Suchergebnisse

A strong tradition in democratic theory claims that only constitutions made with direct popular involvement can establish or deepen democracy. Against this view, we argue that new constitutions are likely to enhance liberal democracy when they emerge through a plural agreement among political elites with distinct bases of social support. Power dispersion during constitution writing induces the adoption of institutions that protect opposition forces from the arbitrary use of executive power without unduly impairing majority rule. However, since incumbents may renege on the bargain, the democratizing effect of politically plural constitutional agreements is likely to be larger in the short term, when the identity of negotiating political forces and the balance of power between them tend to remain stable. We find support for these arguments using an original global dataset on the origins of constitutions between 1900 and 2015 and a difference-in-differences design.

AbstractInter-institutional cooperation between the congress and the presidency may be the best way to promote good governance in a regime of separation of powers. In order to evaluate the performance of different political institutions, especially the different frameworks associated with 'presidentialism' and 'parliamentarism', we adopt the criterion that policy outcomes coinciding with the median voter's preference can produce the highest satisfaction or social utility. From this perspective, proportional representation in congress can be very appropriate since it tends to establish a close correspondence between the median party's and the median voter's preferences. Likewise, cooperation – rather than conflict or mutual checks – between the median party in congress and the presidency for both legislative decisions and cabinet formation can favour socially efficient outcomes. A survey of some recent institutional reforms in democratic presidential regimes in Latin America shows that 'parliamentarization' of presidentialism is gaining acceptance, although intermediate formulae may be more conflictual than a global, more coherent institutional reform.

The predominant interpretation of nineteenth century Latin America is
to see the failure of constitutional democracy in the region in terms of the
inability of liberal elites to break with an authoritarian past. Against these views,
we argue that the divorce between liberalism and democracy in Latin America
was the unintended outcome of the institutions created by the liberal elite in
response to the problems of territorial fragmentation and factional conflict that
emerged after the fall of the Spanish empire. Using the cases of Argentina and
Mexico, we support this proposition by focusing on the creation of a centralised
form of government and a system of electoral control by the ruling elites as the
main factors that through time prevented the evolution of the liberal regime into
a competitive democracy.There is no good faith in America, nor among the nations of America. Treaties
are scraps of paper; constitutions, printed matter; elections, battles; freedom,
anarchy; and life, a torment.Simón Bolívar