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The recognition by the US and NATO of 'new' domains of operations, namely the cyber and (outer-)space, plus the information and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), makes the traditional partition of physical domains of land, air, maritime obsolete (Marsili, 2019a). While classic domains are generally well understood conceptually, to the extent that joint doctrine does not feel the need to define them, the new domains are much more difficult to conceptualize and bound within a constructive definition (Donnelly & Farley, 2019, p. 9). Since the cyber has been recognized by NATO as a domain of operations (July 2016), and the Alliance has approved the first-ever space policy (June 2019) – a step towards the acknowledgment of space as a warfighting domain, as President Trump has officially characterized it (August 2019) – the doctrine has speeded the integration of all domains (Marsili, 2019a). The concept of cross-domain operations is not new, but multi-domain has increased in popularity over the past decade as military services, those of the US, inter alia, have sought to codify their approach to warfare beyond the traditional confines of land, sea, and air (Marsili, 2019; Reilly, 2019, p. 16). What they are committed to are converging military capabilities across the joint force with continuous integration across multiple domains (Marsili, 2019a; Townsend, 2019, p. 29). The discussion about 'Multi-Domain Operations' (MDO), i.e. how operations are conducted in time and space with synchroniza­tion of the other domains, has been stimulated since new domains such as the cyber and space have emerged next to the traditional domains of air, land and sea — emerging and disruptive technologies have further complicated the operational environment (OE). We then moved quickly from a concept of cross-domain to multi-domain (Marsili, 2019), without the time to define any of the new domains — neither of the classic domains. Rather, the doctrine does not provide us with any definition of the basic term 'domain', and this ...

Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and a candidate to the accession to the European Union. As a transcontinental country, Turkey belongs both to Asia and Europe, and can be used as a benchmark to assess the narrowing of human rights and civil liberties in the fight against terrorism. While having become the central platform for action for Islamist groups in the Middle East, as a result of the gradually Islamized domestic and foreign policy of Ankara since 2011, Turkey demands its Western allies to stand by it in the fight against terrorism. Turkey has a concept of terrorism that clashes with the principles enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, that should be obliged to comply, together with other international instruments. The authoritarian turn put in place by the Turkish government after the failed coup d'état of 15 July 2016 is a challenge to the values of European and Western civilization, and pillories all the contradictions and the limits of the latter concerning defending fundamental human rights while countering terrorism. This paper scrutinizes the policy of the Turkish authorities to counter terrorism within the country and at its external borders, and the inconsistencies of this policy with the international legal commitments and with the values of European and Western nations. ; The author gratefully acknowledges the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, for supporting his research through Ph.D. grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018

Turkey is a member of the Council of Europe, of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and a candidate to the accession to the European Union. As a transcontinental country, Turkey belongs both to Asia and Europe, and can be used as a benchmark to assess the narrowing of human rights and civil liberties in the fight against terrorism. While having become the central platform for action for Islamist groups in the Middle East, as a result of the gradually Islamized domestic and foreign policy of Ankara since 2011, Turkey demands its Western allies to stand by it in the fight against terrorism. Turkey has a concept of terrorism that clashes with the principles enshrined in the European Convention on Human Rights, that should be obliged to comply, together with other international instruments. The authoritarian turn put in place by the Turkish government after the failed coup d'état of 15 July 2016 is a challenge to the values of European and Western civilization, and pillories all the contradictions and the limits of the latter concerning defending fundamental human rights while countering terrorism. This paper scrutinizes the policy of the Turkish authorities to counter terrorism within the country and at its external borders, and the inconsis- tencies of this policy with the international legal commitments and with the values of European and Western nations. ; Abstract of the paper presented in the Panel 7 'EU & the Middle East' (9 May 2019, 14h00-15h45, Room C1.01) at the 4th International Conference Europe as a Global Actor (EGA) 2019, organized by CEI-IUL - Centre for International Studies, ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL); OBSERVARE - Observatory of Foreign Relations, Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (UAL); TSF Rádio Notícias, held in Lisbon at Universidade Autónoma de Lisboa (UAL) and ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), on 8-10 May 2019. Research supported through national funds under FCT grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018. Abstract available at ...

The recognition by the US and NATO of 'new' domains of operations, namely the cyber and (outer-)space, plus the information and the electromagnetic spectrum (EMS), makes the traditional partition of physical domains of land, air, maritime obsolete (Marsili, 2019a). While classic domains are generally well understood conceptually, to the extent that joint doctrine does not feel the need to define them, the new domains are much more difficult to conceptualize and bound within a constructive definition (Donnelly & Farley, 2019, p. 9). Since the cyber has been recognized by NATO as a domain of operations (July 2016), and the Alliance has approved the first-ever space policy (June 2019) – a step towards the acknowledgment of space as a warfighting domain, as President Trump has officially characterized it (August 2019) – the doctrine has speeded the integration of all domains (Marsili, 2019a). The concept of cross-domain operations is not new, but multi-domain has increased in popularity over the past decade as military services, those of the US, inter alia, have sought to codify their approach to warfare beyond the traditional confines of land, sea, and air (Marsili, 2019; Reilly, 2019, p. 16). What they are committed to are converging military capabilities across the joint force with continuous integration across multiple domains (Marsili, 2019a; Townsend, 2019, p. 29). The discussion about 'Multi-Domain Operations' (MDO), i.e. how operations are conducted in time and space with synchroniza­tion of the other domains, has been stimulated since new domains such as the cyber and space have emerged next to the traditional domains of air, land and sea — emerging and disruptive technologies have further complicated the operational environment (OE). We then moved quickly from a concept of cross-domain to multi-domain (Marsili, 2019), without the time to define any of the new domains — neither of the classic domains. Rather, the doctrine does not provide us with any definition of the basic term 'domain', and this ...

This paper aims to trace the origins of the protection of human rights and fundamental freedoms in the European integration process. It is a transcontinental journey that connects the French and the American revolution under the achievements and the principles of the Enlightenment. It is the history of contemporary Europe, from the French Revolution to the tragedy of World War II. In the process of European integration the institutions overlap, and find in the Council of Europe, an institution larger than the European Union, the moment in which these rights are codified. These principles, which are the basis of European values, have been embodied in the European Convention on Human Rights, one of the most advanced instruments on the protection of fundamental human rights. ; Paper presented at the international conference "Diritti e dignità della persona. Agli albori del processo di integrazione europea: dalla CECA ai Trattati di Roma", held at the University Niccolò Cusano, in Rome, on 5 April 2017, with the patronage of the Vicariate of Rome-Pastorale Universitaria.

Alongside non-international and international conflict, a third category of armed conflict is emerging: hybrid, asymmetric, and transnational conflict which involve state and non-state actors such as insurgents or terrorist organizations. Unconventional conflicts are among the trend topics of defense and security, and they pose a threat to the stability of international order. States and international organizations, such as the UN and NATO, face difficulty using legal tools currently provided by international law, in particular international humanitarian law (IHL) and the law of war (Geneva and Hague conventions). The question is how current international law applies or can be adapted to these conflicts. There are some questions to be fixed. First, we should find whether new rules are required to deal with situations of hybrid conflict, or if current rules are still valid and can be used/adapted. Secondly, we should determine whether IHL applies in transnational armed conflict against non-state groups, and if their members cease to be targetable during a pause in their active involvement, and whether there can be a non-international armed conflict which has no finite territorial boundaries with a non-state armed group operating transnationally. Lastly, we should assess whether attacks carried out by a transnational organisation and its affiliates meet the criteria of qualifying as a state of armed conflict under IHL. ; This poster was presented at 14h00 in the Parallel Session AR1, Part 1, at the Instituto Universitário Militar (IUM), Lisboa, Portugal, and later published in the conference proceedings, together with an extended abstract of the presentation. This poster received financial support by the European Social Fund (ESF) and by the Fundação para a Ciência e a Tecnologia (FCT), Portugal, under research grant SFRH/BD/136170/2018.

This article addresses the problem of international lawenforcement within the War on Cyberterrorism. Hybrid conflicts have replaced the traditional ones, and new threats have emerged in cyberspace, whichhas become a virtual battlefield. Cyber threats - cybercrimes, cyberterrorism, cyberwarfare - are a major concern for Western governments, especially for the United States and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The international community has begun to consider cyberattacksas a form of terrorism, to which the same measures apply. Because the term "terrorism" is ambiguous and legaly undefined, there is no consensus on a definition of the derivative term "cyberterrorism", which is left to the unilateral interpretations of states.Pretending to consider the cyberspace domain astraditional domains,and claiming to apply IHLfor the sole purpose of lawfully using armed forces in contrast to cyberterrorism is a stretch.This paper addresses the question of whether or not current laws of war and international humanitarian law apply to cyber domain, and gives some recommendations on how to tackle this issue. ; Marco Marsili (2019), The War on Cyberterrorism, Democracy and Security, 15:2, 172-199, doi.org/10.1080/17419166.2018.1496826. Published online: 17 Jul 2018. 50 limited free access digital copies through https://www.tandfonline.com/eprint/kqqCMFnEtWJxAD8ZJEhY/full

The European Union security and counter-terrorism strategy adopted after 11 September 2001 has not been effective, instead resulted in the increase of Islamist terrorist incidents. Europe has been hit by a wave of terrorist attacks, which demonstrates the limits of the Security and Defence Policy. The EU short-term strategy, tending only to hit terrorist organisations, has not produced the expected effects: attacks in Europe, rather than decreasing, have increased. Little or nothing has been done to develop a successful preventive strategy. After the early 2000s, there is hardly registered Islamic attack within the EU, due to the change in the Al-Qaeda strategy. The recrudescence recorded after 2014 coincides with the rise of ISIS. The EU shortsighted strategy adopted so far to combat Islamic terrorism has proved ineffective. Attacks within the EU, rather than decreasing, have increased. The high number of terrorist incidents and casualties within the EU demonstrates that terrorism can not be stopped only with criminal provisions, freezing of assets and financial resources, blocking immigration and strengthening of border controls. Only a long-term cultural strategy, adequately funded, can be effective to counter terrorism. ; Poster presented at Encontro Ciência 2017 (National Cience Summit 2017), the Science and Technology Summit in Portugal, held at Lisbon Congress Centre, Lisboa, Portugal, 3-5 July 2017 Seminal research has been presented at the international conference Europe as a Global Actor (EGA) 2016 in Lisbon on 24 May 2016. See: "A Critical Assessment of the European Cultural Approach to Counter Terrorism" (DOI:10.5281/zenodo.810533)

ABSTRACT This paper analyzes the situation of some states (Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, South Ossetia and Transnistria), de facto independent after the dissolution of the USSR, which have been being in a limbo for 25 years, hovering between being considered 'fake states' and from getting the international legal status to which aspire. There is the problem of identifying the objective requirements for their largely recognition, which otherwise remains merely a discretionary choice of the other actors in the international society, based on purely political requirements and economic interests. In a world made up of states, which are the main actors on the international stage, how can these entities get the 'certification' of de jure sovereign states? RESUMO Este artigo analisa a situação de alguns Estados (Abkhazia, Nagorno Karabakh, Ossétia do Sul e Transnístria), de facto independentes depois da dissolução da URSS, que estão há cerca de 25 anos no limbo, oscilando entre ser considerados 'Estados falsos' e recebendo o status legal internacional a que aspiram. Existe o problema de identificar os requisitos objetivos para o seu reconhecimento, em grande parte, que de outra forma parece apenas uma escolha discricionária dos outros atores na comunidade internacional, com base em requisitos puramente políticos e interesses econômicos. Num mundo feito de Estados, que são os principais actores na cena internacional, como podem estas entidades obter a 'certificação' de Estados soberanos de jure? ; "The Birth of a (Fake?) Nation at the Aftermath of the Decomposition of USSR. The Unsolved Issue of Post-Soviet 'Frozen Conflicts'" (O Nascimento de uma (Falsa?) Nação no Seguimento da Decomposição da URSS. A Questão não Resolvida de Conflitos Pós-Soviéticos 'Congelados'), in Proelium: Revista da Academia Militar n. 10 (January 2016) "Relações internacionais e estudos de segurança", Serie X (10), pp. 161-178 (ISSN 1645-8826), idexed in Latindex: 14377. Link to download this paper ...

The scope of this abstract is to pursue and increase the quality levels of the military instrument to enhance the effectiveness, operational capabilities and overall employability by providing a timely information representation and a catchy and tailored visualization and communication support. The impact of information and communication on civilian/military maritime operations should be addressed in a social and political perspective. The success of communication, both indoor and outdoor, is essential for achieving goals. A fully-informed and favorable outdoor and indoor environment supports and facilitates the achievement of military objectives. Communication must be multimedia, multiplatform and multilevel. Communication to be strength, must represent information in a simply and clear way through short text elements integrated with interactive visual representations: they capture at best the audience attention, without compromising the efficacy of the information content to be transmitted. Online availability through user-friendly and intuitive interface, enabling a positive user experience, is strongly recommended. Language should be natural for not military audience, and glossary should be available. Information should be manually categorized for not military audience. Communication results should be measured through a validation and verification process. ; Presentation at the Decision Support and Risk Assessment for Operational Effectiveness (DeSRA) 2016 Conference held on 26-28 July hosted at NATO's Science and Technology Organization (STO)-Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE) in La Spezia, Italy

The purpose of this abstract is to pursue and increase the quality levels of the military instrument to enhance the effectiveness, operational capabilities and overall employability by providing a timely information representation and a catchy and tailored visualization and communication support. The impact of information and communication on civilian/military maritime operations should be addressed in a social and political perspective. The success of communication, both indoor and outdoor, is essential for achieving goals. A fully informed and favorable outdoor and indoor environment supports and facilitates the achievement of military objectives. Communication must be multimedia, multiplatform and multilevel. Communication to be strength, must represent information in a simply and clear way through short text elements integrated with interactive visual representations: they capture at best the audience attention, without compromising the efficacy of the information content to be transmitted. Online availability through user-friendly and intuitive interface, enabling a positive user experience, is strongly recommended. Language should be natural for not military audience, and glossary should be available. Information should be manually categorized for not military audience. Communication results should be measured through a validation and verification process. ; Abstracts from the Decision Support and Risk Assessment for Operational Effectiveness (DeSRA) 2016 Conference, La Spezia, Italy, July 26-28 July 2016, NATO Science and Technology Organization (STO) Centre for Maritime Research and Experimentation (CMRE)

Presentation of the paper "A Critical Assessment of the European Cultural Approach to Counter Terrorism" at the international conference "Europe as a Global Actor" hosted by the Center for International Studies (CEI-IUL) at ISCTE–IUL (Lisbon University Institute), in Lisbon, on 24 May 2016 (Panel 13 on Terrorism & Security, 18h00–20h00, Room C1.03, Building II)

The wave of jihadism which affects western countries since 11 September 2001, has pushed governments to pass repressive legislation, which restricts the fundamental rights and freedoms. Complementing this, have been taken true warfare actionsto counter this phenomenon in the countries of origin. However, little or nothing has been done to try to understand why many European actors – namely grown and often born in western countries – turned themselves into 'lone wolves' or 'foreign fighters'. What drove them to embrace the religious fanaticism that leads to terror- ism, and leaving their European homes to fight in the milita of the Islamic State? This essay aims to give a 'cultural' approach to the phenomenon of terrorism in Europe, and suggests a new holistic and comprehensive strategy to counter it. ; Abstract of the paper presented at the International Conference Europe as a Global Actor (EGA) 2016, organized by the Centro de Estudos Internacionais (CEI-IUL), held in Lisbon at ISCTE-Instituto Universitário de Lisboa (ISCTE-IUL), on 23-24 May 2016. Programme with abstract available at https://europeglobalactor.cei.iscte-iul.pt/europe-as-a-global-actor-2016/