Bureaucratic politics, risk management, and agency strategy: a study of agency management in a gale
In: Journal of European public policy, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1466-4429
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In: Journal of European public policy, S. 1-24
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: West European politics, Band 43, Heft 4, S. 749-771
ISSN: 1743-9655
In: Local government studies, Band 40, Heft 4, S. 518-532
ISSN: 1743-9388
In: Politica: tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, Band 38, Heft 2, S. 232-234
ISSN: 0105-0710
In: Politica: tidsskrift for politisk videnskab, Band 38, Heft 4, S. 480-482
ISSN: 0105-0710
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 30, Heft 12, S. 2854-2885
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political Science, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 379-379
ISSN: 1741-1416
In: Acta politica: AP ; international journal of political Science, Band 58, Heft 2, S. 359-378
ISSN: 1741-1416
In: Journal of European public policy, Band 30, Heft 12, S. 2786-2806
ISSN: 1466-4429
In: American journal of political science, Band 53, Heft 3, S. 603-620
ISSN: 1540-5907
We explore the impact of institutional design on the distribution of changes in outputs of governmental processes in the United States, Belgium, and Denmark. Using comprehensive indicators of governmental actions over several decades, we show that in each country the level of institutional friction increases as we look at processes further along the policy cycle. Assessing multiple policymaking institutions in each country allows us to control for the nature of the policy inputs, as all the institutions we consider cover the full range of social and political issues in the country. We find that all distributions exhibit high kurtosis values, significantly higher than the Normal distribution which would be expected if changes in government attention and activities were proportionate to changes in social inputs. Further, in each country, those institutions that impose higher decision‐making costs show progressively higher kurtosis values. The results suggest general patterns that we hypothesize to be related to boundedly rational behavior in a complex social environment.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 8, S. 1001-1030
ISSN: 1552-3829
The distribution of attention across issues is of fundamental importance to the political agenda and outputs of government. This article presents an issue-based theory of the diversity of governing agendas where the core functions of government—defense, international affairs, the economy, government operations, and the rule of law—are prioritized ahead of all other issues. It undertakes comparative analysis of issue diversity of the executive agenda of several European countries and the United States over the postwar period. The results offer strong evidence of the limiting effect of core issues—the economy, government operations, defense, and international affairs—on agenda diversity. This suggests not only that some issues receive more attention than others but also that some issues are attended to only at times when the agenda is more diverse. When core functions of government are high on the agenda, executives pursue a less diverse agenda—focusing the majority of their attention on fewer issues. Some issues are more equal than others in executive agenda setting.
In: Comparative political studies: CPS, Band 44, Heft 8, S. 1001-1031
ISSN: 0010-4140
In: Jennings , W , Bevan , S , Timmermans , A , Breeman , G , Brouard , S , Chaqués-Bonafont , L , Green-Pedersen , C , John , P , Mortensen , P B & Palau , A M 2011 , ' Effects of the core functions of government on the diversity of executive agendas ' Comparative Political Studies , vol 44 , no. 8 , pp. 1001-1030 . DOI:10.1177/0010414011405165
The distribution of attention across issues is of fundamental importance to the political agenda and outputs of government. This article presents an issue-based theory of the diversity of governing agendas where the core functions of government-defense, international affairs, the economy, government operations, and the rule of law-are prioritized ahead of all other issues. It undertakes comparative analysis of issue diversity of the executive agenda of several European countries and the United States over the postwar period. The results offer strong evidence of the limiting effect of core issues-the economy, government operations, defense, and international affairs-on agenda diversity. This suggests not only that some issues receive more attention than others but also that some issues are attended to only at times when the agenda is more diverse. When core functions of government are high on the agenda, executives pursue a less diverse agenda-focusing the majority of their attention on fewer issues. Some issues are more equal than others in executive agenda setting. © The Author(s) 2011.
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We examine regularities and differences in public budgeting in comparative perspective. Budgets quantify collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of decision makers, and the institutions that structure how decisions are made. We first establish that the distribution of budget changes in many Western democracies follows a non-Gaussian distribution, the power function. This implies that budgets are highly incremental, yet occasionally are punctuated by large changes. This pattern holds regardless of the type of political system—parliamentary or presidential—and for level of government. By studying the power function's exponents we find systematic differences for budgetary increases versus decreases (the former are more punctuated) in most systems, and for levels of government (local governments are less punctuated). Finally, we show that differences among countries in the coefficients of the general budget law correspond to differences in formal institutional structures. While the general form of the law is probably dictated by the fundamental operations of human and organizational information processing, differences in the magnitudes of the law's basic parameters are country- and institution-specific.
BASE
We examine regularities and differences in public budgeting in comparative perspective. Budgets quantify collective political decisions made in response to incoming information, the preferences of decision makers, and the institutions that structure how decisions are made. We first establish that the distribution of budget changes in many Western democracies follows a non-Gaussian distribution, the power function. This implies that budgets are highly incremental, yet occasionally are punctuated by large changes. This pattern holds regardless of the type of political system—parliamentary or presidential—and for level of government. By studying the power function's exponents we find systematic differences for budgetary increases versus decreases (the former are more punctuated) in most systems, and for levels of government (local governments are less punctuated). Finally, we show that differences among countries in the coefficients of the general budget law correspond to differences in formal institutional structures. While the general form of the law is probably dictated by the fundamental operations of human and organizational information processing, differences in the magnitudes of the law's basic parameters are country- and institution-specific.
BASE