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Based on three in-depth case studies, the study analyzes how and why Chinese enterprises partner with governments in cooperative ventures which aim to simultaneously achieve poverty alleviation objectives and establish profitable business ventures in rural areas. The analysis draws out specific characteristics of three government-business partnerships in China, which vary in terms of governance structure, resource complementarity and incentives. The findings show that in this state capitalist system, outcomes of government-business partnerships depend on firms having unique resources and capabilities that serve particular policy objectives of the government. By the same token, in order to make partnerships attractive to firms, national and local governments must hold the keys to unique resources needed by enterprises looking to do business in low-income markets. The cases further illustrate that, in order to build and maintain successful government-business partnerships over time, the alignment of incentives plays an important role. In sum, complementary resources and well-aligned interests between firms and governments help to explain why some government-enterprise partnerships are more successful than others.

This paper analyzes the determinants of Chinese government support for methanol automobile fuel development. At the national level, a preference for low carbon alternatives, ongoing bureaucratic restructuring, and profitability concerns of the national oil companies (NOCs) help to explain a lack of support for methanol fuel. At the local level, a short-term and localized view of industry development explains why some governments actively promote methanol fuel through local standardization, subsidies, and management of NOC opposition. The case of methanol fuel illustrates how local governments with strong, embedded interests have filled in the national-level policy vacuum on this issue. These findings contribute to the ongoing debate on the evolving central-local relations in China and hold lessons for alternative fuel adoption efforts underway in many parts of the world. (J Contemp China/GIGA)

AbstractThis paper analyses Chinese sub-national governments' implementation strategies to meet national energy efficiency targets in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006–2010). Previous research has focused on the ways governance practices and decision-making structures shape implementation outcomes, yet very little attention has been given to what strategies local leaders actually employ to bridge national priorities with local interests. To illustrate how local leaders work politically, this paper highlights specific implementation methods officials use to strengthen formal incentives and create effective informal incentives to comply with energy efficiency mandates. The analysis is drawn from 53 interviews conducted in June and July of 2010 in Shanxi, a major coal-producing and energy-intensive province. Findings suggest that local government leaders conform to national directives by "bundling" the energy efficiency policy with policies of more pressing local importance or by "bundling" their energy efficiency objectives with the interests of groups with significant political influence. Ultimately, sub-national government officials frame policies in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level.

This paper analyses Chinese sub-national governments' implementation strategies to meet national energy efficiency targets in the 11th Five-Year Plan (2006-2010). Previous research has focused on the ways governance practices and decision-making structures shape implementation outcomes, yet very little attention has been given to what strategies local leaders actually employ to bridge national priorities with local interests. To illustrate how local leaders work politically, this paper highlights specific implementation methods officials use to strengthen formal incentives and create effective informal incentives to comply with energy efficiency mandates. The analysis is drawn from 53 interviews conducted in June and July of 2010 in Shanxi, a major coal-producing and energy-intensive province. Findings suggest that local government leaders conform to national directives by "bundling" the energy efficiency policy with policies of more pressing local importance or by "bundling" their energy efficiency objectives with the interests of groups with significant political influence. Ultimately, sub-national government officials frame policies in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level. (China Q/GIGA)

China's energy-service companies (ESCOs) have developed only modestly despite favorable political and market conditions. We argue that with sophisticated market institutions still evolving in China, trust-based relations between ESCOs and energy customers are essential for successful implementation of energy efficiency projects. Chinese ESCOs, who are predominantly small and private enterprises, perform poorly in terms of trust-building because they are disembedded from local business, social, and political networks. We conclude that in the current institutional setting, the ESCO model based on market relations has serious limitations and is unlikely to lead to large-scale implementation of energy efficiency projects in China.

This paper investigates poverty alleviation efforts in China and the nature of governmententerprise partnerships there. We argue that firms partnering central and local governments can be an effective strategy to overcome resource-based obstacles in low-income markets. In China, local and central governments are owners of rare and valuable resources, thus offering better access to finance, infrastructure, technical and planning expertise, advocacy through government marketing and distribution channels, and links to other stakeholders. The findings are based on 16 case studies of firms entering the low-income market in China, of which two cases in the agricultural and telecommunication sector are studied in depth.

This paper analyzes the determinants of alternative automobile fuel regulation and development support with a particular focus on methanol fuel. We find that embedded interests, bureaucratic reforms, and political circumstances in the Chinese national, provincial, and municipal governments have all shaped policy outcomes in this area. The paper seeks to explain why at, the national level, support for alternative fuels has waned and finds that the concerns of state oil majors and disorganization during the process of national bureaucratic restructuring have been the deciding factors. Interestingly, at the sub-national level promotion of methanol continues unabated in some places. At the local level, business relationships as well as the embedded economic and personal interests of local leaders help to explain managerial local government behavior and sheds light on why government officials actively create and manage methanol fuel business opportunities through local standardization, subsidies, and hands-on management of SOE opposition. The switch towards methanol fuel was more successful in localities where individuals, either government officials or enterprise managers, formed an alliance and made this their 'pet projects'. The analysis draws on 55 interviews conducted between June and October 2010 in Shanxi, a major coal-producing province which has supported methanol fuel-switching programs for over ten years. The findings contribute to debates about the condition of the local state in China. The argument put forward in this paper is that because of limited state capacity at the central level and insufficient concerns for the development of alternative fuels in the short-term, some sub-national governments with strong embedded interests promote certain alternative fuels by taking on active managerial roles, adopting creative and ad-hoc strategies to fill in the national level policy gap at the local level.

With the end of China's 11th Five-Year Plan approaching, this paper analyzes sub-national governments' implementation strategies to meet national energy efficiency targets. Previous research focuses on the way governance practices and decision-making structures shape implementation outcomes, yet very little attention has been given to what strategies local leaders actually employ to bridge national priorities with local interests. To illustrate how leaders work politically, this paper highlights specific implementation mechanisms officials use to strengthen formal incentives and create effective informal incentives to fulfill their energy efficiency mandates. The analysis is drawn from fifty-three interviews conducted in June and July 2010 in Shanxi, a major coal-producing and energy-intensive province. Findings suggest that local government leaders conform to the national directives by 'bundling' the energy efficiency policy with policies of more pressing local importance or by 'bundling' with the interests of groups with significant political influence. Ultimately, officials take national policies and then frame them in ways that give them legitimacy at the local level.

The adoption of COVID-19 contact tracing apps (CTAs) has been proposed as an important measure to contain the spread of COVID-19. Based on a cross-national dataset, this article analyzes public perceptions toward CTAs and the factors that drive CTA acceptance in China, Germany, and the United States. We find that public acceptance of CTAs is significantly higher in China as compared with Germany and the United States. Despite very different sociopolitical contexts, there are striking similarities in the factors that drive CTA acceptance in all three countries. Citizens are willing to accept digital contact tracing despite concerns about privacy infringement and government surveillance, as long as the apps are perceived as effective in lowering infection rates and providing health information. This creates a chicken-and-egg problem for CTAs in Germany and the United States where CTAs are voluntary: a high citizen adoption rate is necessary for CTAs to be effective, but CTAs are only effective if adoption rates are high.