Abstract: High-quality democracy requires a truly democratic rule of law that ensures political rights, civil liberties, and mechanisms of accountability which in turn affirm the political equality of all citizens and constrain potential abuses of state power. How may the democratic rule of law ( état de droit, estado democrático de derecho, Rechsstaat ) be conceptualized and, insofar as possible, empirically gauged? By exploring a set of variables within the rule of law we can understand what makes it effective and how it relates to other aspects of the performance of democratic countries. This essay focuses on contemporary Latin America (especially Argentina and Brazil) where national-level democratic regimes often effectively coexist with undemocratic sub-national regimes—so-called "brown areas."
This article focus on the analysis of the mistrust & their institutionalized expressions in the public sphere, beginning with the analysis of the horizontal accountability. The central point in the topic begins with the lack or the extreme weakness of this kind of accountability in great part of the contemporary Latin American democracies. In this aim, in this text there is a discussion about the pertinence of the diverse agencies of balance (control which is produced when some of the great powers -- executive, legislative, judicial, exceed illegally their own jurisdiction) & another assigned agencies (those charged of face up to specific risks of transgression and/or corruption). All of these kind of accountability are relevant to the right working of the democratic regime. References. Adapted from the source document.
This article offers a revision of democratic theory in light of the experience of recently democratized countries, located outside of the northwestern quadrant of the world. First, various definitions of democracy that claim to follow Schumpeter and are usually considered to be "minimalist" or "processualist" are critically examined. Building upon but clarifying these conceptual efforts, a realistic and restricted, but not minimalist, definition of a democratic regime is proposed. Thereafter, this article argues that democracy should be analyzed not only at the level of the political regime but also in relation to the state—especially the state qua legal system—and to certain aspects of the overall social context. The main underlying theme that runs through this article is the concept of agency, especially as it is expressed in the legal system of existing democracies.
It took some gentle prodding from professors Cynthia McClintock and John Harbeson, conveners of this session, to persuade me to participate. The reason for my reluctance may be obvious, considering the composition of this panel. My distinguished colleagues can speak about "them" when referring to the contributions of scholars from the regions on which they specialize. This, I gather, allows them some degree of objectivity when summarizing and assessing the works of their colleagues in the respective regions; instead, when I analyze the contributions of Latin Americans, I analyze "us."
The occasion of honouring the memory of John Brooks, a great friend of Latin America, has helped me vanquish my initial reluctance to tackle a topic that is as broad, varied and still open-ended as the present situation of democracy in South America. As a first measure of my limitations, with the exception of some references to Costa Rica and Mexico, I will not discuss Central America and the Caribbean, not because I feel these regions are unimportant but because, simply, I do not know enough about them. However, when I feel that I am on sufficiently solid ground so as to refer to Latin America as a whole, I will do so.I begin by noting that in contemporary South America some countries satisfy the definition of political democracy. Those countries share two main characteristics. One is that they hold elections under universal adult franchise that, at least at the national level, are reasonably fair and competitive. These are standard criteria in the political science literature. However, having in mind the experience of Latin America and elsewhere in the third world, I believe that we should add that such elections must be institutionalised. By this I mean that all relevant actors expect that elections of this kind will continue being held in the indefinite future so, whether they like or not, it is rational for them to play democracy, not coup-making or insurrection. We should also stipulate that these elections are decisive, in the sense that those who are elected do occupy the respective offices and end their terms in the constitutionally prescribed way; they are not, as it has happened too often in Latin America, prevented from occupying office or thrown out of it because some supra-constitutional power feels that they are the 'wrong people'.The second characteristic is the enjoyment of certain political rights, especially of opinion, expression, association, movement and access to a reasonably free and pluralist media. Of course, these and other rights are important per se; in addition, they are instrumental – necessary conditions – for the effectuation of the kind of elections I have just specified.
El presente ensayo contiene dos argumentos principales: Uno es que el tipo de capital financiero que se ha impuesto en la Argentina no tiene ni puede tener aliados sociales y que, obedeciendo a su propia logica, no puede querer otra cosa que seguir devorando a la sociedad y el estado argentinos. El segundo argumento es que la orientacion politica de este capital va desplegando, cada vez mas claramente, su contenido intrinsecamente autoritario. (Am Lat Mov/DÜI)
