Suchergebnisse

The theory of patterned inequality between rulers and ruled provides a valuable analytic approach to the relationship between inequality and political violence. Under conditions of a bifurcated pattern of inequality, the probability of political violence is likely to be greater than under a more generalized inequality typically measured by the Gini index. A strong systematic relationship between patterned inequality in Latin American landholdings and deaths from political violence was discovered using the exponential distribution as a model for the lower portion of the land distribution and the log-exponential for the upper. This degree of association was far stronger than that found between the Gini index of land inequality in Latin America and deaths from political violence. Evidence supporting the theory was also found in an analysis of Middle Eastern landholdings.

The stability of the American two-party system is examined from 1866 until 1980. Following the approach of Stokes and Iversen (1962), restoring forces are posited for presidential elections, but restraining forces also are suggested for congressional elections, leading to an equilibrium between the two in elections to the House. Points of maximum restoration in presidential elections are derived using autocorrelations, and these points suggest a pattern of second-term Republican victories every 28 years beginning in 1872.Equilibrium properties of the American two-party system lead to the twin criteria of representation and restraint in multiparty cabinet coalitions in order to achieve cabinet durabilities on the order of those found in two-party systems. Minimum entropy-minimum winning coalitions satisfy these criteria. Cabinet durabilities on the order of two-party systems can be achieved by means of a 44-55 percentage of the legislative seats won by the first party in a multiparty system.

In this article, an equilibrium theory of conflict behavior is developed in which there exists a balance or equilibrium in the number of disputes begun and ended in a given time period. Significant interdependence as the result of diffusion, reinforcement, or a common source of conflict behavior leads to departures from the equilibrium model that, in turn, are associated with the onset of systemic, or global, war. Using a set of serious international disputes occurring in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, the nineteenth century is found to fit the equilibrium model, but the period approaching World War I does not, when all disputes involving both major and minor powers are considered. Disputes involving only major powers constitute a stable system in both the nineteenth century and pre-World War I period. Implications for crisis management and conflict resolution are developed through the use of disjoint sets that effectively separate the different kinds of disputes, which together could lead to global war.