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The widespread belief that one can read off the public's expectations of inflation from the yield differential between indexed and conventional bonds ignores the fact that indexed bonds are held largely by those who expect the most inflation. However, holding indexed bonds as a hedge against inflation implies that such bonds have the advantage of being a relatively cheap source of funds.

Why was the Fed so inflationary in 1965-79? No single explanation suffices. Forecast errors and poor operating procedures played at most a minor role. Unwillingness to accept greater interest-rate variation and cognitive errors played a greater role. Political pressures also played a role, but, given its desired policy the Fed was not greatly constrained by them. Wage and price controls played an uncertain role. The most important factor was the prevailing intellectual atmosphere with its de-emphasis on the costs of inflation, its faith in the viability of an inflation/unemployment trade-off and concern with cost-push elements.

The author, born in 1927, received his Ph.D. from Columbia University. He is emeritus professor of economics at the University of California, Davis. Previously he taught at the University of West Virginia, Notre Dame University, Michigan State University, and the University of California, Berkeley.

Recent behavior of velocity suggests that a stable monetary growth rate rule could have dangerous consequences. Hence this paper suggests a compromise–adjusting the money growth rate only in accordance with past changes in velocity. This preserves most of the benefits of a stable monetary growth rate rule.