussed as means of enhancing tax compliance. However, the psychological mechanisms that determine the effectiveness of each strategy are not clear. Although highly relevant, there is rare empirical literature examining the effects of both strategies applied in combination. It is assumed that coercion decreases implicit trust in tax authorities, leading to the perception of a hostile antagonistic tax climate and enforced tax compliance. Conversely, it is suggested that legitimate power increases reason‐based trust in the tax authorities, leading to the perception of a service climate and eventually to voluntary cooperation. The combination of both strategies is assumed to cause greater levels of intended compliance than each strategy alone. We conducted two experimental studies with convenience samples of 261 taxpayers overall. The studies describe tax authorities as having low or high coercive power (e.g., imposing lenient or severe sanctions) and/or low or high legitimate power (e.g., having nontransparent or transparent procedures). Data analyses provide supportive evidence for the assumptions regarding the impact on intended tax compliance. Coercive power did not reduce implicit trust in tax authorities; however, it had an effect on reason‐based trust, interaction climate, and intended tax compliance if applied solely. When wielded in combination with legitimate power, it had no effect.

Research on tax behaviour or attitudes towards tax evasion has rarely taken into account the political preferences of taxpayers. The present research aimed to explore the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward tax compliance within the "slippery slope framework" (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). We conducted a quantitative survey (N = 272) and two online focus groups with self-employed taxpayers in Italy, and found significant differences between left-leaning and right-leaning taxpayers. These two groups were characterized by two different pathways that lead to greater tax compliance, and attached different meanings and values to tax behaviours. In particular, left-leaning taxpayers expressed higher levels of voluntary cooperation and showed reactance to the coercive power of authorities, whereas right-leaning taxpayers expressed higher levels of enforced tax compliance and were more averse to tax evasion with increased trust in authorities and institutions. Although further research on this topic is advisable, these results bear relevant theoretical and practical implications. ; peerReviewed ; publishedVersion

Research on tax behaviour or attitudes towards tax evasion has rarely taken into account the political preferences of taxpayers. The present research aimed to explore the relationship between political ideology and attitudes toward tax compliance within the "slippery slope framework" (Kirchler, Hoelzl, & Wahl, 2008). We conducted a quantitative survey (N = 272) and two online focus groups with self-employed taxpayers in Italy, and found significant differences between left-leaning and right-leaning taxpayers. These two groups were characterized by two different pathways that lead to greater tax compliance, and attached different meanings and values to tax behaviours. In particular, left-leaning taxpayers expressed higher levels of voluntary cooperation and showed reactance to the coercive power of authorities, whereas right-leaning taxpayers expressed higher levels of enforced tax compliance and were more averse to tax evasion with increased trust in authorities and institutions. Although further research on this topic is advisable, these results bear relevant theoretical and practical implications.

Intro -- Was Sie in diesem essential finden können -- Vorwort -- Inhaltsverzeichnis -- 1 Chronologie der Ereignisse -- 1.1 Kein Grund zur Sorge -- 1.2 Unvorbereitet in Gefahr -- 1.3 Entwicklung der Krise auf gesellschaftlichen Ebenen -- 2 Beginn der Krise -- 2.1 Beginn der Krise auf Mikroebene -- 2.1.1 Angst -- 2.1.2 Soziale Vorstellungen -- 2.1.3 Entscheidungen -- 2.2 Beginn der Krise auf Mesoebene -- 2.2.1 Bewältigungsstrategien -- 2.2.2 Moral und Trittbrettfahren -- 2.3 Beginn der Krise auf Makroebene -- 2.3.1 Wir-Gefühl -- 2.3.2 Akzeptanz der Maßnahmen -- 3 Leben in Zeiten der Krise -- 3.1 Verhalten auf Mikroebene -- 3.1.1 Soziale Gewohnheiten -- 3.1.2 Anpassungsstrategien -- 3.1.3 Soziale Vergleiche und Normen -- 3.2 Dynamik auf Mesoebene -- 3.2.1 Arbeit und Konsum -- 3.2.2 Gerechtigkeit -- 3.3 Interaktion auf Makroebene -- 3.3.1 Motivation -- 3.3.2 Kooperation -- 3.3.3 Vertrauen und Steuerehrlichkeit -- 4 Reparatur, Rückschau und Ausblick -- 4.1 Schuldzuweisung und Verschwörungstheorien -- 4.2 Bewertung und Rückschau -- 4.3 Gesundheitsschutz als Voraussetzung für die Wirtschaft -- 4.4 Klare Regeln oder libertärer Paternalismus -- 4.5 Globale Krisen - globales Handeln -- 4.6 Krise als Chance -- 4.7 Aufbruch in eine bessere Welt? -- Was Sie aus diesem essential mitnehmen können -- Literatur.