Krise der Demokratie - Krise der Wissenschaften?
In: Wissenschaft, Bildung, Politik Band 22
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In: Wissenschaft, Bildung, Politik Band 22
In: Wissenschaft - Bildung - Politik Bd. 17
In: Wissenschaft - Bildung - Politik 14
Die Gleichstellung von Mann und Frau in allen gesellschaftlichen Belangen stellt seit vielen Jahren eine Herausforderung für Politik und Gesellschaft dar. Der Österreichischen Forschungsgemeinschaft ist es ein Anliegen, das Genderthema fundiert aus der Perspektive der Wissenschaften zu behandeln. Inhalt: Schiebinger, Londa: Science, Gender and Beyond. An international perspective. - Donald, Athene: Science and gender in Academia - obstacles and interventions. - Hausmann, Markus: Sex oder Gender? Neurobiologie kognitiver Geschlechtsunterschiede. - Spiel, Christiane/Schober, Barbara/Finsterwald, Monika: Brave Mädchen - böse Buben? Genderstereotype in der Bildungssozialisation. - Bornmann, Lutz: Bewertung wissenschaftlicher Leistungen - gender-fair? - Kucsko-Stadlmayer, Gabriele: Kann die "gläserne Decke" mit den Mitteln des Rechts überwunden werden? - Alving, Barbara/Fox Keller, Evelyn/Kratky, Christoph/Sünkel, Hans: Science and Gender 2025: Will Science become Feminine? Beiträge zu einer Podiumsdiskussion. - Hornbostel, Stefan: Erfolg, Einfluss und Macht in der Scientific Community. - Diggelmann, Heidi: Individuelle Wege zu höchster Anerkennung als Wissenschaftlerin. (HoF/Text übernommen)
In: Schriftenreihe des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts zur Analyse Wirtschaftspolitischer Aktivitäten 17
In: Schriftenreihe des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts zur Analyse Wirtschaftspolitischer Aktivitäten 16
In: Schriftenreihe des Ludwig-Boltzmann-Instituts zur Analyse Wirtschaftspolitischer Aktivitäten 14
Lit.
In: Emerging markets, finance and trade: EMFT, Band 52, Heft 7, S. 1562-1573
ISSN: 1558-0938
In: Philosophy of the social sciences: an international journal = Philosophie des sciences sociales, Band 46, Heft 3, S. 219-220
ISSN: 1552-7441
In this paper, we investigate how fiscal policies should look like in a country like Slovenia. Slovenia's present situation is characterized by high and rapidly increasing public debt and low growth. It is an interesting case because it is one of the few small open economies from Central and Eastern Europe that was already in the Euro Area before the "Great Recession". Using the SLOPOL model, an econometric model of the Slovenian economy, we analyse the effects of different fiscal policies in Slovenia over the next couple of years by means of simulations. In particular, we determine optimal fiscal policies for Slovenia over the next few years. Using the OPTCON algorithm, we calculate approximately optimal fiscal policies under different scenarios. We show that an optimal design of fiscal policies depends essentially on the political preferences of Slovenian policy makers. Moreover, the simulations and optimizations reveal the small scope of possible alternative fiscal stabilization policies available due to the relatively low effectiveness of the fiscal instruments with respect to their influence on the business cycle in the Slovenian economy. (author's abstract)
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This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin-Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem.
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The European Monetary Union policy was evaluated using a global macroeconomic model. Results show that the optimal design of monetary and fiscal policies in Europe cannot be derived easily. The optimization experiments in this analysis have shown that the ranking of different institutional setups for European policy making in terms of total welfare is not stable with respect to different types of shocks and different geographical magnitudes of these shocks.
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In this paper, we analyze the reactions of European economies to a fiscal policy strategy aiming at diminishing the public sector. Within the framework of the MSG3 model, a macroeconomic model of the world economy, we perform several simulation experiments to explore the effects of reducing government expenditures permanently in different phases of the business cycle. For this purpose, we combine the fiscal contraction with negative and positive, Euro Area-wide and global, supply and demand shocks. It turns out that adverse Keynesian effects on output and employment tend to be mostly weak and short-lived, whereas long-run effects on output and employment are favorable. Due to these long-run effects, the fiscal contraction policy raises welfare as measured by an asymmetric quadratic objective function. The size of these welfare effects depends on the initial situation in a non-trivial manner.
BASE
The European Monetary Union policy was evaluated using a global macroeconomic model. Results show that the optimal design of monetary and fiscal policies in Europe cannot be derived easily. The optimization experiments in this analysis have shown that the ranking of different institutional setups for European policy making in terms of total welfare is not stable with respect to different types of shocks and different geographical magnitudes of these shocks.
BASE
This paper examines the design of macroeconomic policies after Central and Eastern European countries (CEECs) have joined the EU. We consider scenarios with and without CEECs being members of the European Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) and analyze consequences of different intermediate targets for the European Central Bank. For the fiscal policy variables, we assume that the governments of incumbent and new members either refrain from pursuing active stabilization policies or follow either non-cooperative or cooperative activist fiscal policies. Different scenarios are simulated with the macroeconomic McKibbin-Sachs Model (MSG2 Model), and the resulting welfare orderings are determined. They show that the advantages and disadvantages of different policy arrangements depend strongly on the nature of the shock the economies are faced with. Additional macroeconomic noise resulting from the CEECs' membership of the EMU does not seem to be too much of a problem.
BASE