Suchergebnisse

The disciplining of Preferential Trade Agreements (PTAs) by the WTO has been 'relaxed' recently as a result of the new context (the Transparency Mechanism) within which notified PTAs are being multilaterally reviewed. This is probably a blessing for a number of reasons, including the success of the multilateral trading system in bringing tariffs down over the years (and the ensuing reduced trade diversion), the fact that modern PTAs deal with many non-trade issues as well (for which no WTO disciplines exist), and the recent empirical literature suggesting overall positive welfare implications for those participating in similar schemes. This paper discusses these and other reasons to support the view that the WTO should rather focus on the multilateral agenda instead of diverting its attention towards disciplining PTAs. In more concrete terms, this paper argues in support of the thesis that the Transparency Mechanism should not be simply a de facto substitute of the previous regime (where outlawing a PTA could not a priori be excluded), but the de jure new forum to discuss PTAs within the multilateral trading system, at least for the time being. A first do-no-harm-policy is one of the rationales for the thesis advocated here.

This article provides a critical assessment of the corpus of law that the adjudicating bodies of the World Trade Organization (WTO)—the Appellate Body (AB) and panels—have used since the organization was established on January 1, 1995. After presenting a taxonomy of WTO law, I move to discern, and to provide a critical assessment of, the philosophy of the WTO adjudicating bodies, when called to interpret it. In discussing the law that WTO adjudicating bodies have used, I distinguish between sources of WTO law and interpretative elements. This distinction will be explicated in part I below. Part II provides a taxonomy of the sources of WTO law, and part III a taxonomy of the interpretative elements used to illuminate those sources. Part IV concludes.

This Paper analyses how the network of enforcers envisaged in the Proposal for a Council Regulation on the implementation of the rules on competition laid down in Articles 81 and 82 of the EC Treaty (September 2000) would operate. We identify four issues. First, we observe that the Proposal (unlike the White Paper) includes safeguards to avoid a shift of competence in favour of national competition laws, which may be questionable in terms of subsidiarity. Second, we recognise that the accountability of antitrust authorities might vary across the members of the network, so that, for instance, some authorities may be more prone than others to accept industrial policy considerations. The preservation of the Commission's monopoly (among administrative units) with respect to decisions granting a positive application of Article 81(3) (a matter which was not fully clear in the White Paper) can be seen in this light. We suggest that the imposition of institutional constraints on Member States like accountability and independence standards could have been a more effective way of addressing the issue. Third, we observe that in the proposed framework, sequential enforcement by several authorities is likely to occur and that each Member States will have little incentive to take into account in its decision the interests of other Member States. We show that such a system of enforcement can have a 'disintegrating effect', to the extent that it does not allow for a balance between positive and negative net benefits across Member States. The Proposal contains a number of measures which may reduce the scope of multiple enforcement, without however addressing the underlying incentive issue. We suggest that additional co-ordination between the members of the network may prove necessary. In particular, we advocate the re-emergence in the intra-EC context of a 'positive comity' obligation and we suggest that a formal procedure for co- ordination between different institutions might turn out to be necessary. Finally, we observe that if the Proposal formalises the (vertical) relationship between the Commission and the national competition authorities (beyond what was considered in the White Paper), it fails to bind the Commission discretion. We argue, in light of the US experience with multiple enforcement that such commitment would be useful.

The notorious ERTA decision by the European Court of Justice (ECJ), if viewed from a federalist perspective independently of its legal merits, represents an equilibrium: the quantity of the sovereignty transferred from European Community (EC) Member States to the Community at the internal (intra-EC) level equals the quantity of sovereignty that the Community can exercise on behalf of the EC Member States on the international scene. The ECJ's Opinion 1/94 casts some doubt upon this statement by restrictively interpreting the Community competence with respect to international trade negotiations. Opinion 1/94, however, is not a drastic departure from the ERTA case law. It is not, in the Kuhnian sense of the term, a "paradigm shift."

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1. The Rise and Rise of China: (And What Should Be Done About It) -- 2. Complaints against China: (Euphoria Exits and Dysphoria Enters) -- 3. Dealing with Heterogeneity in the GATT/WTO: Lessons from the Past for China -- 4. Unilateral Responses Do Not Work -- 5. Staying Idle Is No Solution -- 6. The Way Forward -- 7. The Time Is Now -- Concluding Remarks: This Time It Is Different Indeed -- References -- Index -- A Note on the Type.

Frontmatter -- CONTENTS -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- List of Abbreviations -- Introduction -- 1. The Rise and Rise of China: (And What Should Be Done About It) -- 2. Complaints against China: (Euphoria Exits and Dysphoria Enters) -- 3 Dealing with Heterogeneity in the GATT/WTO: Lessons from the Past for China -- 4 Unilateral Responses Do Not Work -- 5 Staying Idle Is No Solution -- 6 The Way Forward -- 7 The Time Is Now -- Concluding Remarks: This Time It Is Different Indeed -- References -- Index

The World Trade Organization (WTO) Agreement covers international commerce in goods and services including measures that directly affect trade, such as import tariffs and quotas, and almost any type of internal measure with an impact on trade. Legal and Economic Principles of World Trade Law contributes to the analysis of the texts of World Trade Law in law and economics, reporting work done to identify improvements to the interpretation of the Agreement. It starts with background studies, the first summarizes The Genesis of the GATT, which highlights the negotiating history of the GATT 1947–8; the second introduces the economics of trade agreements. These are followed by two main studies. The first, authored by Bagwell, Staiger and Sykes, discusses legal and economic aspects of the GATT regulation of border policy instruments, such as import tariffs and import quotas. The second, written by Grossman, Horn and Mavroidis, focuses on the core provision for the regulation of domestic policy instruments - the National Treatment principles in Art. III GATT