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Public criticism of the superpowers came to be a prominent feature of Sweden's 'active neutrality' by the late 1960s. This article analyzes the Soviet reactions to Swedish criticism (a) of the Soviet invasion of Czechoslovakia in 1968, and (b) of the US intervention in Vietnam, 1967-75. Soviet responses to Sweden's explicit and harsh condemnation of the invasion of Czechoslovakia were delayed and muted due to the ongoing Swedish election campaign. Yet the 1968 experience appears to have had an indirect impact on the Soviet view of Swedish criticism of US warfare in Vietnam. After 1968 Soviet commentaries on Sweden's Vietnam posture were restrained and ambiguous. A number of conceivable explanations are discussed. First, there were components of the Swedish criticism which were likely to arouse suspicions among Soviet leaders, based on their traditional view of Sweden. Second, the domestic politics behind Sweden's external behavior on the Vietnam issue apparently caused concern in Moscow. And finally, Soviet attitudes to the Vietnam War itself were ambiguous. In conclusion, similarities and differences between Soviet and US reactions to Sweden's public criticism of the superpowers are noted.

"Using the Russian president's major public addresses as the main source, Bo Petersson analyzes the legitimization strategies employed during Vladimir Putin's third and fourth terms in office. The argument is that these strategies have rested on Putin's highly personalized blend of strongman-image projection and presentation as the embodiment of Russia's great power myth. Putin appears as the only credible guarantor against renewed weakness, political chaos, and interference from abroad--in particular from the US. After a first deep crisis of legitimacy manifested itself by the massive protests in 2011-2012, the annexation of Crimea led to a lengthy boost in Putin's popularity figures. The book discusses how the Crimea effect is, by 2021, trailing off and Putin's charismatic authority is increasingly questioned by opposition from Alexei Navalny, the effects of unpopular reforms, and poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, Russia is bound to head for a succession crisis as the legitimacy of the political system continues to be built on Putin's projected personal characteristics and--now apparently waning--charisma, and since no potential heir apparent has been allowed on center stage. The constitutional reform of summer 2020 made it possible in theory for Putin to continue as president until 2036. Yet, this change did not address the Russian political system's fundamental future leadership dilemma."--

This chapter focuses on the final stage of the history of the Soviet Union, from 1985 to 1991, when the last Communist Party and Soviet state leader Mikhail Gorbachev tried to reform his country by making economic life more effective, widen the scope of political participation, open up history and culture for debate, and introduce a new, peaceful thinking in international affairs. Gorbachev wanted to save the Soviet system but ended up destroying it. His initially successful strategy of taking a middle-of-the road position to gain support worked well during the first years of reform, but the mid-position became successively narrower until it finally dissolved. Gorbachev's increasingly desperate attempts to negotiate a new and revised union treaty led in 1991 to the failed August coup which, in turn, dealt the final death blow to the Soviet Union. By way of conclusion, political mistakes are often difficult to distinguish from failures caused by structural problems. As is illustrated by the case of Gorbachev and the Soviet Union, this is particularly salient in societies in which statist power and cultural patterns have traditionally played decisive roles in historical developments.

In their chapter, "Ukraine and the Disenchantment of Europe", Bo Petersson and Cecilie Stokholm Banke take up the current and acute situation between the EU, Russia and Ukraine, asking if Russia with its behavior and attitude towards Europe indeed will come to act as the 'other' and eventually give the EU new momentum as a project. By analyzing the way the Crimean crisis from early on was framed with historical references both by Western commentators, politicians and historians , but indeed also by Vladimir Putin, the authors show how present the past is in this crisis. Russia's annexation of Crimea and its heavy-handed de facto involvement in the civil war in eastern Ukraine has severely challenged the European normative order as defined by the EU tenets of democracy, human rights and respect for national sovereignty. It shows how Russia aspires to define its own norms and implement them on behalf of Europe. This has led to the deepest political crisis between Russia, on the one hand, and the United States and the EU, on the other, since the Cold War.As recently argued by the American historian Timothy Snyder, the Russian government designated in 2013 for the first time the European Union as an adversary: "In its media and indeed in official foreign policy pronouncements it has characterized the European Union as 'decadent', in the sense of being about to disintegrate"(Snyder 2014). This reflects the traditional Russian disdain for weakness and points towards a Russian allegation that the EU is a mere illusion only reflecting the policies and preferences of the United States. It may well be, argue Petersson and Stokholm Banke, that the weakness of the European Union as perceived by the Russian government can come to serve as a future raison d'etre for the EU, providing the Union with new vitality and strength of appeal.

The 2014 Winter Olympic Games in Sochi, Russia, were during the preparations and run-up phase intensely followed by the global community and were generally associated with a vast array of problems: political, democratic, economic, ecological and securityrelated. When the hosting of a mega-event such as the Olympic Games has been awarded to a site in an authoritarian state, the global community has moral responsibilities to live up to. There is a need and an obligation to raise one's voice and criticize where criticism is due also after the Games are concluded. For Sochi, as for sites of all major sports events, continued critical attention is therefore warranted also after the competitions. It is essential to try to gauge the extent to which predicted problems materialized, what happened afterwards, and what have been the more long-term consequences and local effects. This is the general perspective that brought the authors of this special issue together.

Using the Russian president's major public addresses as the main source, Bo Petersson analyzes the legitimization strategies employed during Vladimir Putin's third and fourth terms in office. The argument is that these strategies have rested on Putin's highly personalized blend of strongman-image projection and presentation as the embodiment of Russia's great power myth. Putin appears as the only credible guarantor against renewed weakness, political chaos, and interference from abroad—in particular from the US. After a first deep crisis of legitimacy manifested itself by the massive protests in 2011–2012, the annexation of Crimea led to a lengthy boost in Putin's popularity figures. The book discusses how the Crimea effect is, by 2021, trailing off and Putin's charismatic authority is increasingly questioned by opposition from Alexei Navalny, the effects of unpopular reforms, and poor handling of the COVID-19 pandemic. Moreover, Russia is bound to head for a succession crisis as the legitimacy of the political system continues to be built on Putin's projected personal characteristics and—now apparently waning—charisma, and since no potential heir apparent has been allowed on center stage. The constitutional reform of summer 2020 made it possible in theory for Putin to continue as president until 2036. Yet, this change did not address the Russian political system's fundamental future leadership dilemma.