Suchergebnisse

Cover -- Contents -- Preface -- Acknowledgments -- Map -- Ch 1 Introduction -- The Political Economy of North Korea, 1990-2010: A Brief Introduction -- Using Refugee Surveys: Sample Characteristics and Caveats -- Ch 2 Perils of Refugee Life -- Who Are the Refugees? A Demographic Profile -- Leaving North Korea, Coming to China -- Vulnerability -- Psychological Condition of Refugees: Prevalence of Distress -- Modeling Psychological Distress -- Moving On: Experiences in China -- Conclusion -- Ch 3 Marketization, Reform, and Retrenchment -- The Food Economy: Role of the Market in Household Consumption -- The Emerging Market Economy: Household Earnings -- The Political Economy of the 2002 Reforms -- Did Reform Matter? Effects on Market Behavior and Satisfaction -- The Market, Corruption, and the Changing Social Order -- Ch 4 The Penal System and Criminalization of Economic Activity -- Criminalization of Economic Activity -- The North Korean Penal System -- Who Gets Arrested and Imprisoned? -- Nature of Punishment -- Institutionalization of Repression -- Ch 5 Political Attitudes And Nascent Dissent -- Political Attitudes: Perceptions of Regime Performance and Their Determinants -- Aspirations for the Future -- From Attitudes to Behavior: Political Communication -- From Attitudes to Behavior: Everyday Forms of Resistance -- Conclusion -- Ch 6 Conclusion -- Whither North Korea? -- Engaging North Korea -- The Humanitarian and Human Rights Imperative -- Final Thoughts -- Appendix A -- References -- About the Authors -- Index.

Beginning sometime in the early 1990s and extending into 1998, North Korea experienced famine. We estimate that the great North Korean famine killed between six hundred thousand and one million people, between 3 and 5 percent of the entire population of the country. Such events are national traumas that live in the collective memory for generations. Famines produce countless personal tragedies: watching loved ones waste away from hunger and disease; making fateful choices about the distribution of scarce food; migrating to escape the famine's reach; and, all too often, facing the stark reality that these coping strategies are futile. A full understanding of such disasters can only be communicated through their human face: the individual experience of the suffering and humiliation that extreme deprivation brings to its victims. Through refugee accounts, this human face of the North Korean famine is slowly becoming available to us and speaks far more eloquently than we can here

ObjectiveThis article examines determinants of women's participation and performance in the Olympics.MethodsThe authors analyze total and sport‐specific data on female Olympic athletic participation and medaling at the Summer Games between 1960 and 2012, controlling for a number of country‐level socioeconomic variables.ResultsOlympic outcomes are generated by a complex process involving the socioeconomic status of women and, more weakly, societal attitudes. Medal performance is affected by large‐scale boycotts. But the historical record for women's medal achievement is utterly distorted by the doping program in the former East Germany. At its peak, the program was responsible for 17 percent of the medals awarded to women, equivalent to the medal hauls of the Soviet or American team in 1972.ConclusionHeightened success and performance for women at the Olympics is a reflection of environments more conductive to women's general success in education, the labor force, and society.

Since 2010, Myanmar has been in the midst of a multifaceted transition, involving economic reforms, the resolution of multiple long-standing civil conflicts, and a nascent transition to democratic rule. These transitions are coinciding with a resource-led economic boom. The paper assesses the current status of governance institutions, as well as their performance, in comparison to the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) and selected other countries. Specifically, the paper discusses outstanding problem areas related to economic governance, particularly in the legal system, the business regulatory framework, and in bureaucratic capacity as well as the potential use of external policy anchors, particularly in the Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative (EITI) process, to strengthen Myanmar's ongoing reform effort.

Following North Korea's second nuclear test, the U.N. Security Council tightened sanctions. However, North Korea has tilted its relations toward partners uninterested in such measures. Since 2005, it has retreated from economic reform, most obviously in the 2009 confiscatory currency reform. These developments raise doubts about North Korea's interest in engagement.

In 2008, North-South relations worsened, food shortages re-emerged, and the Six Party process yielded an interim agreement. The U.S. dropped North Korea from the terrorism list but nuclear verification issues remained contentious. Kim Jong-il reportedly suffered a stroke in August, casting uncertainty over all aspects of politics and policy.

Northeast Asia is notable for the relative absence of regional institutions. The Six Party Talks could constitute an embryonic starting point for the development of such institutions. The path toward greater institutionalization is likely to begin in a modest fashion. Functional working groups on topics such as the environment, maritime transport, technical barriers to trade, road and rail links, and energy could provide the locus for integrating North Korea into the broader regional and global economies. Foreign ministries will inevitably take the lead in developing the Northeast Asia Peace and Security Mechanism (NEAPSM), but meaningful economic achievements will require the involvement of other ministries. North Korea has proved problematic in this regard thus far. Moreover, given the importance of private-sector involvement in achieving sustainable economic development in North Korea, modalities will have to be developed to integrate private-sector actors when possible. The governments of the region, and particularly China and South Korea, may continue support on a bilateral basis as a hedge against North Korea's collapse or as inducements in the context of the nuclear talks. But the development of more permanent multilateral structures is unlikely until the nuclear issue is resolved. (Pac Rev/GIGA)