Suchergebnisse

The American and Chinese trade wars of 2018 risk undermining not only the law of the World Trade OrganiZaton (WTO), as explained in Part I but also the democratic mandates given bpariaments when thep approved the 1994 WTO Agreement. Illegal import tanffs (e.g., as imposed by US President Donald Trump) and the collective undermining of the WTO dispute settlement spstem run counter to the WTO princples that are incorporated into the trade laws in the United States of America (USA/ US), dealt gith in Part II, and in the European Union (EU), detailed in Part III. Multilevel governance of global pubc goods (PGs)-ke the WTO trading spstem, which has helped left bildons of people out of povery b promoting unprecedented economic welfare, transnational rule of law and compulsory third-party dispute settlements-cannot remain effective j citiZens and democratic institutions fail to hold their governments democratically and legaly accountable for violating 'PGs treaties' (Part IV). This contribution uses the example of the USA and the EU to argue that constitutional democradesincluding Asian democrades kke India, Korea and Japan-must adopt more speajic trade legislations to protect the WTO legal system. Multilevel governance of transnational PGs requires empowering citiZens, paraments and courts ofjustice to limit popukst abuses of trade podgypowers to tax and restrict atzens in man Jestly illegal ways that reduce general consumer welfare, non-discriminatory competition and rule of law.

The American and Chinese trade wars of 2018 risk undermining not only the law of the World Trade Organization (WTO, section I). As tariffs tax and restrict domestic citizens and redistribute their income, illegal import tariffs (e.g. as imposed by US President Trump) - and the collective undermining of the WTO Appellate Body and dispute settlement system - also run counter to the democratic mandates given by parliaments when they approved the 1994 WTO Agreement and incorporated it into domestic legal systems, as illustrated by trade laws and policies in the USA (section II) and in the European Union (EU, section III). Multilevel governance of global public goods (PGs) - like the WTO trading system, which has helped to lift billions of people out of poverty by promoting unprecedented economic welfare, transnational rule of law and compulsory third-party dispute settlements - cannot remain effective if citizens and democratic institutions fail to hold their governments democratically and legally accountable for violating 'PGs treaties' (section IV). This contribution uses the example of the USA and the EU for arguing that constitutional democracies - including Asian democracies like India, Korea and Japan - must adopt more specific trade legislation protecting the WTO legal system. Multilevel governance of transnational PGs requires empowering citizens, parliaments and courts of justice to limit populist abuses of trade policy powers to tax and restrict citizens in manifestly illegal ways reducing general consumer welfare, non-discriminatory competition and rule of law.

This contribution suggests a 'republican interpretation' of EU citizenship rights based on the following three propositions: First, the more globalization transforms national into transnational public goods (PGs), the more democratic and republican constitutionalism require designing and implementing transnational 'PGs treaties' as 'democratic law' empowering citizens to invoke and enforce precise and unconditional, multilevel market regulations and protection of PGs vis-à-vis multilevel governance institutions. Second, as EU law (e.g. Articles 2, 9-12 TEU) requires EU institutions and member states to protect constitutional, representative, participatory and deliberative democracy and limits all internal and external EU powers by fundamental rights and protection of PGs (res publica), EU citizens rightly challenge EU trade, investment and other treaties that privilege interest groups and undermine the 'constitutional contract' of citizens as codified in the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (EUCFR). Third, just as common market and competition law inside and beyond the EU protects citizen-driven 'network governance' and rights-based 'vigilance' of EU citizens embedded into comprehensive protection of fundamental rights and a 'social market economy' (Article 3 TEU), EU institutions should respond to the legitimacy- and rule-of-law-crises in other areas of EU governance by 're-connecting' EU law with EU citizens as 'democratic principals' of multilevel governance agents. 'Anti-citizen clauses' in EU free trade agreements (FTAs) with non-European countries (like Article 30.6 CETA) and discriminatory 'arbitration privileges' for foreign investors illustrate 'authoritarian dis-connect' of EU bureaucrats from EU citizens; they risk undermining rule of law, constitutional democracy, and the 'social market economy' inside the EU.

The 'constitutional failures' ushering in World Wars I and II and the emergence of post-war 'multilevel constitutionalism' in Europe suggest that also UN/WTO law can effectively protect international public goods only if UN/WTO law are interpreted and protected for the benefit of citizens in conformity with the human rights and other 'principles of justice' recognized by all UN member states. This paper discusses recent publications by Philip Allott on 'international constitutionalism' and argues that the necessary transformation of the prevailing conceptions of 'international law among sovereign states' into a 'multilevel constitutional law of humanity' requires extending 'multilevel constitutionalism' to UN/WTO governance of public goods with due respect for 'constitutional pluralism' protecting individual and democratic diversity, subsidiarity and 'institutional experimentation'.

The universal recognition of human rights promotes international 'cosmopolitan law' protecting rights and judicial remedies of citizens in ever more fields of international regulation. Yet, even though free trade agreements (FTAs) protecting rights and remedies of citizens have been uniquely successful in European integration, the European Union (EU)'s 'cosmopolitan foreign policy mandate' is increasingly disregarded in FTA negotiations with non-European countries. The EU's transatlantic FTAs risk undermining fundamental rights and judicial remedies inside the EU. Citizens rightly challenge the interest group politics in designing transatlantic FTAs and the EU's neglect for participatory and deliberative democracy in EU trade policies on regulating international markets.