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The literature has pointed out the negative aspects of political dynasties. But can political dynasties help prevent autocratic reversals? We argue that political dynasties differ according to their ideological origin and that those whose founder was a defender of democratic ideals, for simplicity labelled "pro-democratic dynasties", show stronger support for democracy. We analyze the vote by the French parliament on July 10, 1940 of an enabling act that granted full power to Marshall Philippe Pétain, thereby ending the Third French Republic and aligning France with Nazi Germany. Using data collected from the biographies of parliamentarians and information on their voting behavior, we find that members of a pro-democratic dynasty were 9.6 to 15.1 percentage points more likely to oppose the act than other parliamentarians. We report evidence that socialization inside and outside parliament shaped the vote of parliamentarians. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/inPress

AbstractWe trace the long‐term performance of the UK art market across a broad set of crises: world wars, economic recessions, financial crises, inflationary periods, and changes in monetary policy. By means of digitalized historical auction archives, we construct art price indices from the early twentieth century onwards and disclose that annual art auction value grew, in real terms, more than seven‐fold over this period. The arithmetic annual real return and risk amount to 3.6 per cent and 20.1 per cent, respectively. Art returns plummeted at the onset of wars, but turned positive in the second half of wars when they outperformed stocks, suggesting that art was seen as a safe haven in times of political turmoil. During wars, smaller – and thus more transportable – paintings obtained higher returns. Art returns are sensitive to economic and financial crises, with the largest slumps occurring during the Great Depression, oil crisis, recessions of the early 1980s and early 1990s, and the Great Recession. We also document changes in art preferences for paintings' sizes, schools, liquid art, and artists' nationalities across crises. Art enters a broad optimal asset portfolio both in non‐crisis periods and during war times.

Abstract
This article introduces the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 to the odious debt and sovereign debt literatures. We argue that the legal doctrine of odious debt is surprisingly and perhaps indefensibly narrow, possibly because of historical contingency rather than any underlying logic or principle. The story of the Haitian Independence Debt of 1825 serves as an illustrative case study. In the context of telling that story, we provide estimates of the evolution of Haiti's external debt-to-GDP ratio over 1825–2020, and discuss the implications of the independence debt for the economy of Haiti. We conclude by discussing the implications of Haiti's Independence Debt for the doctrine of odious debt and the possibilities for Haiti to recover compensation.

Following Waterloo, managing French public finances represented a daunting task. Defeated France had lost a substantial part of its population and territory. The country was partially occupied and France was to pay huge amounts as reparations to the victors. Furthermore, France's reputation had been tarnished by several defaults on its debt in the preceding decades. Despite all these elements, in the ten years between 1815 and 1825, not only did France manage to place a huge amount of debt on the market (resulting in a threefold increase) but it did so with a spread, compared to the British consol, falling from more than 400 basis points to a meagre 100 basis point. Based on an econometric analysis of the yields of the French rentes, we show that the military threat of the Allied coupled to a significant improvement in French institutions explain the dramatic decrease in yields. ; info:eu-repo/semantics/published

Following Waterloo, managing French public finances represented a daunting task. Defeated France had lost a substantial part of its population and territory. The country was partially occupied and France was to pay huge amounts as reparations to the victors. Furthermore, France's reputation had been tarnished by several defaults on its debt in the preceding decades. Despite all these elements, in the ten years between 1815 and 1825, not only did France manage to place a huge amount of debt on the market (resulting in a threefold increase) but it did so with a spread, compared to the British consol, falling from more than 400 basis points to a meagre 100 basis point. Based on an econometric analysis of the yields of the French rentes, we show that the military threat of the Allied coupled to a significant improvement in French institutions explain the dramatic decrease in yields.

AbstractBecause of the scarcity of data, there are few quantitative analyses dealing with clandestine markets, despite their prime importance during wartime. This article exploits a unique database of daily prices of gold coins traded in occupied Paris in order to gain insights into the price formation on such a market. First, using data from Switzerland, we show that arbitrage took place, despite the costs and risks involved, and led to a gradual (but incomplete) convergence of gold prices. Furthermore, a study of price seasonality reveals that less strict borders controls during the weekends made the volatility of returns higher at the start of the following week. Second, on the basis of an event study, we provide evidence that laws related to black markets did not have a significant impact on the gold price, except for the most severe law passed on 8 June 1943 which greatly increased the sentences for involvement. Finally, we assess whether the so‐called coin premiums existed on this clandestine market, and show that the large price variations for one gram of fine gold contained in different coins were due to market participants' preferences for specific gold coins.