Intro -- Tragedy and Citizenship -- Contents -- Acknowledgments -- Introduction: Conflict, Reconciliation,and Citizenship -- 1. Listening to Haemon: Citizenship in the Antigone -- 2. Pity, Fear, and Citizenship:The Politics of Aristotle's Poetics -- 3. Hegel and the Politics of Reconciliation -- 4. Redescription as Reconciliation -- 5. John Rawls and Hegelian: Political Philosophy -- 6. Judith Butler's Postmodern Antigone -- Conclusion: Tragedy, Citizenship,and the Human Condition -- Notes -- Bibliography -- Index -- A -- B -- C -- D -- E -- F -- G -- H -- I -- J -- K -- L -- M -- N -- O -- P -- R -- S -- T -- U -- V -- W -- Y.
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The lockdown in Britain has rendered a large proportion of the population economically vulnerable and has at least quadrupled demand for emergency food relief. This paper looks critically at response to the crisis from the government and the voluntary sector with respect to provision of emergency food. In doing so, it has exposed gaps in understanding of the vagaries of the food supply for certain population groups and systemic weaknesses in the current system of emergency food aid. We make recommendations for healthier governmental capacity to react to a food security crisis, better relationships between the government and the voluntary sector, and further research into the dietary constraints of the precariate. Importantly, the social system needs to be responsive to short-term changes in people's income if people are not to fall into food insecurity.
Drawing upon insights from virtue ethics, this essay develops a concept of collective identity specifically suited to deliberative democracy: a virtues-centered theory of deliberative justice. Viewing democratic legitimacy as a political phenomenon, we must account for more than the formal rules that must be satisfied according to deontological theories of deliberative democracy. I argue that common approaches to deliberative democracy are unable to account for the motivations of deliberation, or ensure that citizens have the cognitive skills to deliberate well. Next, I engage with critics of deliberative democracy who have moved toward broader and more humanistic concepts of deliberation but have stopped short of conceiving of justice as a virtue and, in their own way, neglected questions of collective identity. I reconstruct justice as a virtue from a deliberative perspective, combining virtue ethics' emphasis on habituation with a weaker sense of collective identity that allows for value pluralism and disagreement, consistent with deliberative democracy. That is, deliberative democracy requires a shared and habituated civic culture of mutual understanding of differences. Finally, drawing from discourse on race in contemporary American politics, I conclude with brief illustrations of the need for a collective identity based on mutual understanding. Although deliberative democracy does not require a thick or intense sense of social solidarity, it does need citizens to share habits, inclinations, and capacities to engage in communication across their differences.
"To reveal one's own emotional state to someone outside of the family, such as a social worker, or psychiatrist, is foreign to the usual repertoire of responses of Asians when in need of psychological support." This assertion, made by two Asian-American mental health workers, is supported by the authors, based upon their social work experience with Indo-Chinese refugees in Queensland.
