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Much of Mancur Olson's work explored the link between government structure and economic development. This paper provides a framework for thinking about this link that exposes both the powerful insights and the deep tensions in Olson's work. In The Rise and Decline of Nations Olson argued that instability was good for democratic accountability because it upset entrenched interests. In contrast, after the fall of the socialist regimes in Europe and the Soviet Union, Olson argued that the stability of a single autocrat or "stationary bandit" was superior to the competitive rent seeking of competing "roving bandits." I argue that there is a real inconsistency in Olson's thinking on the role of stability and change in political life; I do this by developing the connections between Olson's classic Logic of Collective Action and his subsequent writing. The paper concludes by building on Olson's insights to point the way to a more complete analysis of democracy and transition.

A comment on Robin Theobald's essay, 'Can the State Deliver?,' maintains that his assessment is too pessimistic. Theobald correctly claims that neoliberalism is an oversimplified response to government failures & his concern that too much attention is being placed on corruption & not enough on the alleviation of poverty is realistic. However, he fails to address whether attempts to improve government can succeed without a massive global effort to reduce poverty. The neoliberal argument that corruption can be combated by reducing the size of the state disregards the many benefits of public services to citizens. Theobald is right to argue that anti-corruption policies should be part of state functioning & state-society relations but the question of which policies are more effective under what conditions remains unanswered. It is contended that simplicity is needed in addition to standardization & stability. In addition, there are various ways poor countries can combat corruption & enhance the delivery of services without having to wait for a transformation in the global distribution of resources. J. Lindroth

Conditions that render political corruption detrimental to governmental efficiency & legitimacy are examined. An overview of research illustrates that the magnitude of corruption's harmful effects remains uncertain. Cases of low-level corruption (eg, granting licenses to unqualified individuals) highlight the different efficiency costs of corrupt behavior; it is asserted that corrupt acts whose only cost is illegality should be legalized. Frank Flatters & W. Bentley MacLeod's (1995) contention that the public should tolerate corrupt acts involving tax collection is questioned. Additional attention is dedicated to determining the costs of high-level corruption (eg, accepting bribes before granting major contracts) & to investigating whether high-level corruption engenders capital flight. Two reasons for not tolerating bribes designed to overcome inefficient laws & overwhelming taxes are presented (eg, companies may subsequently make payoffs to overcome necessary laws & taxes). 40 References. J. W. Parker