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The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labeled "pro-democratic dynasties," show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on 10 July 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians.

We study how demonstrating against a far-right candidate changes the behavior of voters and ultimately impacts election results. To do so, we focus on the 2002 French runoff presidential elections which pitted far-right candidate Jean-Marie Le Pen against the incumbent, Jacques Chirac. Between the two rounds of the election, demonstrators protested Le Pen's quest for power at roughly 300 demonstrations. Using rainfall as an exogenous source of variation in demonstration attendance across municipalities, we find that larger protests reduced the number of votes for Le Pen and the number of abstentions and blank or invalid ballots, and increased the number of votes for Chirac. We show that this positive effect on voting for Chirac results from left-wing voters who did not cast a blank or invalid ballot and right-wing voters who switched from Le Pen to Chirac. Next, we focus on the mechanisms behind these results to find that the 2002 demonstrations both reduced support for the policies advocated by Le Pen and signaled that voting for him was socially undesirable. Finally, we provide evidence that demonstrations affected voting mainly through local media coverage and spread out beyond the municipalities that hosted the demonstrations. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper studies a new mechanism that allows political elites from a non-democratic regime to survive a democratic transition: connections. We document this mechanism in the transition from the Vichy regime to democracy in post-World War II France. The parliamentarians who had supported the Vichy regime were purged in a two-stage process where each case was judged twice by two different courts. Using a difference-indifferences strategy, we show that Law graduates, a powerful social group in French politics with strong connections to one of the two courts, had a clearance rate that was 10 percentage points higher than others. This facilitated the persistence of that elite group. A systematic analysis of 17,589 documents from the defendants' dossiers is consistent with the hypothesis that the connections of Law graduates to one of the two courts were a major driver of their ability to avoid the purge. We consider and rule out alternative mechanisms.

Using a difference-in-differences method on a panel of 115 developing countries from 1970 to 2014, we find that democratic transitions do not affect foreign direct investment (FDI) inflows, on average. However, consolidated democratic transitions, i.e. transitions that do not go into reverse for at least five years, increase FDI inflows, with the bulk of the improvement appearing 10 years after the transition. Furthermore, when controlling for political risk, the effect of consolidated democratic transitions appears immediately after they have occurred, suggesting that higher political risk in the early years of the new regime offsets their positive intrinsic effect on FDI. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

This paper investigates the evolution of foreign direct investment net inflows (FDI) around democratic transitions, in a panel of 115 developing countries from 1970 to 2014, using an event-study method. We find no effect of democratic transitions on FDI net inflows on average. We then distinguish the effect of democratic transitions per se and the effect of its consolidation. To do so, we specifically focus on consolidated democratic transitions, defined as transitions that did not reverse during five years at least. We find that consolidated democratic transitions do increase FDI net inflows. The bulk of the improvement appears ten years after the transition. Furthermore, the effect of consolidated democratic transitions on FDI is not limited to their impact on political risk. When controlling for the political risk index of the International Country Risk Guide, the intrinsic effect of consolidated democratic transitions appears immediately after the transition, suggesting that higher political risk accompanying the early years of democratic transitions offsets the positive intrinsic effect of democratictransition on FDI. The results are robust to controlling for GDP per capita and schooling, to alternative codings of the variables capturing the transition, disaggregating the political risk measure into several sub-components and the exclusion of outliers. Moreover local projections, propensity score matching, and IV estimates lend credence to a causal interpretation of our results. Furthermore the longer the democratic history of a country is, the fewer FDI this country may expect to attract thanks to a new democratic transition. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

SummaryWe investigate the impact of investment on growth in a sample of 85 developed and developing countries over 1984–2009, conditioning the marginal effect of investment on institutional quality. The panel structure of our dataset allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and dealing with the risk of endogeneity bias. We find that investment increases growth more in countries with high institutional quality than in countries with defective institutions. The results are robust to estimating the model separately for developed and developing countries, for each continent, and over two sub‐periods. A jackknife experiment shows that they do not depend on any single country. The results are essentially driven by the quartiles of countries with the lowest and the highest institutional quality, and by the Government instability, Corruption, and Rule of law sub‐components of the ICRG index.

This paper assesses the relationship between institutions, output, and productivity when official output is corrected for the size of the shadow economy. Our results confirm the usual positive impact of institutional quality on official output and total factor productivity, and its negative impact on the size of the underground economy. However, once output is corrected for the shadow economy, the relationship between institutions and output becomes weaker. The impact of institutions on total ("corrected") factor productivity becomes insignificant. Differences in corrected output must then be attributed to differences in factor endowments. These results survive several tests for robustness. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We investigate the impact of investment on growth in a sample of 85 developed and developing countries over 1984-2009, conditioning the marginal effect of investment on institutional quality. The panel structure of our dataset allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and dealing with the risk of endogeneity bias. We find that investment increases growth more in countries with high institutional quality than in countries with defective institutions. The results are robust to estimating the model separately for developed and developing countries, for each continent, and over two sub-periods. A jackknife experiment shows that they do not depend on any single country. The results are essentially driven by the quartiles of countries with the lowest and the highest institutional quality, and by the Government instability, Corruption, and Rule of law sub-components of the ICRG index. ; SCOPUS: ar.j ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We investigate the impact of investment on growth in a sample of developed and developing countries, conditioning the marginal effect of investment on institutional quality. The panel structure of our dataset allows controlling for unobserved heterogeneity and dealing with the risk of endogeneity bias. In line with our expectations, we find that investment increases growth more in countries with high institutional quality than in countries with defective institutions. The results are essentially driven by government instability, corruption, and the rule of law. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

We analyze how adding the shadow economy to official output figures affects estimated technical efficiency at the country level. We find that this only slightly affects the ranking of efficiency scores, but increases average efficiency in a sample of 87 to 97 countries, both developed and developing. Our results are robust to the functional form of the production technology and the adjustment of labour to account for years of schooling.

This paper relates the volatility of interest rates to the collective nature of monetary policymaking in monetary unions. Several decision rules are modelled, including hegemonic and democratic procedures, and also committees headed by a chairman. A ranking of decision rules in terms of the volatility of policy rates is obtained, showing that the presence of a chairman has a cooling effect. However, members of a monetary union are better off under symmetric rules (voting, averaging, bargaining), unless they themselves chair the union. The results are robust to the inclusion of heterogeneities among members of the monetary union. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published