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The paper presents a dynamical extension of the well­known Bernheim— Cartwright—Patel model of conformism. In this model the signaling equilibrium is a result of the optimal choice of an individual when he/she maximizes his/ her utility by choosing a donation in the amount x. In doing this the individual takes into account the intrinsic utility based on the generosity type t, and social attitude expressed by two types of observers: rational and naïve. Such an attitude significantly depends on social norms in this society and affects the esteem of the individual. Social attitude toward generosity varies within the broad range and at its endpoints leads to either neglect of the society (I do not care what people think of me) or an ideal conformism when a person chooses the same x as the rest of the public. Cartwright and Patel have shown that the presence of the inexperienced observers greatly affects equilibrium. This paper explores the dynamics of the naïve observers when they are informed by the rational ones. The dynamic law in the form of the differential equation was set and the stable steady­state solutions were found. Besides, while working on the dynamic law some clarifications of the preceding results of the original model were done.

The paper examines the evolution of individual political preferences under the influence of the parties and political groups of which they are members. Individual preferences are considered in terms of proximity to political doctrines of the political institutions in question. The change in political views can be considered as a combination of a steady trend with the imposition of random change, and in this sense it is similar to mutations in biology. The paper shows that stationary distributions of individuals on the political spectrum scale are defined by their utility functions and initial numbers. While the initial distribution was generated by membership of the central party and two groups conventionally called "left" and "right", the stationary distribution has the form of three narrow peaks, the maximums of which are at the points characterizing political doctrines on the political spectrum scale. In addition, it is shown that in the stationary mode, the relative number of members of the "center" party will increase as compared to the initial period, and vice versa, the total share of "left" and "right" will decrease.

Drei empirische Studien wurden 1985-86 im Raum Port Elizabeth/Uitenhage durchgeführt, um bessere Informationen über Arbeitsstruktur und Lebensbedingungen zu gewinnen. Schwarze wie Farbige litten unter den gleichen Problemen. Beschäftigung gab es überwiegend im Handel, selten in der Produktion. Der Sektor ist relativ klein und zeigt keine Aufwärtsentwicklung bei Beschäftigung und Einkommen. Es gibt rechtliche, finanzielle und wohnungsbedingte Hindernisse. Die Infrastruktur ist schlecht.(DÜI-Wsl)

Varianten der Phillips-Kurve, mit der Beziehungen zwischen Arbeitsmarkt, Konjunkturzyklus und Einkommenssteigerungen untersucht werden, sind hier bezogen auf einen längeren Zeitraum, insbesondere auf den Konjunkturzyklus 1975-81. Die Arbeitsmärkte für die weiße und schwarze Bevölkerung weisen jeweils Besonderheiten auf mit unterschiedlichen Sprüngen in der Einkommensentwicklung. Die Situation der schwarzen ungelernten Arbeiter würde sich in einem reinen Marktsystem noch verschlechtern. (DÜI-Wsl)

Using a representative sampling, att's of Boston U S's towards the presidential election of 1956 are discussed. The responses support the following generalizations: (1) a greater % of young Coll S's voted than did the general pop. (2) A majority of those who voted cast their ballots for Eisenhower even though a plurality preferred the Democratic (Dem) Party. (3) Large numbers of young voters who prefer either pol'al party profess ideological views which are traditionally associated with the party which they prefer. Despite this, the basis for voting very often seems to be the personality of the candidate rather than his stand on issues. (4) Agreement between child & parents in both party preference & vote for the presidential candidate is extremely high. (5) Though a small number do `revolt' against their parents' pol'al views, there is no evidence that the likelihood of such revolt is related to the strictness of parental control. (6) Marked diff's in pol'al preference & ideology are evident between S's in diff Sch's within the U, business S's being preponderantly Rep & liberal arts S's Dem. (7) Striking diff's are found when pol'al att's are related to religious preferences. AA-IPSA.