Suchergebnisse

The model presented here assumes that nations initiate conflict to change the international status quo across one or more issues to an outcome they prefer. Their preferences for different issue outcomes are represented by a classical spatial utility function. International coalitions are formed both to enhance the chance of a successful challenge and to counter existing challenges. Disputes are modeled as periods of competition between two coalitions through the recruitment of additional members, erosion of support for the opposing coalition and escalation of the crisis. The two-nation model is analyzed in detail, and the existence of the core for the resulting game is proved. The two main conclusions of the two-nation model are that nations have a general incentive to exaggerate their issue positions in disputes and that the possibility of issue trades enhances the likelihood of compromise.

A continuous-outcome expected utility model is presented that generalizes the expected utility theory of Bueno de Mesquita. An examination of the more general model uncovers several unstated assumptions within and produces new conclusions from, while supporting the basic logic of, the expected utility theory. Among the new conclusions is the finding that nations shifting their level of acceptable outcomes to a conflict upward or downward after fighting starts is perfectly consistent with a rational model. The derivations demonstrate the value of theoretical articulation, a task too often neglected in quantitative international relations, and provide a sound logical basis for the construction of systemic theories based upon the expected utility theory.

This report describes a dataset on compliance with the laws of war in 20th century interstate wars. We introduce the dataset, discuss sources, and explain the coding schemes. The unit is a directed warring dyad in a given war for one of nine issues. We collect five dimensions of compliance, including quality of the data, and construct a single measure of compliance. Reciprocity exists in the data, and treaty law strengthens reciprocity by clarifying what acts constitute violations. Compliance varies across issues, matching the scope for individual violations. States are more likely to respond reciprocally to violations by individuals than to those that are state policy.

States negotiate over the specific terms of multilateral treaties because those terms determine states' willingness to ratify the treaty. In some cases, a state might decline to ratify a treaty it otherwise supports because specific terms are too far from those it prefers. States and inter-governmental organizations negotiating treaties would like to uncover the minimal terms needed to secure the ratification of key states, but under what circumstances will those states candidly reveal those terms? Using a spatial representation of the issues in a treaty negotiation, we use mechanism design to determine what information states will reveal in a treaty negotiation. We find that states are willing to reveal how they would like tradeoffs between different issues to be resolved but not the minimal terms they require for ratification. Further, negotiations cannot always separate types that need concessions to ratify from other types that would like concessions but would ratify the treaty even if they do not receive them. These findings provide insight into how treaty negotiations can succeed or fail, and they lay the theoretical groundwork for a new line of empirical research on how multilateral treaties are negotiated.

Axiomatic and deductive theorizing about international political conflict has precipitated lively debate. Much of the disputation of recent years has derived from an expected utility theory of conflict advocated by Bruce Bueno de Mesquita. In the June 1990 issue of this Review, Roslyn Simowitz and Barry L. Price dissected crucial parts of Bueno de Mesquita's formulation of the theory, arguing that it suffers from errors of logic and clarity. In this controversy, James D. Morrow challenges the claims of Simowitz and Price that the reviewed theory is logically and conceptually flawed. In turn, Price and Simowitz join issue.

Efforts to replicate our study of the effects of politics on trade flows between the major powers have revealed that the computer program written to calculate the estimates produced errors in both the coefficients and the standard errors. Furthermore, these errors have some consequences for the results. In this brief corrigendum, we present corrected tables for our research note and a slightly modified interpretation of the results.Our study examined evidence to assess three arguments about how politics may affect trade. The first contends that positive political relations in a dyad result in higher levels of trade. This argument leads to two hypotheses: States in conflict will have a lower level of trade than those not in conflict, and trade will increase with the degree of common interests between a pair of states. The second argument concludes that democratic dyads will have a higher level of trade than other dyads. The third argument focuses on the security concerns of states and leads to the hypotheses that alliances will increase trade in a bipolar system but will have no effect in a multipolar system. We refer readers to the original article for a fuller statement of the logic of these arguments, their respective hypotheses, and a complete statement of our research design and operationalization of the variables (Morrow, Siverson, and Tabares 1998).