Suchergebnisse

Intro -- Anthony de Jasay, Economic Sense and Nonsense -- Front Matter -- Title Page -- Copyright Details -- Table of Contents, p. vii -- Preface, p. xi -- Part I. To Spend or Not to Spend?, p. 1 -- 1. To Spend or Not To Spend?, p. 3 -- 2. Who is Afraid of the National Debt?, p. 8 -- 3. Two Cheers For Fiscal Austerity: Part I, p. 13 -- 4. Two Cheers For Fiscal Austerity: Part 2, p. 17 -- 5. What Became of the Liquidity Trap?, p. 22 -- 6. The Archbishop and the Accountants, p. 25 -- 7. Two Ways, But Where To?, p. 29 -- 8. The Platinum Rule, p. 34 -- 9. A Fiscal Curb To Tame the State?, p. 40 -- 10. Can Sovereign Borrowing Be A Criminal Offense?, p. 43 -- Part 2. The Third Way to Stability?, p. 47 -- 1. Greed, Need, Risk, and Regulation, p. 49 -- 2. Trudging Down the Third Way, p. 59 -- 3. Open Season on the Capitalist Free-For-All, p. 63 -- 4. Collective Choice at Work, p. 66 -- 5. Instinctive Blunders: Job Protection and Redistribution, p. 70 -- 6. In Fantasyland: the Stressless Economy, p. 74 -- 7. They Wanted A New Order, p. 78 -- Part 3: The United States of Europe and America, p. 83 -- 1. The Foolish Quest For Stability, p. 85 -- 2. Europeans Know Better: The Atlantic Cleavage on Financial Reform, p. 89 -- 3. Our Cherished Optimum Currency Area: Its Trials and Tribulations, p. 93 -- 4. Eurozone: It Seemed A Good Idea at the Time, p. 98 -- 5. Stone-Age Banking, Anti-Speculation, and Rescuing the Euro, p. 102 -- 6. Butcher, Brewer, Baker, Banker: All Must Work by the Golden Rule, p. 106 -- 7. Euramerica: A Safety-First Economy, p. 110 -- 8. Come and Get Caught in my Trap, p. 114 -- 9. The Use and Abuse of Taxes and Tax Havens, p. 118 -- 10. Russia's Socialist Heritage, p. 122 -- 11. Oil, Gas, and Bluster, p. 127 -- Part 4. The Best of the Worst, p. 135 -- 1. The Best of the Worst: What Price Democracy?, p. 137.

Anthony de Jasay's work has been enormously influential, describing both a theoretical philosophical model for a stateless, liberal, free market order and offering analysis of and solutions to many of the technical economic problems associated with such a vision of society - most notably his work on the free rider and his return. In this book ten significant scholars in philosophy and political economy, including Nobel laureate in economics James Buchanan, pay tribute to the man and his work in a series of essays at once both respectful and critical. Ordered Anarchy focuses on three fundamental questions of libertarian thinking. Which are the basic libertarian principles and how do rights and liberties relate to each other? Is order possible and durable in an anarchic or quasi-anarchic society, and if so, under which preconditions? How and to what extent are the pillars of politics, such as the constitution, institutions and government, detrimental or beneficial to an enduring free society? While Narveson, Palmer and Bouillon focus on the first of these questions, the late Radnitzky and van Dun address the second. Benson, Holcombe and Kliemt provide answers to question number three, while Buchanan and Little highlight the role of Anthony de Jasay in this debate and the inspiration that his thinking has given to the authors of this volume.

AbstractThis paper in honor of Hans Albert '@100' seeks to show how adhering to critical rationalist 'economic philosophy' avoids contradictions in James Buchanan's contractarianism: restricting constitutional economic advice to what serves the ends of all potential addressees simultaneously Buchanan not only blurs the borderline between value-neutral economic philosophy and substantive moral philosophy but also contradicts his thesis of the "necessary relativism and individualism of values". Translating 'means-ends'-relations into technological 'cause-effect'-relations, Albert can treat technological blueprints as nomological hypotheses subject to scientific test and corroboration while leaving their practical implementation to citizens whose contingent particular ends may or may not be universalistic.

We suggest that procedures of monetarized bidding can facilitate co-operation in Elinor Ostrom type common(s) projects without crowding out communitarian faculties of self-governance. Axioms securing procedurally egalitarian bidding on the basis of declared monetary evaluations are introduced. They guarantee that all realized changes of a status quo are in an objective (pecuniary) sense equally advantageous for all members of the community. Some empirical evidence that procedurally fair bidding can promote communitarian co-operation rather than crowding it out, is presented. The practical scope and limits of procedural egalitarianism need further empirical exploration, though.