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The deployment of onshore wind power is an important means to mitigate climate change. However, wind turbines also produce local disamenities to residents living next to them, mainly due to noise emissions and visual effects. Our paper analyzes how the presence of local disamenities affects the socially optimal siting of onshore wind power. The analysis builds on a spatial optimization model using geographical information system (GIS) data for Germany. Our results indicate a major spatial trade-off between the goals of minimizing electricity generation and disamenity costs. Considering disamenity costs substantially alters - and in fact dominates - the socially optimal spatial allocation of wind power deployment. This is because in Germany a) the spatial correlation between generation costs and disamenity costs is only moderately positive, and b) disamenity costs exhibit a larger spatial heterogeneity than the generation costs. These results are robust to variations in the level and slope of the disamenity cost function that we assume for the modeling. Our findings emphasize the importance of supplementing support schemes for wind power deployment with approaches that address local disamenties, e.g., compensation payments to local residents or minimum settlement distances.

Abstract
Germany faces the challenge of rapidly breaking free from its dependence on fossil fuels. This requires a comprehensive transformation of the energy system. Onshore wind energy is one of the most important generation sources that must be developed on a large scale in order to decarbonise the energy sector. While the expansion targets were raised significantly with the Renewable Energy Law (Erneuerbare-Energien-Gesetz) 2023, the actual deployment of onshore wind energy remains in crisis. To accelerate the expansion, much has been discussed about providing land and simplifying the approval process. However, this article emphasises that reimbursing bid preparation costs can also contribute to driving the expansion of onshore wind energy.

This paper frames the transition towards clean energies as a sequential process of instrument choice and instrument change. First, regulators decide how to initiate the transition away from fossil energies. Here, support policies for renewable electricity are politically convenient because they face low resistance from fossil energies' interest groups. In the second stage, regulators need to adapt support policies for renewables to challenges arising along the transition pathway. We empirically substantiate our arguments by tracing the development of support policies in Germany. Against the backdrop of this analysis, we point towards small-step policies that could foster the transition process.

In this paper, we employ a public choice perspective to analyze the development of policies for renewable energy sources (RES) in the EU in general and in Germany more specifically. In doing so, we explain the main characteristics of current RES policies in the EU by reference to the selfinterest driven motivations of voters, stakeholders and political actors. One important puzzle, which we address, is the following: How could effective RES-policies be introduced against the political opposition of fossil-fuel interest groups in the past? Via analyzing the German example in more detail, we show how over time a self-reinforcing interplay of ideological and financial RES support has emerged. Moreover, we demonstrate that observed specific design choices for EU RES policies, such as largely riskless remuneration schemes, high degrees of technology differentiation and decentralized decision-making across Member States, can be traced back to politicians' need to balance a variety of partly opposing interests. A major benefit of the presented analysis is that it provides a realistic assessment of the challenges for RES policy reform - any reform effort critically depends on its ability to balance stakeholder interests.

It is often argued that Germany's energy transition (the so-called Energiewende) needs to be Europeanized, so as to make the transition process more efficient. In particular, the German system of feed-in tariffs for renewables is criticized for being an obstacle to efficient European energy supply. However, we point out that Germany's approach is no outlier but rather well embedded in the European context of heterogeneous energy policies. Also, full centralization of energy policy decisions on the EU-level is neither desirable from an economic point of view nor a politically feasible option. Against this background, we identify priorities for fostering the European dimension of the Member States' energy policies, such as the coordination of grid extensions and capacity markets.

It is often argued that energy policy is too fragmented across EU Member States and should be Europeanized to pave the way towards an efficiently organized European power system, which rest on the internal market for energy and a pan-European super-grid. However, this view neglects i) the factual heterogeneity of European energy policies in terms of harmonization and centralization, ii) economic arguments in favor of decentralization and iii) legal as well as political-economic obstacles against centralization of decision making. In this vain, we point out that a plea for a stronger role of the EU needs to be made with care and differentiation.

Dieser Beitrag untersucht die Folgen einer polit-ökonomischen Betrachtung des europäischen Emissionshandels (ETS) für die ökonomisch optimale klima- und energiepolitische Instrumentenwahl. Die aus dem wirtschaftswissenschaftlichen Raum prominent vorgetragene Forderung, die energiepolitische Regulierung ausschließlich auf einen möglichst perfekten Emissionshandel zu beschränken und auf ergänzende technologiepolitische Eingriffe zu verzichten, beruht auf drei restriktiven und zugleich realitätsfremden Annahmen: Dass 1) der anthropogene Klimawandel die einzige für die Energieversorgung relevante Externalität ist, daher 2) nur die Begrenzung des CO2-Ausstoßes ein legitimes Umweltziel darstellt und 3) der ETS über ein insoweit optimales Design verfügt, kann jedoch in der Realität nicht vorausgesetzt werden. Vielmehr erscheint der realtypische Emissionshandel aus politökonomischer Sicht als das Resultat eines politischen Regulierungsspiels. Die sich hieraus ergebenden polit-ökonomischen Grenzen des Emissionshandels können flankierende Politikinstrumente insofern legitimieren, als dass die ergänzende Förderung Erneuerbarer Energien (EE) die gesellschaftliche Durchsetzung der gegebenen Klimaziele erleichtert, indem politisch weniger widerstandsträchtige Verteilungsschlüssel der Klimalasten gesellschaftlich organisiert werden. Die Berücksichtigung der tatsächlich bestehenden technologiepolitischen Ziele im Rahmen der Energiewende verstärkt die Notwendigkeit flankierender Politikinstrumente. Denn ein Energiewende-Emissionshandel, der als Einzelinstrument den vollständigen Zielfächer der Energiewende herbeiführt, wäre schon in der Theorie überfordert, geschweige denn in der politischen Praxis durchsetzbar. Die polit-ökonomischen Bedingungen der Energiepolitik zeigen daher zusätzliche Begründungen für einen Policy Mix auf. ; In this paper, we analyse the rationale for an energy policy mix when the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is considered from a public choice perspective. That is, we argue that the economic textbook model of the ETS implausibly assumes 1) anthropogenic climate change as the only relevant externality related to energy provision, 2) thus, climate protection as the single objective of policy intervention and 3) efficient policy design. Contrary to these assumptions, we propose that the ETS originates from a political bargaining game within a context of multiple policy objectives. In particular, the emissions cap is negotiated between regulators and emitters with the emitters' abatement costs as crucial bargaining variable. This public choice view yields striking implications for the optimal policy mix. Whereas the textbook model implies that the ETS alone provides sufficient climate protection, our analysis calls for additional policies. Hence, support for renewable energies contributes to a more effective ETS-design and may even increase the overall efficiency of climate and energy policy if other externalities and political objectives besides climate protection are considered.

In this paper, we analyze the rationale for an energy policy mix when the European Emissions Trading scheme (ETS) is considered from a public choice perspective. That is, we argue that the economic textbook model of the ETS implausibly assumes 1) efficient policy design and 2) climate protection as the single objective of policy intervention. Contrary to these assumptions, we propose that the ETS originates from a political bargaining game within a context of multiple policy objectives. In particular, the emissions cap is negotiated between regulators and emitters with the emitters' abatement costs as crucial bargaining variable. This public choice view yields striking implications for an optimal policy mix comprising RES supporting policies. Whereas the textbook model implies that the ETS alone provides sufficient climate protection, our analysis suggests that support for renewable energies 1) contributes to a more effective ETS-design and 2) may even increase the overall efficiency of climate and energy policy if other externalities and policy objectives besides climate protection are considered. Thus, our analysis also shows that a public choice view not necessarily entails negative evaluations concerning efficiency and effectiveness of a policy mix.

Since numerous countries have already initiated a process of adaptation to climate change by drafting strategies or catalogues of measures, it is of particular importance to identify and overcome potential barriers to efficient public adap-tation from the beginning. A major source of barriers is given by self-interest driven behaviour of actors involved in the adaptation policy process. This is for the reason that several features of the adaptation option and the surrounding policy framework, such as the lacking of a clear-cut success-metric, are likely to boost such behaviour since they facilitate both the manipulation of the adaptation output and the exertion of influence through the various actor groups shaping the political system. Against this background, this paper provides a broad conceptual Public Choice theory framework serving both for raising the consciousness of potential barriers to efficient public adaptation and creating a sound basis for further in-depth research. Concerning the efficiency of public adaptation policies, we distinguish three dimensions, namely extent, structure (form and timing) and organisation (vertical and horizontal) of public adaptation. For either case, potential political biases are investigated taking into consideration the self-interests and influence of voters, pressure groups, bureaucrats and politi-cians in a representative democracy framework.

Exclusion zones, like protected areas or setback distances, are the most common policy instrument to mitigate environmental impacts of human land-use, including the deployment of renewable energy sources. While exclusion zones may provide environmental benefits, they may also bring about opportunity costs. This paper aims to understand and quantify the drivers determining the opportunity costs related to environmental exclusion zones. Using a simple analytical model, we propose that opportunity costs of exclusion zones can be decomposed into a substitution effect (because production is shifted to sites with higher or lower marginal production costs) and an output effect (because more sites may be needed to satisfy demand for produced goods). We provide a numerical illustration for the opportunity costs for two examples of environmental exclusion zones - setback distances to settlements and forest bans - which are implemented for wind power deployment in Germany. The numerical illustration builds on a spatially explicit optimization model using GIS data for more than 100,000 potential wind turbine sites in Germany. Our analysis reveals that opportunity costs may primarily arise in terms of higher local environmental impacts of wind power generation. Opportunity costs are mainly due to the output effect for setback distances, and the substitution effect for forest bans. We also show that the actual sign and size of opportunity costs depends a lot on the cost criteria under consideration as well as the type and stringency of the environmental exclusion zone. Our analysis emphasizes the importance to properly understand possible opportunity costs, and compare them carefully with possible benefits when implementing exclusion zones. Interestingly, our analysis also shows that very restrictive setback distances may not be recommendable at all: In our analysis they turn out to increase the total disamenity costs produced by wind power deployment - contrary to the policy objective pursued by this instrument. We believe that our analytical insights are also helpful when thinking about the impacts of environmental exclusion zones applied to other fields of environmental policy, such as urban development or agriculture.