Suchergebnisse

In an earlier article in these pages I examined the origins of the price-control legislation of the Jacobin phase of the French Revolution, suggesting that it ought, most properly, to be regarded not as a revolutionary innovation, but rather as the re-emergence in a new environment of an old and well-established tradition of popular action to fix fair market prices, and thus maintain living standards, by riot and demonstration. At the same time, and in passing, I indicated briefly that a similar tradition existed in 18th-century England, if anything more strongly marked and more widespread than in France itself. The present article will be concerned with a discussion of the significance of this English tradition.

The "war communism" of the Jacobins, mobilizing all economic forces for the defence of the Republic, has many features which seem to anticipate later regimes more self-consciously and more consistently socialist. At the same time it appears in some respects as a partial return to the étatisme of the Ancien Régime in reaction against the liberalism of 1789. Particularly is this true of the adoption, in 1793, of a system of price control for essential commodities.

The political support of citizens of new democracies reflects two sets of experiences. Initially, people are socialized into an undemocratic regime; then, they must re-learn political support in relation to a new regime. In an established democracy, it is difficult to disentangle the effect of early socialization and current performance because both refer to the same regime. However, this is both possible and necessary in countries where there has been a change in regime. Critical questions then arise: When, whether and how do citizens determine their support for their new regime? At the start of a new regime past socialization should be more important but, after a few years, current performance should become more important. We draw on 47 Barometer surveys between 1991 and 1998 in ten more or less democratic post-communist regimes of Central and Eastern Europe and the former Soviet Union to test the relative importance of early socialization influences, the legacy of the communist past, and the political and economic performance of new regimes. We find that economic and political performance explains the most variance in support and, secondarily, the communist legacy. Early socialization is insignificant. However, contrary to economic theories of voting, the impact of political performance is greater than the impact of economic performance in post-communist countries - and its impact is increasing. (European Journal of Political Research / FUB)

To understand the impact of reunification upon Germans, we must make before and after comparisons across time, and also across Central Europe. The first section shows that from the perspective of comparative Communist regimes, East Germans have been doubly advantaged, in former times because of belonging to a relatively prosperous part of the Soviet bloc and since reunification as subjects of a 'ready-made state' with democracy and a wealthy social market economy. Analysis in the second section of the impact of reunification on West Germans shows that a significant proportion feel less satisfied than before, whereas the opposite is the case for East Germans. The third section introduces comparisons with Austria. Like the Federal Republic, it has enjoyed the advantages of democracy and a market economy, but without the trauma of division and reunification. (German Politics / FUB)

Im Idealfall ist ein demokratisches System repräsentativ und verfügt über effektive Führer. In postkommunistischen Systemen bleibt jedoch offen, ob sich Führung und Repräsentation gegenseitig ergänzen oder miteinander in Konflikt stehen. Auf der Basis von Umfragedaten des "New Democracies Barometer" analysieren die Verfasser die Einstellungen zu parlamentarischer Repräsentation und starker Führung in neun Staaten Mittel- und Osteuropas. Dabei wird zwischen "Repräsentationsdemokraten" und "Führungsdemokraten" auf der einen Seite und autoritären Wertorientierungen auf der anderen Seite unterschieden. Eine Diskriminanzanalyse zeigt, daß die politischen Einstellungen zu Demokratie und Marktwirtschaft, zu Recht und Ordnung sowie zu wirtschaftlicher Sicherheit für die Einstellung zu politischer Führung prägend sind. Darüberhinaus variieren Einstellungen zu politischer Führung bei unterschiedlicher Nationalität: eine Tradition repressiver Herrschaft führt eher zur Ablehnung starker Führung und zur Befürwortung von Repräsentation. (BIOst-Wpt)

HOW HAVE GERMANS, EAST AND WEST, RESPONDED TO DRAMATIC CHANGES IN THEIR POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC REGIMES RESULTING FROM RE-UNIFICATION? SINCE EVERY GERMANY HAS LIVED UNDER AT LEAST TWO REGIMES, EVALUATIONS OF THE PRESENT ARE MADE IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE OF THEIR PREVIOUS REGIME, THE PRE-UNIFICATION FEDERAL REPUBLIC OR THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC. THIS ARTICLE ANALYZES THE 1993 GERMANY RE-UNIFICATION SURVEY TO TEST THE EXTENT TO WHICH GERMANS HAVE SHOWN A COMMON RESPONSE, AS IMPLIED BY THEORIES OF PAN-GERMAN CULTURE OR, IN THE CASE OF THE GDR, THAT SOVIETIZATION MATTERS. IN BOTH PARTS OF GERMANY, PEOPLE ARE DIVIDED. IT THEN TESTS THREE COMPETING HYPOTHESES ABOUT THE CAUSES OF DIFFERING EVALUATIONS OF REGIME CHANGE. AT FIRST GLANCE, ECONOMIC COSTS AND BENEFITS APPEAR MOST IMPORTANT. BUT A CAUSAL MODEL SHOWS THAT CONTEXT - EVALUATING REGIMES IN THE LIGHT OF EXPERIENCE OF THE GDR OR THE FEDERAL REPUBLIC - IS MOST IMPORTANT, INDIRECTLY AND DIRECTLY. A FOLLOW UP SURVEY SHOWS THAT POSITIVE RESPONSES ARE INCREASING IN BOTH PARTS OF GERMANY.

The (Winston Churchill) hypothesis that democracy, though far from ideal, is preferable to other forms of government is tested via factor analysis of the 1994 New Democracies Barometer (interview) Survey of nine postcommunist countries of Central & Eastern Europe (total N = 9,079). Data show that democracy is supported by 50+% of Ss, but support for authoritarianism was also high. Five factors posited to account for this are examined: political legacy of the past, economic attitudes, social structure differences, national culture, & tradition. Since these countries have never experienced democracy, results show hypothetical preferences of the populations surveyed & are thus more a test of past legacy than of the potential success of democracy. 2 Tables, 2 Figures, 1 Appendix, 68 References. Adapted from the source document.

The first object of this paper is to determine whether in post-Communist states of Central and Eastern Europe there is a cross-class consensus in favour of the collective state provision of welfare; an egoistic consensus favouring individual responsibility; or dissensus. Factor analysis of data from the New Democracies Barometer, a multinational survey in nine countries - the Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Hungary, Poland, Bulgaria, Romania, Belarus and the Ukraine - produces a scale of attitudes toward state or individual provision of welfare. It shows dissensus in each country. Three alternative causes for dissensus - socio-economic differences, political values and national contexts - are tested with multivariate statistical analysis. Socio-economic differences are by far the most important cause of disagreement about welfare. Political values have little independent influence upon attitudes to welfare, and national differences are only marginally important. The results raise the possibility that there may be convergence on welfare values between East and West European countries through similar patterns of within-nation dissensus. (European Journal of Political Research / AuD)