Suchergebnisse

E. M. Clarke ("Multipart Pricing of Public Goods," Public Choice 1971, 8, 19-33) has proposed a means of resolving the problem of giving voters incentive to impart their true preferences & to determine these preferences carefully: the demand-revealing process. The workings of this process are analyzed for a single hypothetical public project of fixed size. If this mechanism is applied to a sample of the population (with greater accuracy resulting from a larger sample), the strength of the incentive to reveal a true preference rating will decrease as the sample size increases. If the population consists of rational expected utility maximizing individuals & the decisionmaker is a Bayesian agent, an optimal sample size can be derived. The value of this procedure is positive. The sampling procedure itself, however, may induce certain biases such that truth revelation is not a dominant strategy in all cases. W. H. Stoddard.

This book comprises the second volume of papers presented at the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. With papers from the world's leading specialists, it gives the reader a unique survey of the most recent advances in economic theory

This book comprises the first volume of papers presented at the Sixth World congress of the Econometric Society in Barcelona in August 1990. With papers from the world's leading specialists, it gives the reader a unique survey of advances in economic theory