Suchergebnisse

Why do democracies survive or break down? In this paper, it returns to this classic question with an empirical focus on Latin America from 1945 to 2005. The argument deviates from the quantitative literature and a good part of the qualitative literature on democratic survival and breakdown. It is argued that structural variables such as the level of development and inequalities have not shaped prospects for democratic survival in Latin America. Nor, contrary to findings in some of the literature, has economic performance affected the survival of competitive regimes. Instead, it is focused on the regional political environment and on actors' normative preferences about democracy and dictatorship and their policy radicalism or moderation. It is argued that 1) a higher level of development did not increase the likelihood of democratic survival in Latin America over this long time; 2) if actors have a normative preference for democracy, it is more likely to survive; and 3) policy moderation facilitates democratic survival. ; ¿Por qué las democracias sobreviven o se quiebran? En este trabajo retomamos esta clásica pregunta haciendo foco en América Latina entre 1945 y 2005. Nuestro argumento difiere de los resultados de los estudios cuantitativos y de buena parte de los análisis cualitativos sobre supervivencia y quiebra de los regímenes democráticos. Sostenemos que las variables estructurales como el grado de desarrollo y de desigualdad no han tenido mayor impacto en la supervivencia de la democracia en América Latina. De la misma manera, el desempeño de la economía tampoco ha tenido una incidencia importante en la supervivencia de los regímenes competitivos, contrariamente a lo que afirma una parte de la literatura sobre el tema. En cambio, nos centramos en el entorno político regional y en las preferencias normativas de los actores sobre la democracia y la dictadura, y en su moderación o radicalismo político. Se sostiene que: 1) un mayor nivel de desarrollo económico no aumentó la probabilidad de supervivencia democrática en América Latina durante el período analizado; 2) si los actores tienen una preferencia normativa a favor de la democracia, es más probable que sobreviva; y 3) la moderación política contribuye a la supervivencia de la democracia. ; Pourquoi les démocraties survivent-elles et ne s'effondrent-elles pas ? Dans ce travail de recherche il s'agit de reprendre cette question typique en se concentrant sur l'Amérique latine entre 1945 et 2005. Notre argument diffère des résultats des études quantitatives et d'une bonne partie des analyses qualitatives sur la survie et l'effondrement des régimes démocratiques. Nous soutenons que les variables structurelles comme le degré de développement et d'inégalité n'ont pas eu d'impacts importants dans la survie de la démocratie en Amérique latine. De la même manière, le rôle de l'économie n'a pas non plus eu une influence importante sur la survie des régimes compétitifs contrairement à ce qu'affirme une partie de la littérature sur le sujet. Cependant, nous nous sommes concentrés sur l'environnement politique régional et sur les préférences normatives des acteurs sur la démocratie et la dictature ainsi que sur sa modération ou son radicalisme politique. On soutient que : un niveau plus important de développement économique n'augmente pas la probabilité de survie démocratique en Amérique latine pendant la période analysée (1) ; si les acteurs ont une préférence normative en faveur de la démocratie, il est plus probable qu'elle survive (2) ; la modération politique contribue à la survie de la démocratie (3).

Legal scholars frequently advocate institutional reforms to modernize the judiciary and promote judicial independence. However, constitutional reforms also offer an opportunity for politicians to reshuffle the high courts. The negative consequences of constitutional change for judicial stability are explored using an original database of Supreme Court and Constitutional Tribunal members in eighteen Latin American countries between 1904 and 2010. Because unobserved factors potentially explain constitutional replacement as well as judicial turnover, a two-stage event-history model has been employed. The analysis integrates two literatures, studies of constitution-making and studies of judicial politics. The results show that constitutional change is a significant cause of judicial instability and court manipulation, even after potential endogeneity has been taken into account.

This article systematically assesses whether open political competition ends the coup trap. We use an original data set of coup reports, electoral competition, and socioeconomic data spanning the 20th century in 18 Latin American countries. Our models, which are robust to multiple-comparison tests, generate support for a central claim: While recent experience with military coups increases the risk of incumbents being overthrown, the establishment of open political competition ends cycles of political instability. The risk of being overthrown consequently declines with time for presidents in noncompetitive systems, but remains stable—and, on average, substantially lower—in competitive polities. Coups do not vary with levels of development or of inequality, economic growth rates, or the legislative powers of the presidency.

Abstract:
Why do democracies survive or break down? In this paper, we return to this classic question with an empirical focus on Latin America from 1945 to 2005. Our argument deviates from the quantitative literature and a good part of the qualitative literature on democratic survival and breakdown. We argue that structural variables such as the level of development and inequalities have not shaped prospects for democratic survival in Latin America. Nor, contrary to findings in some of the literature, has economic performance affected the survival of competitive regimes. Instead, we focus on the regional political environment and on actors' normative preferences about democracy and dictatorship and their policy radicalism or moderation. We argue that 1) a higher level of development did not increase the likelihood of democratic survival in Latin America over this long time; 2) if actors have a normative preference for democracy, it is more likely to survive; and 3) policy moderation facilitates democratic survival.

In this paper, we analyze the relationship between modernization and democracy for one region of the world, Latin America from 1945 to 1996, on the basis of quantitative data. We make three arguments. First, we show that the level of development had a modest impact on the likelihood of democracy in Latin America for the 1945-1996 period. Democracy in Latin America has survived in the face of a low level of development, and it has faltered des pite moderately high per capita income. Second, we show that per capita income is a markedly worse predictor of democracy in Latin America than in the entire world or in other countries in the same income range. To account for this pattern we identify a distinctive, non-linear functional shape for this relationship in Latin America. Third, we address some potential explanations for this Latin American exceptionalism. No existing structural explanation suffices; this issue merits further exploration in future research. ; En este artículo analizamos la relación que existe entre el grado de modernización y la democracia en una región concreta del mundo, América Latina entre 1945 y 1996, apoyándonos en datos cuantitativos. Los argumentos que defendemos son tres. En primer lugar, mostramos cómo el nivel de desarrollo ha tenido una influencia relativamente débil en la probabilidad de que surgieran regímenes democráticos en América Latina durante el período 1945-1996. La democracia en América Latina ha sobrevivido en un contexto de escaso desarrollo pero también ha colapsado a pesar de unos niveles de renta per cápita relativamente altos. En segundo lugar, demostramos que, en América Latina, la renta per cápita permite predecir la democracia en menor medida que en el resto del mundo e incluso que en otros países con niveles de renta similares. Para entender las peculiaridades de esta relación en América Latina identificamos una función no lineal cuya forma se ajusta específicamente a esta región. En tercer lugar, consideramos una serie de posibles explicaciones a este excepcionalismo latinoamericano. Ninguna de las explicaciones estructurales ofrecidas hasta el momento resulta satisfactoria por lo que creemos que este tema merece ser estudiado en mayor profundidad en futuras investigaciones.

In this article, the relationship between modernization and democracy in Latin America from 1945 to 1996 is analyzed on the basis of quantitative data. Three arguments are made. First, it is shown that the level of development had a modest impact on the likelihood of democracy in Latin America from 1945 to 1996. Democracy in Latin America has survived in the face of a low level of development, and it has faltered despite moderately high per capita income. Second, it is shown that per capita income is a markedly worse predictor of democracy in Latin America than in other countries with the same income range or in the world as a whole. A distinctive, nonlinear, functional shape is identified for this relationship in Latin America. Third, some potential explanations for this Latin American exceptionalism are addressed. No existing structural explanation suffices, however; this issue merits further exploration in future research.