Despite our efforts to understand the dynamics of the arms race, we know little about the causes of short-term fluctuations in USSR military spending. This article attempts to shed new light on the domestic causes of these fluctuations, with special emphasis on Soviet economic conditions. It is found that annual shifts in military budgets are responsive to the magnitude of the economic burden that defense outlays represent in a given year and to the stage of the five-year planning cycle the Soviet economy happens to be in. With respect to the latter, the military sector fares least well relative to the civilian sector at the beginning and end of the five-year period, but compensates for this toward the middle of the cycle.
In: Bulletin of peace proposals: to motivate research, to inspire future oriented thinking, to promote activities for peace, Band 13, Heft 3, S. 267-269
The purpose here is to consider some significant gaps in the theoretical bases with which we seek to under stand international conflict - either at the level of non-military hostility or at that of actual warfare. The in centives behind both levels of conflictive behavior are examined in terms of discrepancies between achieved and expected levels of attainment (attainment gaps) on relevant needs. Two general conflict-inducing situa tions at the level of non-violent hostility are identified: one where the attainment gap is causally attributable to the target of the hostility and another where such behavior might help narrow the gap even in the absence of external attributability. Although the properties of a nation which, in the second situation, might make it the object of another's hostility are not well understood, some tentative suggestions are advanced to account for this possibility. The differences in the incentives behind warfare and those that lead to simple hostility are considered, with particular attention to the relation between specific sorts of unsatisfied needs and war involvement. It is suggested that both the salience of certain needs and the range of strategies to enhance attainments thereon are factors which link given needs to armed conflict; both, it is argued, are shaped by the nature and structure of the societies within which the needs are experienced. Situations where the bene fits from simple hostility carry over into (or are amplified by) warfare are discussed, as are instances where the contrary occurs. Tentative explanations for these patterns are suggested. Finally, the impact of military capacity on the transition from hostility to warfare is examined, both from the point of view of the balance between potential antagonists and the nature of the actual weaponry involved.
The article deals with certain political and economic consequences of recent American war involvements. It is found that the nation's economy experienced particularly pronounced surges of growth during wartime and certain implications of this fact for both Keynesian and Marxian doctrine are discussed. It is further demonstrated that, contrary to much conven tional wisdom, labor rather than business derived the greatest gains from U.S. military interventions abroad - a finding which, while perhaps counterintuitive, can be explained by the joint exigencies of politics and economics in wartime. Finally, while economic con siderations may not have influenced the decisions to initiate foreign intervention, it is sug gested that they may well have affected the subsequent expansion and duration of military involvement.
The article examines a set of hypothesized determinants of hostile foreign policy stances emanating from the Third World in an attempt to derive simple models accounting for their targeting toward the international system in general and toward the United States in particular, as well as for the ratio of the latter to the former. The first two classes of hostility seem to obey very similar causal mechanisms. Relative deprivation assessed through intertemporal comparisons of one's value positions is found to be a good predictor of hostility as are defense expenditures and, to a lesser extent, domestic instability. The proportion of hostility preferentially directed toward the United States has been less successfully predicted although links of a military-political character would seem to be a more likely determinant than those of a more economic nature.
The gap between academics and practitioners in international relations has widened in recent years, according to the authors of this book. Globalization, ethnic conflict, and ecological threats have created a new set of issues that challenge policymakers, and cutting-edge scholarship can contribute a great deal to the diagnosis and handling of potentially explosive situations
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Die folgenden Links führen aus den jeweiligen lokalen Bibliotheken zum Volltext:
Inhaltsverzeichnis: Economic coercion and foreign policy / Miroslav Nincic and Peter Wallensteen -- On the effects of international economic sanctions: with examples from the case of Rhodesia / Johan Galtung -- Strategies for evading economic sanctions / Jerrold D. Green -- Economic sanctions: ten modern cases and three important lessons / Peter Wallensteen -- Using food power: opportunities, appearances, and damage control / Robert L. Paarlberg -- The vulnerability of modern nations: economic diplomacy in East-West relations / David A. Deese -- The politics of international sanctions: a case study of South Africa / David F. Gordon -- Ideology and the concept of economic security / David J. Sylvan.
In: Political science quarterly: a nonpartisan journal devoted to the study and analysis of government, politics and international affairs ; PSQ, Band 131, Heft 4, S. 717-748