Suchergebnisse

The tragic August conflict between Georgia and Russia has initiated a wave of accusations about which side was to blame for the outbreak of full-scale war. The war and its aftermath have ratcheted tensions between the West and Russia, as the international community pressures Moscow to withdraw its troops from Georgian territory and abide by its ceasefire obligations. Russia's reckless decision to recognize the independence of South Ossetia and Abkhazia not only contravenes international law regarding sovereign statehood, but if allowed to stand, would establish the unacceptable precedent that countries can justify military intervention in the territory of a neighbor by invoking the rights of their ethnic citizens. Not surprisingly, Moscow has found little support in the international community for its heavy-handed actions, even among countries friendly to Russia. Yet, as analysts focus on the Russian-Georgian relationship, the questions of how the United States—Georgia's friend and patron—failed to anticipate the conflict and prevent its escalation need to be addressed. Two unequivocal, but ultimately flawed, principles guided recent U.S. policy towards Georgia. First, the United States supported the Saakashvili government, rather than promoting broader Georgian democratic development. Second, the United States backed reuniting Georgia's territorial integrity, rather than acting as an honest broker to resolve the frozen conflicts with South Ossetia and Abkhazia. The strong personalized ties that developed between Washington and Tbilisi prevented the United States from using its power and influence to credibly restrain the Saakashvili government from adopting a military solution. U.S. reluctance to encourage Georgia to consider alternative sovereign formulas to resolve the frozen conflicts further emboldened Georgian hardliners. Over time, the Georgian regime's domestic policies and priorities themselves became official U.S. policies and goals, leading to an unhealthy capture of U.S. foreign policy by Tbilisi. Looking forward, the United States must continue to offer robust and sustained support to Georgia and its democratic development, but should do so by reversing these demonstrably flawed principles. What policies should the new U.S. administration adopt that would preserve its friendly relations with Georgia, while seeking to resolve the ongoing tensions in South Ossetia and Abkhazia?

The United States must not be dissuaded from restoring the promotion of freedom and democracy as a core principle of U.S. foreign policy. Democracy assistance is both a reflection of American values and in America's strategic interests. America's next president will be challenged to revitalize the democracy agenda — and get it right. What's needed to address the challenges of the 21st century is a more versatile approach based on the requirements of each country and tailored to the characteristics of different regime types — authoritarian regimes, illiberal democracies, free-wheeling kleptocracies and post-conflict countries.

The authors examine how the relative standing of candidates in public opinion polls during a primary campaign affects their ability to raise money. A theory is proposed that considers when individuals are most likely to contribute to the electoral campaigns of their most preferred candidate based on a rational model of political participation and concerns about a candidate's likelihood of winning. The theory is then applied to the case of the 1989 New York City Democratic mayoral primary race. The data indicate that contributors are motivated to support candidates financially by the changing status of a candidate's electoral prospects throughout the campaign.

Frontmatter -- Contents -- Acknowledgements -- Preface -- Introduction: The Complex and Contested History of Democracy -- Part I Pre-Classical Democracy -- Chapter 1 Prehistory -- Chapter 2 The Assyrians -- Chapter 3 Ancient India -- Chapter 4 Ancient China -- Chapter 5 Israel and Phoenicia -- Part II Classical Democracy -- Chapter 6 Early Greece -- Chapter 7 Athens -- Chapter 8 Rome -- Part III Medieval Democracy -- Chapter 9 Islam -- Chapter 10 Venice -- Chapter 11 The Nordic Countries -- Chapter 12 The Christian Church -- Part IV Early Modern Democracy -- Chapter 13 The English Parliament -- Chapter 14 The Levellers and Diggers -- Chapter 15 The Swiss Cantons -- Chapter 16 The American Revolution -- Chapter 17 The French Revolution -- Part V Colonialism and Democracy -- Chapter 18 Africa -- Chapter 19 Native Americans -- Chapter 20 Australasia -- Chapter 21 Singapore -- Part VI National Movements -- Chapter 22 1808: South American Liberation -- Chapter 23 1848: European Revolutions -- Chapter 24 1919: After Versailles -- Chapter 25 1945: Post-Second World War Japan -- Chapter 26 1989: Eastern Europe -- Part VII Peoples' Movements -- Chapter 27 Anti-Slavery -- Chapter 28 Women's Suffrage -- Chapter 29 Socialism, Communism, Anarchism -- Chapter 30 Civil Rights -- Part VIII Democracy Today -- Chapter 31 South Africa -- Chapter 32 Bolivia -- Chapter 33 Georgia -- Chapter 34 Iraq -- Chapter 35 Burma -- Chapter 36 China since Tiananmen Square -- Chapter 37 Islam since 9/11 -- Part IX Futures and Possibilities -- Chapter 38 Democracy Promotion -- Chapter 39 Transnational Democracy -- Chapter 40 Digital Democracy -- Chapter 41 Radical Democracy -- Chapter 42 Deliberative Democracy -- Chapter 43 New Thinking -- Conclusion: The Future History of Democracy -- Notes on the Contributors -- Index