Adaptive Incrementalism and Complexity: Experiments with Two-Person Cooperative Signaling Games
In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 341-365
ISSN: 1477-9803
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In: Journal of public administration research and theory, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 341-365
ISSN: 1477-9803
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 83
ISSN: 1939-9162
In: Legislative studies quarterly, Band 21, Heft 1, S. 83-104
ISSN: 0362-9805
In: Group decision and negotiation, Band 22, Heft 3, S. 499-518
ISSN: 1572-9907
In: Organization science, Band 19, Heft 5, S. 709-728
ISSN: 1526-5455
When there are constantly new, valuable opportunities to transact with alternative partners—a situation we refer to as exchange value uncertainty—long-term or committed transactions among the same individuals are discouraged. However, when opportunism creates exchange hazards, which escalate in nonrecurring transactions, individuals will be reluctant to take full advantage of the gains from switching to more valuable partners, thereby leading to "overembedded" exchanges. Instead of embracing new, valuable exchanges with strangers whose propensity to cooperate is uncertain, individuals may prefer to preserve recurring ties with familiar actors. Two mechanisms may encourage movement out of committed relationships in those conditions. First, formal contracts should serve as a safeguard to market participants, in the sense that they limit potential losses due to opportunistic behavior. Second, trust in general others (as opposed to trust in familiar people) reduces participants' perception of hazards in market exchanges, and hence promotes transactions among strangers. By increasing the propensity to initiate new exchanges, general trust also diminishes the role of contracts in causing movement out of committed relationships. In this paper, we present experimental evidence largely consistent with this theory of the interplay between formal and informal mechanisms in the determination of social mobility.
In: Review of agricultural economics: RAE, Band 30, Heft 2, S. 194-213
ISSN: 1467-9353
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 40, Heft 2, S. 298-319
ISSN: 1552-8766
Important decisions are often determined by group vote. Institutional provisions may stipulate who has the authority to determine the group's agenda. According to cooperative game theory, this privilege gives the leader a great deal of power to control the outcome. In a series of experiments, the authors demonstrate the influence of norms on coalitions and decisions. Subjects were assigned to groups with two agenda setters, two issues, and concentric indifference curves. Three theories were tested: coalitional rationality, group fairness, and coalitional integrity. The pattern of coalition formation, coalition dissolution, and decisions was consistent only with coalitional integrity. The integrity norm (members will not join a coalition requiring them to vote against the interests of prior coalition members) generates friction in coalition dynamics. Clearly, when formulating an agenda, leaders must consider a potential partner's coalitional history. Theories of group decision making must be sensitive to social constraints as well as self-interest.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 40, Heft 2, S. 298-319
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: American journal of political science, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 511-525
ISSN: 1540-5907
In: American journal of political science: AJPS, Band 55, Heft 3, S. 511-526
ISSN: 0092-5853
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 44, Heft 2, S. 147-169
ISSN: 1552-8766
The authors examine how negotiators' risk preferences influence the formation of coalitions. Joining a coalition may either increase or mitigate risk depending on the nature of the bargaining problem. In an experimental setting, the authors test whether relative risk preferences influence the likelihood of joining a coalition and the distribution of payoffs in coalitions that form. With inexperienced bargainers, risk preferences predict coalition composition but not payoff distribution. This may reflect the fairly egalitarian agreements reached by these coalitions. With experienced bargainers, risk preferences are unrelated to coalition membership but do predict the distribution of payoffs. Risk preferences influence the course of negotiation in a different manner as parties learn to use both their alternatives and their risk preferences as sources of bargaining power.
In: The journal of conflict resolution: journal of the Peace Science Society (International), Band 44, Heft 2, S. 147-169
ISSN: 0022-0027, 0731-4086
In: Political Analysis, Band 16, Heft 2, S. 115-137
SSRN
In: The journal of politics: JOP, Band 76, Heft 2, S. 430-445
ISSN: 1468-2508