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This paper revisits two classical problems in the theory of voting—viz. the divided majority problem and the strategic revelation of information—in the light of evolutionarily founded partial Kantian morality. It is shown that, compared to electorates consisting of purely self-interested voters, such Kantian morality helps voters solve coordination problems and improves the information aggregation properties of equilibria, even for modest levels of morality.

International audience ; If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.

International audience ; If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.

International audience ; If voters vote strategically, is it useful to offer them the possibility of expressing nuanced opinions, or would they always overstate the intensity of their preferences? For additive voting rules, say that a ballot is extremal if it is neither abstention-like nor can be expressed as a mixture of the available ballots. We give a sufficient condition for strategic equivalence: if two rules share the same set of extremal ballots (up to an homothetic transformation), they are strategically equivalent in large elections. This condition is also necessary for the strategic equivalence of positional rules. These results do not hold for small electorates.

We study a unidimensional model of spatial competition between two parties with two types of politicians. The office oriented politicians, referred to as "opportunist" politicians, care only about the spoils of the office. The policy oriented politicians, referred to as "militant" politicians have ideological preferences on the policy space. In this framework, we compare a winner-take-all system, where all the spoils go to the winner, to a proportional system, where the spoils of office are split among the two parties proportionally to their share of the vote. We study the existence of short term political equilibria and then, within an evolutionary setup, the dynamics and stability of policies and of party membership decisions.

We study a unidimensional model of spatial competition between two parties with two types of politicians. The office oriented politicians, referred to as "opportunist" politicians, care only about the spoils of the office. The policy oriented politicians, referred to as "militant" politicians have ideological preferences on the policy space. In this framework, we compare a winner-take-all system, where all the spoils go to the winner, to a proportional system, where the spoils of office are split among the two parties proportionally to their share of the vote. We study the existence of short term political equilibria and then, within an evolutionary setup, the dynamics and stability of policies and of party membership decisions.

This note is devoted to the question: How restrictive is the assumption that preferences be Euclidean in d dimensions. In particular it is proven that a preference profile with I individuals and A alternatives can be represented by Euclidean utilities with d dimensions if and only if d=min(I,A-1). The paper also describes the systems of A points which allow for the representation of any profile over A alternatives, and provides some results when only strict preferences are considered. ; Cette note est consacrée à la question:Quelle restriction impose-t-on en faisant l'hypothèse qu'un profil de préférences est euclidien en dimension d ? En particulier on démontre qu'un profil de préférences sur I individus et A alternatives peut être représenté par des utilités euclidiennes en dimension d si et seulement si d est supérieur ou égal à min(I,A-1). On décrit aussi les systèmes de points qui permettent de représenter tout profil sur A alternatives, et on donne quelques résultats quand seules les préférences strictes sont considérées.

Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one.

Within the framework of pure redistribution (dividing one unit of a homogeneous good among identical individuals), the paper analyses the redistributions that arise from Downsian two-party electoral competition. It appears that the strategic behavior of vote-maximizing parties lead them to propose divisions which are not far from the egalitarian one.

L'article se propose d'atteindre deux buts. D'une part montrer que la notion de système auto-organisé peut combler le vide épistémologique qui sépare d'un côté le parti-pris d'individualisme méthodologique et de l'autre côté les équilibres de marché. D'autre part montrer qu'il est effectivement possible de construire des outils efficaces d'analyse micro-économique (des modèles) s'inspirant de la théorie des systèmes autoorganisés. Dans ces modèles dynamiques, les individus sont des systèmes adaptatifs lents : leur rationalité est une rationalité limitée « à la Simon ». Les interactions entre individus sont aléatoires et explicitement modélisées. Un exemple d'analyse est fourni : un modèle de « création des compétences ».