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Argues that descriptive representatives (persons who typify the larger class of the people they stand for) are better able to serve their constituents in situations of communicative distrust or uncrystallized interests. The functions & benefits of descriptive representation are examined. Contexts in which communication between representative & constituents is likely to be undermined by mistrust are described, along with circumstances in which horizontal communication among representatives serves to crystallize legislative issues. It is maintained that there are two forms of descriptive representation: the "microcosmic" form, in which the entire assembly is designed to form a representative sample of the electorate; & the "selective" form, in which institutional design is intended to give selected legislative groups greater descriptive representation in order to bring proportions of those groups closer to their percentages in the population. The costs & benefits of both forms are analyzed. It is concluded that descriptive representation is not always necessary & should be evaluated in terms of whether the benefits exceed the costs. J. Lindroth

Disadvantaged groups gain advantages from descriptive representation in at least four contexts. In contexts of group mistrust & uncrystallized interests, the better communication & experiential knowledge of descriptive representatives enhances their substantive representation of the group's interests by improving the quality of deliberation. In contexts of historical political subordination & low de facto legitimacy, descriptive representation helps create a social meaning of "ability to rule" & increases the attachment to the polity of members of the group. When the implementation of descriptive representation involves some costs in other values, paying those costs makes most sense in these specific historical contexts. 1 Table, 97 References. Adapted from the source document.

Replies to Mark Haugaard's article (see abstract 9706229) on noncoercive-based power conflict operating in the democratic process, written in response to this author's 1994 article on such power conflict (see abstract 9503177). Haugaard's notion of two parties' mutual commitment to accept defeat under a set of rules is challenged. It is argued that this set of rules does not erase coercion. A distinction is made between raw & legitimized coercion, the latter representing a form dependent on compliance with rules. It is further contended that legitimized coercion is the most effective form because of its sociological & normative implications of fairness. This produces a seductive veil over the true coercive nature of such commitments & agreements. D. Bajo