Suchergebnisse

This paper presents a conceptual framework for developing more effective approaches to tax reform and compliance. The framework proposes that by combining complementary investments in enforcement, facilitation, and trust, reformers can not only strengthen enforced compliance but can also (a) encourage quasi-voluntary compliance, (b) generate sustainable political support for reform, and (c) create conditions that are more conducive to the construction of stronger fiscal contracts. A key challenge for governments lies in finding the right combination of these three measures -- enforcement, facilitation, and trust—to achieve revenue and broader development goals. The framework proposes greater reliance on locally grounded binding constraints analysis, coupled with careful attention to understanding politics and the drivers of trust in particular contexts, to guide analysis of how best different investments may be combined, prioritized, or sequenced. This framework can help policy makers to think about the right combination of strategies in specific contexts, and thus to allocate resources most effectively.

1.Why does tax matter? --2.A new tax era in Africa? --3.Is Africa the victim of global forces? --4.What can Africa do in the face of international tax challenges? --5.Extractives and extraction: taxing oil, gas and minerals --6.Taxing at national level: rising to the challenge? --7.Small taxes and large burdens: informal and subnational revenues --8.Does taxation lead to improved governance? --9.The way forward.

ABSTRACTIs the analysis of patron–client networks still important to the understanding of developing country politics or has it now been overtaken by a focus on 'social capital'? Drawing on seventeen country studies of the political environment for livestock policy in poor countries, this article concludes that although the nature of patronage has changed significantly, it remains highly relevant to the ways peasant interests are treated. Peasant populations were found either to have no clear connection to their political leaders or to be controlled by political clientage. Furthermore, communities 'free' of patron–client ties to the centre generally are not better represented by political associations but instead receive fewer benefits from the state. Nonetheless, patterns of clientage are different from what they were forty years ago. First, patronage chains today often have a global reach, through trade, bilateral donor governments and international NGOs. Second, the resources that fuel political clientage today are less monopolistic and less adequate to the task of purchasing peasant political loyalty. Thus the bonds of patronage are less tight than they were historically. Third, it follows from the preceding point and the greater diversity of patrons operating today that elite conflicts are much more likely to create spaces in which peasant interests can eventually be aggregated into autonomous associations with independent political significance in the national polity. NGOs are playing an important role in opening up this political space although at the moment, they most often act like a new type of patron.